

T.C.
HASAN KALYONCU ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
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İNGİLİZCE TEZLİ YÜKSEK LİSANS PROGRAMI

**MULTIPLYING EFFECT OF ENERGY RESOURCES: CURTAILING THE LONG-
LASTING CONFRONTATION OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL STATE**

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HAZIRLAYAN
ÜMİT ÇAĞLAYAN ARSLAN

GAZİANTEP – 2021

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TEZ ETİK VE BİLDİRİM SAYFASI

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Ümit Çađlayan ARSLAN

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ABSTRACT

Standing as historically conflicting actors within the scope of safety and security concerns, the two major actors of the Eastern Mediterranean, Egypt and Israel State have taken grand steps and advanced from fierce hostility to regional collaboration in a relatively short period of time in accordance with the necessities of modern and trending norm that is the Globalization within the scope of free-market capitalism and thusly set a good example to the non-negligible effects of pragmatic measures including the cooperation on the basis of natural resources and energy causing direct alterations in interactions on international level.

In accordance with the example in the region in regard to the historically advancing relations between Egypt and Israel State, the aim of this study is to analyze the potential contribution of Neorealist motives to the very probable and substantial regional peace or conflict which would, followingly, set a basis for the probability of international peace or inclined tensions within the scope of natural resources and energy while indirectly fortifying the national incentives of safety and security, national interests and survival; proving, once more, that the exigence of elements required for the continuation of states overcome the constructed elements as well as fundamental ideals.

Keywords: International Cooperation, Energy and Natural Resources, Egypt – Israel Relations, Sustainable Collaboration, Safety and Security.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

Egypt and Israel are two major actors in the Eastern Mediterranean. Despite the expected, it is witnessed that these two countries have been, primarily unofficially and concordantly, officially liaising for benefitting from the energy resources in the region.

The aforementioned relation carries vital importance as, through the depictions of Constructivist norms and identity politics, these two countries can be defined as autogenous competitors; however, in a globalizing environment that is based on the free-market capitalism which refers to a perpetual rivalry, and Realist anarchy that underlines the significance of multilateral distrust on an international level, existing structures might require an occurrence of the unlikely association like collaboration and cooperation of Egypt and Israel State in order to advance towards a, perhaps partial yet still substantial, regional safety and security.

Thus, analyzing the Eastern Mediterranean energy politics of Egypt and Israel within the framework of Neorealist collaboration will contribute to a transparent understanding of regional energy and safety and security issues and further estimate the probable consequences of similar rapprochements in corresponding situations within the region as well as around the globe.

In accordance with this, based upon the Egypt-Israel example, the aim of the study is to comprehend and ascertain the contribution capacity of Neorealist collaboration, which is considered to be depending solely on subjective and pragmatic reasons, as part of substantive Realist motives of national interests, survival and self-help in order to build the regional safety and security related to regional collaboration and cooperation, despite identity based Constructivist antithesis', that refer to the two countries' historically proven rivalry within the perspective of their identities, social structures, cultural perspectives and fundamental motives, through one of the most significant subjects in all subjects of international relations; the energy and natural resources in general.

1.2. Research Background

Standing as the ancient locals of the Southern Mediterranean, Arab and Hebrew communities have long-standing interactions. Due to the unfortunate divergency of the fundamental dissimilarity which kindled gradually increasing cultural and social secession, these interactions majorly revolved around disputes and conflicts. However, the course of history swayed Hebrew communities to different parts of the globe whereas Arab communities maintained their residency which settled the ages-long dispute temporarily; however, it was neither resolved, nor forgotten.

One of the very first of these ancient Arab residents of the region was Egyptians. Despite their long history in the South Eastern Mediterranean, they relatively had little experience in determining their own destiny. Thus, it was a grand contentment for Egyptians when they obtained their independence. The sentiment was also welcomed by Hebrew communities some 20 years onward to the independence of Egypt when the Israel State was founded. However, through recalling the relics of the past and reciting the fundamental motives, Egypt was outraged. This sparked yet another long-lasting and very vivid set of disputes.

1.3. Problem Statement

The bilaterally perceived hostility was not the only motive commencing a long period of conflicts. It was also one of the internationally acknowledged incentives apperceived by humankind as well as states; the survival.

Identifying as an Arab nation, Egypt directly postulated the newly founded country as a threat to not only national but also the ethnic identity. Furthermore, much like many nations with Arab majorities of the period, Egypt has attributed the impeachment of illegitimacy to Israel State as, according to Egyptians as well as the administrative structure of Egypt, Israel State was artificially and unfairly placed in the Palestinian land by the Western actors. Along with the dogmatic reasons, the hostility from the Egyptian side was inevitable. Similar grounds induced Israelis towards a similar approach as well. It was an ages-old quest for Hebrew communities to establish the long overdue home. Thus, any objection, especially coming from the old nemesis, was intolerable. In addition, standing as the unaided resident of the promised land surrounded by relative enemies, Israel State perceived this opportunity as the sole chance.

Taking into consideration of the cultural, social and the faith-based differences, hostility was inevitable from the Hebrew side as well.

However, gaining momentum especially since the 18th century, the increasing globalism was promptly, firmly and progressively advancing. When the natural resources specific to natural gas and oil of the period were considered, international and most importantly, regional alignment was referring to the unwritten imperativeness of the trending norm. Each day collaboration and cooperation centered approaches were becoming more significant and the fate of international structures that have no access to these approaches for various reasons was designated to the inevitable.

The strive for hostile acting towards the corresponding party was certain however the incentive of survival, which was interpreted as diplomatic measures on the basis of mutual interest by globalism was also non-negligible. These controversial ambitions were crucial issues for both nations and would be expected to pave the way for confounding evolvments.

1.4. Research Question and Objectives

Following the provided data apropos the background and the statement, the research questions were developed upon observing the historical interactions of Egypt and Israel State in accordance with the direction of the research in order to avoid the probable dissipation from the specific underlining of the subject. In line with this, the main question of this study focuses on the vitality of natural resources and how they can alter the course of international relations:

Within the scope of Eastern Mediterranean energy policies specific to oil and natural gas, how do pragmatic measures cause an orientation shift in the relations between Egypt and the Israel State?

In order to respond to the main question, the sub-questions are:

1. What is the historical evolution of the relational structure that currently exists between Egypt and Israel State?
2. What is the role of regional energy in the progression of historically inclining cooperation and collaboration between Egypt and Israel State?
3. From the perspective of energy and natural resources of the region, what might fortify or obstruct the already existing relations between Egypt and Israel State?

In the light of these questions, the primary objective of this study is to identify the terms, norms, their scopes and effects of the subject in order to provide a solid base in regard to the nature of interactions between Egypt and Israel State, which will be analyzed followingly. Concordant to the comprehensive theoretical and normative interpretation, the historical background will be provided in order to better understand the scope of long-lasting relations in regard to energy and natural resources. Finally, taking into consideration of recent interactions on the basis of said elements, the assessment of realized pragmatic measures will be effectuated in order to provide an extensive evaluation apropos the effect of said measures on the international level to international relations.

1.5. Research Hypotheses

Through the data acquired, reviewed and analyzed in line with the research questions and sub-questions, this study aims to focus on responding to the following hypotheses:

- H1: In the event of alignment of interests, relations between two countries can proceed from armed conflict to regional cooperation.
- H2: In the event of the disappearance of joint and mutual interests, relations between two countries can proceed from regional cooperation to armed conflict.
- H3: National interests on the basis of energy and natural resources directly manipulate and alter the international relations.

1.6. Methodology

This study will be structured within the scope of historical assessment and evaluation. Concordant to reviewing the historical background which is essential for the inclusion of the scientific perspective, official declarations of states, press and media materials, articles and reliable third-party resources obtained from think-tanks, organizations and foundations will be analyzed in order to primarily describe the geopolitical significance through the perspective of energy which will be pursued by independent ‘decontextualization’ of energy politics of Egypt and Israel State. The obtained data will be analyzed within the framework of Energy Policies, Neorealist Collaboration & Cooperation, Regional Safety & Security and National Interests and the outputs will be interpreted through the major theories of International Relations; the outcomes will be analyzed in accordance with the original rationale which resulted in the dissertation of this thesis.

1.7. Research Design

This paper is structured on qualitative methodologies including academic research, articles, official reports of international organizations and structures, news and insights of think-tanks. In addition, declarations of states, announcements of related companies and statements of individuals will be taken into consideration. Through analysis of all provided data in regard to concepts and aspects, an extensive analysis will be effectuated in order to contribute a decisive description of political, structural and relational phenomena that clearly explains findings.

1.8. Research Field and Period

This study focuses on the basin of the Eastern Mediterranean. Hosting Egypt, Cyprus, Israel State and conjointly Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey, the Eastern Mediterranean, which remains between the Port of Kaş, Turkey (Latitude: 36.20, Longitude: 29.62) and Port of Alexandria (Latitude: 31.20, Longitude: 29.92) and between the Heraklion Port of Crete, Greece (Latitude: 35.34, Longitude: 25.14) and the Port of Haifa, Israel (Latitude: 32.79, Longitude: 34.98) describes the passage point from Europe to the Levant; an energy and resource rich basin, as comprehended from a number of explorations in the last two decades, platforming for numerous international commercial and economic mobilizations throughout the year.

Although historical background will provide earlier, and relatively ancient historical information to help comprehend the gradual change of international relations specific to Egypt and Israel State, this study will focus on the period of the foundation of Israel State which is dated to 1948 until 2020.

1.9. Significance of the Study

Despite occasional differences specific to each occurrence depending on geography, actors, effecting elements and background, historical developments do follow a similar pattern as the international platform and its components including the structure of the platform, incentives of international structures and conditions of the environment are given and cannot be manipulated.

As explained earlier, this study aims to focus on two actors in a specific region and their relational advancements in accordance with the certain element of impact which is energy, or natural resources in general. In line with this, specific insights will be provided in regard to

inter-relational interactions specific to Egypt and Israel State, further assisting the comprehension of the history, approaches and gradual change in approaches to one another. In addition, after an extensive understanding of relational diversifications of these actors, the aggregate of effecting components will be all-inclusively described in order to comprehend the scale of pragmatic measures and their effects on international relations.

Finally, from the obtained information, further predictions and foresight will be provided from the case study and the outcomes of the subject in order to shed light on the potentially similar interactions that might take place in the future with the intention of avoiding probable conflicts and help build collaborations within the scope of peacebuilding.



CHAPTER II

ESSENTIAL FRAMEWORKS AND CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS

2.1. Theoretical Framework

In order to comprehend, primarily the intention, and concordantly the expectation, motivation and realization of states' actions, it is essential to review the pillars of principles, relatively acknowledged by the theories of International Relations; logical methodologies structured for providing reasonable explanations to international occurring. In accordance with the aim of this study, it is essential to direct the focus towards the concerning topic that is the lack of supra hegemony on the international platform, which refers to the non-existence of a higher authority to settle a sort of order on the international platform, despite the probable and actual administrating power that derives from the ability to impose.

The majority of these structures do confer on the anarchical aspect of international relations; however, they do have various conflicting interpretations. Most of these counter-arguments depend on nature. As an example, Weber (2001: 16) underlines the classical Realist approach as indicated through Machiavelli and Morgenthau's addressing to the analogy of 'original sin', referring to the *ipso facto* maliciousness of humankind, claiming that the ill will of individuals originates from the very nature of the being. The Hobbesian approach elaborates this character with three elements: Equality, the state of nature and incentives (Burchill et al., 1995: 32-33).

However, this approach might surface as relatively impracticable as the collaboration exists as much as conflicts throughout the history, such as marriages of conveniences between monarchical dynasties and royalties, especially after two significant milestones: the end of the second world war and the dissolution of the USSR. These two path-breaking occurrences established and enroot the free-market capitalism centered globalism. Within this concept, for example, the approaches such as partial isolationism or pursuits towards identity-based interactions appear to not compromise with rationalism and even further, might complicate, if not obstruct entirely, the quest to the reliable institution of irreplaceably required concepts that are survival, self-help and security; much like Maslow's hierarchy of needs for individuals (Griffiths, 2007: 12-29).

This specific shortfall in interpreting the international occurrences caused the emergence of Neorealism, a new concept from a newer generation that steers the pivot in resolving the insufficient framework of classical Realism in construing a reasonable narrative regarding the physically existing cooperation implemented on a daily basis, not only on international but also national and individual level. Waltz, one of the pioneers of Neorealism, expresses that the aforementioned maliciousness of states does not originate from nature but is a consequence of nurture. Thus, it does not derive from the pre-given structure but rather the adaptive consequence that comes with the mentioned structure (Weber, 2001: 16). The correlation between a non-existent supreme hegemony and the defensive approach is relatively disprovable; however, there are other occasional factors that define the causes of states' acts; as an instance, Waltz refers to the governance system playing a grand role on the good or bad intentions of states.

The phenomenon in line with the aforementioned survival, self-help and security remain functional despite the change of their attributes and symbols. In a globalist environment of the modern age, which attributes a great significance to access to energy and natural resources as they are one of the prior elements that define the statuses, states require other states to survive; even, on certain occasions, to the extent of existence.

For instance, a postulated irrational approach of ultimate resource nationalism, yet, perhaps presumptive from the Constructivist perspective, blended with the isolationism of, as an instance, Russia could vastly cripple the country's economy. Furthermore, it would harm the intention of preserving the safe conditions as a form of escalation in tension with European countries, a collective of nations that are relatively distrustful towards Russia whereas partially dependent on Russian natural gas, would be probable.

This hypothetical scenario would induce the need for self-help however, even such circumstances would refer to globalism in comparison to isolation as it is very unlikely for European countries to obtain the required resource without international and even further, cross-continental collaborations due to financial and geographical reasons.

In any case, the conflicting or collaborative approaches that are projected to take place between states do not solely, or perhaps at all, depending on the pre-given structure that is the anarchy. It is the state or states that prefer to tend towards a certain approach in line with their interest. In any case, without the state interactions, the mentioned pre-given structure and the extension of the environment, the self-help are void terms (Weber, 2001: 16).

As conclusion, the Neorealist narrative dictates that survival driven collaborations, especially on natural resources and energy in the 21st century, originated from and aimed to lessen the potential threats, if not avoid it completely, of the distrust are inevitable in a free-market capitalism centered globalism.

2.2. Normative Framework

As it was indicated in the theoretical framework, within the scope of globalization, international actors require international interactivity. It is essential in regards to economical, geostrategic, political and other aspects and was relatively dictated by the binding structure of the multipolar world established after certain milestones.

One of these milestones, the industrial revolution re-emphasized and perhaps concretized the importance of natural resources and energy. Certainly, this is not unusual or a newly emerging phenomenon as the course of history, on numerous occasions, demonstrated the cognizance of humankind towards energy capacities. The majority of warfare, battles and clashes that took place among ancient kingdoms were focusing on the control of waterfronts and fertile lands; much like modern conflicts striving towards the predominance of natural resources and energy. The only difference, in addition to descriptions and compositions of 'natural resources' and 'actors' is perhaps the critically inclining need of various resources on a global scale, which underlines the significance of the international activity, especially within the concept of energy.

For the sake of this study, it is essential to focus on definitions of energy and natural resources, specific to oil and natural gas as well as their reserves on a global scale in addition to the reserves within the geographical limitation of Mediterranean Sea, specific to Eastern basin, between two significant actors of the region, Egypt and Israel.

2.3. Natural Gas and Oil

The composition of four hydrogen atoms and a carbon atom produces the raw material of coal, hydrocarbon, natural gas or oil which is later on processed to obtain energy sources. This process takes centuries and includes the multi-layering of living beings, calcium, sand and silt (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2019). The procedure does happen on land and sea however, as the period and the plurality of the layering directly affects the quality as well

as the amount of the processed energy resource, maritime fields are predicted to contain raw energy material of good quality in large amounts. The global reserves indicate the amounts of 196,750 Bcm of natural gas and 1498 billion barrels of proven oil (US Department of Energy).

Another important aspect of natural gas is liquefied natural gas (LNG). It is processed natural gas cooled into a liquid state at -260° Fahrenheit and the procedure provides an alternative form of transportation for regions without structures, or the construction is not feasible (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2020).

2.4. Natural Gas and Oil Reserves of Egypt and Israel

Egypt has four reliable offshore fields in the Eastern Mediterranean and the aggregate offshore natural gas capacity is totaled to be 1075 Bcm. In addition to natural gas, Egypt's oil reserves are non-negligible as well. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, there is a calculated amount of 1.8 billion barrels of offshore recoverable oil in the Nile Delta Basin located in the Eastern Mediterranean (Balkaş, 2011: 28).

Israel's offshore natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean are divided in nine fields and the total sum of these fields has an estimated cumulative reserve that is more than 930 Bcm (Kahveci, 2017: 31-56). On the other hand, oil maintains its clouded feature for Israel State as, until today, there is no specific data indicating the reserves of oil of Israel despite numerous explorations that took place on the basin throughout history. The consumption, however, indicates a rough estimation of 90 million barrels per year (US Energy Information Administration, 2018).

2.5. Related Naval Terminologies

In order to further comprehend the technicalities of the study, it is crucial to refer to internationally acknowledged and relatively accepted terminologies of the sea in regard to the sovereignty of nations.

The Territorial Sea, or Sovereign Waters are considered to belong to a certain nation consisting 12 nautical miles from the seabed. The very controversial term of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) describes waters that stand between the Sovereign Waters boundary line up to 200 nautical miles. Followingly, the term of Continental Shelf refers to waters that stand between the Sovereign Waters boundary line up to 350 nautical miles. The resting 150 miles

from the EEZ is referred to as the Extended Continental Shelf (Territorial Waters Law 5717/1956, 1990). High Seas are free waters that are not included in any nations' sovereign waters, EEZ's or Continental Shelves. High seas are open to all states taking into consideration that the purposes should be peaceful (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Part II – V – VII, 1994). It should be noted that despite the fact that these norms are relatively concurred by the majority, nations do not have any obligation to conform to the aggregate descriptions due to the anarchical structure of the international platform and national interests.

2.6. Energy Safety

Concordantly, discoveries in respects to potential capacities of energy and natural resources entail a new challenge which is safety and security; every crucial and essential phenomenon requires a protection mechanism, especially when the given sphere is conformably uncertain and relatively unregulated, much like the international platform. Within the scope of energy and natural resources, this necessity is accommodated with the highly controversial term of Energy Safety. There are a number of different approaches in regards to the definition of energy safety however, the very basic interpretation refers to the security of supply of energy and natural resources rather than affiliating the term with supplier's stability, as seen from the example of the violent increase in oil prices of 25% due to the abrupt emergence of a process referred as the *Arabian Spring* (Kılıçaslan, 2015: 118-119).

However, there are other relatively major threats of Resource Nationalism, which underlines the increasing domineering power of nations with resources over the national energy sector of purchasers, ergo, purchaser actors themselves, and the increasing phenomenon of Energy Terrorism (Şöhret, 2015: 8-11) which targets the energy infrastructures in order to cripple the energy and financial circulations of both parties and ultimately cause national as well as international alterations and change in paradigms, as vividly illustrated during the process of nationalization of the Suez Canal.

Certainly, due to the uncertainty and lack of higher authority features of the international environment enlarging the scope and scale of these threats, actors of resource geographies are obliged to carry necessary measures with actors of demanding geographies in order to ensure the safe transportation energy. In fact, carrying forward to bilateral agreements based on energy collaborations between regional actors, even long-established international organizations, that were originally founded for acting as these mediation mechanisms in regards to relatively prior

issues of the period, had to change focus due to inclining significance of energy and natural resources; NATO, for instance, an organization which was originally founded on defending the members from military-based attacks, had to expand its scope towards the safety and security of energy and natural resource transportation due to a newly establishing international platform, ergo, international structures including geostrategic and geopolitical alterations of the post-USSR period.

To conclude, energy and natural resources carry crucial importance to nations as reserves are limited whereas the global demand is inclining, which, not only shape international relations towards collaboration through international law and its adjacent of bilateral agreements and internationally concurred conventions or conflicts among international actors, which pave the way to the emergence of phenomena that are Energy Safety/Terrorism and Resource Nationalism; but also shape the mentioned actors themselves as well. One thing is for certain, despite the potential change of concepts, the current paradigms indicate that the norms are going to maintain and perhaps increase their binding capacities.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL STATE RELATIONS

3.1. Period of Conflict

3.1.1. Arab - Israeli War in 1948

Following the establishment of the Kingdom of Judah, the ancient history of the Hebrews underlined certain issues that assisted the construction of the identity. Primarily, for the majority of modern history, Hebrews did not have a sovereign state or similar mechanism which has led to spreading among many nations. Furthermore, despite deeming themselves as the 'chosen people' the Hebrews stood as the outcasts of nations as they did experience marginalization on a large scale from the majority of hosting communities as well as governing organs due to fundamental motives (Kızıloğlu, 2012: 36).

The combination of mentioned elements birthed a strong collective unconsciousness of international solidarity that paved the way for a facilitated international mobilization which has contributed to sociological aspects of Hebrews in addition to the modern norms of migration, ghettoization and even reshaped the international financial circulation which, eventually, reformed the modern banking system.

This was the main cause for Hebrews to celebrate the Balfour Declaration as it was a solid step towards the long and ongoing endeavor that is the establishment of a Jewish 'home' on the Palestinian territory to gain the support of his Majesty of United Kingdom, which was later on supported by other states that stood as periodical powers including France, Italy and USA (Turgay, 2019: 454).

"Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil

and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.” (Türkkaya, 2014: 44-45).

Written by Arthur James Balfour on behalf of a very powerful nation’s highest authority, the mentioned letter has enlightened the Jewish land’s prospect. From the social Constructivist point of view of Judaism, which cannot be limited solely to the norm of the notion but rather the aggregate combination of cultural and historical phenomena (Ör, 2012: 11) - referring that the norm does not only reflect to a collective fundamental approach but to language, the concept of unity and overall, a relatively homogeneous identity -, this was a non-negligible opportunity. The identity was constructed throughout centuries due to collective experiences obtained from various regions and thus, was long past the point of requiring a location of collective inhabitation. Taken into consideration of the epochal trend of a social tendency towards modernist nationalism, which emphasizes a sense of unity originating from the concept of citizenship and geography in comparison to fallen *Third Reich* imposed primordialist and ethno-symbolic aspect of nationalism - emphasizing the common cultural and genetic patterns -, a ‘home’ was not only fulfilling the very first instinctive needs of safety and security, but also the yearning concept of coexistence under the mutual identity.

On the other hand, the mentioned declaration has caused an opposition originating from the Arab nations. The Arab locals and authorities were far from being organized however, especially on the establishment of a Jewish home in the Palestinian land, there was an aggregately concurred and relatively justified protestation, even towards the British, who were perceived as allies in the process of recent Arab liberation initiations and who, concordantly, declared the intent of establishment of the aforementioned structure to Sharif Hussein; which stood as a concrete step towards underlining the desired structure in the region to Arabs (Murat, 2019: 451).

The main cause of this protestation was the fierce divergence between the Arabs and the British Mandate Government apropos the legitimacy of status of Hebrews in respect to Palestinian - Israeli issue, in addition to growing numbers of the Jewish population in the region. This collision of opinion kindled the district-based quarrels which then transformed into violent armed conflicts (Kızıloğlu, 2012: 19).

After World War II, the British Mandate Government failed to establish a consensus and satisfy the demands of all parties - including the USA, a cross-continental actor interfering in favour of Jewish communities - in order to ensure a peaceful mediation between parties and Palestine has thusly become a boiling pot as the counter attacks started. Local groups that are believed to have a rather organized structure with a direct connection to the World Zionist Organization embarked on terrorism methodologies and targeted not only Arab organizations but the British Mandate Government as well. Due to increasing tensions in the region and the ineffectiveness of dialogues with leaders of factions, the British Mandate Government consulted the United Nations Security Council.

After a series of fierce debates and lobbying efforts apropos United Nations Security Council, on November 27, 1947, the option of partition was supported by the majority. The partition suggested a federative state in Palestine which included a state for Arabs, Israel State and an international zone in Jerusalem under the supervision of the United Nations (Kızıloğlu, 2012: 47).

Through the combination of triplication of elements that are the independency, togetherness and the *Aliyah* (Örücü, 2018: 22), on the date of May 14, 1948, the state of Israel was founded (Balpınar, 2017: 165) despite protests of numerous Arab states and the result was the increase in already existing tensions between the Arab and Jewish communities despite the surprisingly mild procedure of Arab - Israel armistice system of the United Nations (Hurewitz, 1952: 515). The very next day from the declaration, on the date of May 15, 1948, the war outbreak took place and the collectivity of Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon commenced to advance in the Palestine region. Initially, the Arab forces dominated the conflict; Egypt claimed Gaza whereas Jordan captured the West Sharia including the eastern borders of Jerusalem. However, with the support of the USSR, the state of Israel triumphed in the war in 1949 as the Arab forces acknowledged the probable outcome of the war.

The outcome of the war was the partition of Palestine among Egypt, Israel State and Jordan which majorly benefitted Israel State, sectionalization of Jerusalem and the commencement of a mass migration of more than 750 thousand Palestinians (Kemiksiz, 2018: 133-136). The 1948 war has been a milestone for both sides. Primarily, Arabs have come to terms apropos the existence, especially the military and international power of Israel State as the newly found structure has defeated the collective forces of five nations with relatively long histories of governance. The major disappointment, in addition to the concrete loss of the war,

addresses to the unjust establishment of the state; Arab nations believed that the Israel State was founded illegitimately with the support and through the strategic benefits of international powers including the USSR and USA while neglecting the rights of Palestinians, locals of the region for centuries.

This development was carved deeply in the Arabian social memory and has shaped the approach of Arabs in regard to Israel State. The Arabian consciousness has taken a major step towards establishing a new challenger, the Jewish state, ergo, the construction of identity was further proceeded. This is why, along with a number of other events, this issue stands as one of the main reasons for the renaissance of Pan-Arabism. In addition to the newly emerging opposing challenger, Arab nations did form a sort of international solidarity and collaboration in order to secure the individual as well as collective need for self-help.

On the other hand, Israel State accomplished the centuries-old strive of recognizable international presence and emphasized the national capacity through the dispute with Arabian entities. This non-negligible triumph underlined two significant phenomena. Primarily, from the very beginning of the foundation, Israel State, especially on the regional level, was regarded as a potential threat to especially neighboring nations' survival needs. Concordantly, despite its short period of history commencing from the foundation, the recognition and the upcoming support to Israel State during the conflict demonstrated that the entity acquired collaborators. This, of course, benefitted both parties as Israel, despite its conquest against Arabian countries, was in need of international indorsement in respects to maintaining essential conditions required for the safety and security whereas the counterparts aspired to express the goodwill for a presupposed regional and local partnership in a potential exigency.

3.1.2. Sinai - Suez Campaign in 1956

The nationalization of the Suez Canal was one of the milestones, not only on the national level for Egypt but for the international level as well, as it blockaded the facilitated transport of Western countries, Britain and France, causing a global economic impact. Prior to this grand happening, the social atmosphere in Egypt indicated a crucial tendency towards Pan Arabism originated primarily from the foundation of Israel State and the Western countries' responses. This, along with other international occurrences, was the main motive of Gamal Abdel Nasser's election concordant to the Free Officers Movement's successful *coup d'état*. Primarily, the Free Officers Movement tried to maintain good relations with the USA and Western nations, despite the nationalist approach that was 'enemizing' the West, that carried the movement to the ruling

position (Serbest, 2017: 691-700). However, due to non-continuation of bilateral initiations between Egypt and USA, the opposition to Baghdad Pact (CENTO) which assumed an unofficial bound between the signing parties and USA and USA's newly emerging and fairly unexpected conditions for the army support conveyed Egypt towards radicalization, which was resulted with the decision of nationalization of the company that controlled the Suez Canal.

The increase in tensions in regards to this surprising response from the Egyptian side was not due to the firm stance of political actors but rather the significance of the Suez Canal. Throughout the history, Suez Canal maintained and further improved the geostrategic importance for the regional as well as international entities as it connects the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, a non-negligible transit route for commerce as well as military-wise initiations (Duman, 2005: 320-322). As an example of the cruciality of the canal, before nationalization took place, the Suez Canal was the main route for 35% of European oil and 85% of British oil.

The complicated nature of this occurring for a very demanded passageway caused further sophistication as the UN's declaration was recognizing Egypt's right to operate the natural resources (Serbest, 2017: 691-700). Furthermore, the Eastern Blocks regional existence was still a viable threat as there was a rapprochement between Gamal Abdel Nasser's government and USSR and, even to a certain extent, Beijing as well. This was complying with the USSR's interest in regional debilitation of western powers (Çetinkaya, 2019: 8). This threat was later proven to be legitimate as, after a decade of ruling, the second of six principles of Gamal Abdel Nasser, 'The Struggle Against Imperialism' manifested itself as declaring the regime to be socialist with nationalist tendencies; differing itself from Marxist doctrine while including the Islamic perspective, which was assumed to be in accordance with socialist narrative by the governing power. Against Britain and France, Egypt was supported by the jurisdiction established by perhaps the most prestigious international organization, United Nations, which included these two nations in addition to indorsement from the main challenger of Western Block.

These developments accelerated the procedure and on July 26th of 1956, Egypt officially declared the nationalization of the company that operated the Suez Canal. Britain and France sent a diplomatic note to Egypt, demanding a retreat of 10 miles whereas Israel, the regional collaborator of Britain and France, commenced a military operation against Egypt on the same date and occupied the Sinai Islands while securing the borders to Jordan, which was in

accordance with the intelligence provided by the British in regards to Jordan joining forces with Egypt (Duman, 2005: 320-322) The physical as well as diplomatic initiations of Britain, France and Israel caused a major reaction originated from not only the regional actors but international entities and even the Western Powers as well. As the main result of this relatively radical initiation, a rare occurrence of USA and USSR agreement during the Cold War took place and both parties declared their bilateral objection, which, as a consequence, reflected as the unmitigated termination of the operation.

Neorealism, in comparison to classical Realism, recognizes that individuals in addition to nations can be international actors. In accordance with this, the Suez Crisis demonstrates the significance of Nasser's leadership in comparison to Egypt's international existence. Despite the fact that it was both of the superpowers that obstructed the invasion of national sovereignty of Egypt, Nasser was renowned for his resistance to British and French imperialism. This, however, was not due to Pan-Arabism as Nasser anticipated, an idea claiming to stand as the infrastructure of Arab salvation through Arabian *renaissance* while not conforming with Realist motives. It was due to regional actors' interests that paved the way for regional solidarity. Similar motive applies to the international scale as well (Duman, 2005: 320-322). Western existence in one of the most valuable regional assets was not desired by regional actors and the Eastern Bloc. At the first glance, sole disaccord in terms of Neorealism throughout this event can be perceived as the bilateral agreement between the USA and USSR. However, the profound analysis indicates that even the rapprochement between superpowers relies on the Realist background, as for USA, the British existence in the region did not have concrete legitimacy and the potential act of opposition would, at most, have a *Pyrus* outcome, costing more than the potential gain including the international prestige of USA.

3.1.3. Six Day War in 1967

Standing as one of the most strategic wars of the period, the war between the Arab forces and Israel State was significant for the course of regional history for several reasons. The background of this initiation was due to Israel State's safety and security concern due to two opposing nations located in the North as well as South of the nation, Syria and Egypt. This concern was kindled because of various elements including the rise in tensions between Israel State and Syria after the Baath party gained power, the bilateral agreement on defense between Egypt and Syria and support to Palestinian militias provided by Syria and Jordan (Kemiksiz, 2018: 133-136).

Despite what is believed to be a set of legitimate reasons from the perspective of Israel State, aforementioned questions were not perceived as motivation for a righteous assault by the USA (Givhan, 1995: 13-14). This, along with other reasons, was the reason for the objective of short and decisive war from the Israel State's part, as the intervention of superpowers was a viable potential. However, from the military perspective, this has caused major problems. The military qualifications and quantities were not in favor of Israel State and neither was the geostrategic aspect of the projected war. This has directed the commanders of the Israel Defense Forces to a rather tactical and strategic approach as division of forces in order to meet each opposition separately were not the most preferred alternative; it would have prolonged the process while the forces were obstructed to advance with an offensive and aggressive manner as the failure of certain objectives including the capture of strategic regions were non-negotiable. Due to all these potential issues, concordant to the declaration of war, Israel State has demonstrated the airpower dominance at the very early stages of the war in a swift manner.

“The proximate events leading up to the Six-Day War began in April 1967, when Israelis responded to Syrian artillery attacks with an air strike. This strike led to an air battle in which the Israelis shot down six Syrian aircraft.” (Givhan, 1996: 13-14).

To these attacks, Gamal Abdel Nasser has moved 100 thousand troops to the border of Israel State in Sinai - a strategic drive as the region was previously prioritized by Israel, along with the West Bank, the Jordan River and the Golan Heights - demanded the United Nations peacekeeping forces to withdraw and closed the Straits of Tiran to marine vessels of Israel State while calling other Arab nations' leaders to action which resulted in a gathering of dominant numbers in military wise assets, in comparison to Israel State's military assets.

“Other Arab nations rallied to Nasser's call; and Israel soon found itself surrounded by a hostile Arab force which included 328,000 troops, 2,330 tanks, and 682 fighters and bombers. The Israelis had 250,000 troops, 1,000 tanks, and 286 combat aircraft available to counter this threat.” (Givhan, 1996: 13-14).

With the aforementioned motivations, Israel State was left with no other option but to launch an unexpected attack. The consequences of the attack were heavy for the Arab nations as it destroyed a set of radar defenses along with grounded aircrafts, which resulted with the capture of strategically crucial regions including the previously prioritized West Bank and even the city of Jerusalem. After three days of these assaults, Israel's victory became definite.

After the triumph, Israel's concerns in regards to future existence terminated, much like the economic recession of two years, which eventuated in a grand boosting of the national morale greatly and even questioning of the military expenses due to the decisive feature of the war whereas Egypt faced with major internal disputes after the war which was escalated to the point of placing officers of high levels on trials, along with other Arab nations' leaders, who felt the humiliation deeply which resulted in reservations in negotiating with Israel State in regards to the loss of war (Terril, 2009: 8-15).

The Six Day War, from the Israel State's perspective, was a survival matter. The objectified regions were required to be captured in order to secure the border safety. Furthermore, the enemy had the geostrategic advantage in addition to military superiority. When the friendly nation of USA's declaration of reservation in regards to Israel's intention of advancement - which was also due to the national interest as the challenger superpower, USSR, had the potential to intervene had the US enacted on assisting Israel - is taken into consideration, Israel State was left with no other option to initiate and finalize the advancement swiftly, as the otherwise would suggest a potential intervention of US and termination of the operation in addition to not being able to fulfill the much needed safety and security as the aforementioned locations had geostrategic significance.

The same war, from Egypt's perspective, had rather pragmatic motives. The loss of Suez has shaken the European economies and was not fully embraced. When the mentioned approach is taken into consideration with Egypt's concerns towards Israel State commencing from the foundation of the state and further tempering through hostility in the course of the Suez campaign, Egypt held on to the skepticism towards relative threat of the neighboring country, which was, later on, proven to be a right analysis. Concordant to attacks, the call of Nasser to Arab nations in the region was - although the narrative was emphasizing the structural Constructivist motives - solely due to the dire exigency of regional support.

The outcome of the war underlined that, although it is crucial to gain the support of regional forces, the self-help consolidated concern of survival, due to neutralism experienced from the side of superpowers, changes the course of history and emphasizing the Realist motives while ousting the probable counterarguments of opposing theories.

3.1.4. Yom Kippur War in 1973

Concordant to the death of Nasser in 1971, Anwar Al-Sadat, Nasser's assistant and comrade from the Free Officers Movement, seized the power. One of his first intentions was to recapture Sinai and re-operate the Suez for the global maritime mobilization in order to recover the wounded economy. He primarily aimed to resolve it in a peaceful manner through US mediation, however, was declined by Israel State due to security reasons. Upon the refusal and comprehension that this cannot be resolved through courtesy dialogues, Anwar Al-Sadat resorted to waging war which, also, was later on discovered to have an intention diplomatic leverage as he was expecting US's intervention.

Further to planning among Egypt, Jordan and Syria, attacks from both frontiers of North and South were commenced on October 6th of 1973, which was Yom Kippur for Hebrews and coincidentally Ramadan for Muslims. Anwar Al-Sadat's narrative towards waging the war emphasized the intolerable occupation of Israel State in Sinai and thusly commenced the attacks along with Syria from the Northern frontier. It was later on called as The Operation Spark, a euphemism for a dispute that commenced with a firm approach of hard power that is the military and was finalized with a political resolution through the mediation of superpowers, as the President Anwar Al-Sadat signaled his wish to discuss the aftermath of the war with Henry Kissinger in the course of the war, if not the commencement.

The reason for the other Arab nations to join forces with Egypt was due to the same motive of Egypt as well; to recover what was lost in 1967. However, the loss of prior war stripped them from the dignity as well as the power of sanction to pursue this aim in a rather diplomatic as well as firm way. In contrast, Anwar Al-Sadat was known for his qualification of analyzing the current situation profoundly and acting thusly. He was addressed as "a statesman who understands that diplomacy is the other side of the battlefield" by Henry Kissinger. In line with the characteristics defined as a good 'statesman', he felt the obligation to place his nation's interest on top of all, including the well-being of his allies, which directed him towards implementing the "deception campaign" against Syrians which was intended to lessen the damages of a potential heat of an Israeli attack while directing Syrians to buffer the aforementioned attack (Terril, 2009: 8-15).

At the early stages of the war, Egypt and allies had the upper hand and were striving towards the presumed objective. However, despite the fact that Arab forces have taken potential US's intervention into consideration, the approach of this probability was uncertain. This

uncertainty, along with other elements, changed the course of the war and the positions of actors as Israel State received US supplied airborne ammunition which resulted in a ceasefire. After the dearworth efforts and the prompt shuttle diplomacy splendidly realized by Henry Kissinger, the tripartite war was finalized with the separation consensus’.

Two consecutive and often referred as expletive wars of the period, Six Day War and Yom Kippur War, emphasizes the significance of self-help in a profound manner while underlining the undeniable potency of foreign support, especially originating from regional powers in addition to superpowers of the period. Realism and components tend to focus on the zero-sum game, an aspect of the Game Theory where a participant's gains or losses are equal to the sum of other participants' gains and losses in a game or economic system; or briefly, all or none concept. The Six Day War impacted the morale of Arab nations vastly and additionally, it costed the loss of highly geostrategic regions.

However, the International Relations, especially from the Neorealist perspective, embraces the course of history as an everlasting game and channels the actors towards striving to obtain the ultimate earning. Anwar Al-Sadat’s ‘deception campaign’ during the Yom Kippur War refers to the ideal zero-sum game intention and furthermore, from the commencement to the finalization, the entire course of this war had singular benefit motives - as Anwar Al-Sadat signalized his intentions to discuss the aftermath of war in the course of war - while disregarding the objectives of, what they can be referred as, auxiliary actors, if not their safety and security aggregately; through endangering the lives of an allied nation.

3.2. Period of Recognition

In comparison to his companion, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Al-Sadat’s intention was to distance the national foreign policy from the Soviet influence and establish better and sustainable relations with the West. This, however, required a substantial amount of time and effort, as the foundation of the nation based its pillars to USSR’s doctrines which were, throughout the course, consistently strengthened. Additionally, the public perspective was not in favor of this intention; the people were exhausted from long lasting armed disputes with Israel and frustrated from the losses of others’ cause, mainly related with the people of Palestine. However, Anwar Al-Sadat gained a relatively large reputation from the partial victory of advancement in the Sinai in the years of 1973 and 1975. He then proceeded to base the public frustration regarding the financial outcomes of Palestinian cause to his ultimate goal and

established an economic liberalization program known as the *'intifāh'* (Kuduoğlu, 2018: 105). Although the objective was to pacify the economic tension and stabilize the current situation, the initiation required the removal of socialist subsidies which caused further economic dismay, outraging the public and triggering massive protests which would, later on, be referred as the Bread Riots in 1977 while gaining a major opposition from Arab nations. Regardless, by the end of 1976, despite all objections, Anwar Al-Sadat commenced peace dialogues with Israel.

“When I commenced the war against Israel in October 1973, many people thought I would drown in the canal waters. However, as it can be seen, I have not. Now, as the second risk, I am trying to establish peace.” (Köprülü, 1990: 175).

Comprehending the encouragement of the USA concordant to his aforementioned statements in the British Sunday Telegraph Journal, Anwar Al-Sadat decided to communicate with Israel State after the Israeli national elections; this was due to his belief that the Labor Party of Israel, a political power that is perceived to be relatively more open to regional peace initiations, would succeed to power. However, the successor of elections was Menachem Begin, the founder of Likud, the rightwing party. Initially, this prompted distress. However, with the help of USA and Ceausescu of Romania, who convinced Anwar Al-Sadat to establish a dialogue with the newly elected Prime Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin, the very first liaising took place in 1977 between Tuhami, Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Dayan, 5th Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel State. After positive correspondences of both parties, in less than a month time, Anwar Al-Sadat made a beyond belief statement in the Egyptian People's Assembly:

“I state in all seriousness that I am prepared to go to the end of the world - and Israel will be surprised to hear me tell you that I am ready to go to their home, to the Knesset itself, to argue with them, in order to prevent one Egyptian soldier from being wounded. Members of the People's Assembly, we have no time to waste.” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1977).

Concordant to these shocking declarations, after only a week's time, Begin sent an invitation letter to Anwar Al-Sadat to give a speech in Knesset. Primarily, Anwar Al-Sadat visited Hafez Al-Assad in Damascus but his good intention of convincing was greeted with harsh objection. On November 19th of 1977, Anwar Al-Sadat visited Israel and the next day, he gave a relatively radical statement of encouraging other Arab nations to establish peace with Israel, in addition to unsheathing the sword and terminating the armed conflict between two nations (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1977). With this shocking step, Anwar Al-Sadat

received endorsements of international actors including Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunis, UAE and the USA while the regional powers of Algeria, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen and Syria objected to the decision and froze relations with Egypt.

In less than a month, Begin visited Ismailia in order to discuss the terms with Anwar Al-Sadat, which were priorly discussed between Tuhami and Dayan in the course of discussing the potential peace. Anwar Al-Sadat's intention was to regain Sinai, however the resting demands regarding the West Bank and Gaza was not to be neglected as it directly affected the future of Palestinians. The mentioned demands excluding Sinai caused divergences as both of the leaders had a firm stance, which endangered the future of dialogues which was perceived as a potential regional threat by the USA. President of the United States of the period, Jimmy Carter engaged in and invited both parties to London on July 18th, 1978 in order to discuss the terms however, the effort was ineffectual.

The following meeting, which was organized by Carter himself in Camp David in the USA, however, was successful. The accord signed in Camp David dictated a number of significant articles including non-inclination towards use of force in case of disagreement, gradual liberation of Sinai and Egypt's recognition of the right of unopposed passage of Israeli marine vessels from the Suez Canal, straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba in addition to the establishment of economic, diplomatic and cultural normalization between two states (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1978). Despite the earlier expressions of Anwar Al-Sadat, the signing of Camp David Accords, which paved the way for the Middle Eastern peace in addition to bilateral thaw, was corresponded with a variety of different approaches on national, regional and international level. The rightwing and fundamentalist actors and organizations of high reputation in Egypt, including the members of the former cabinet like Ismail Fahmy, Anwar Al-Sadat's former Foreign Minister approached this radical development with strict doubt, if not objecting entirely (Karawan, 1994: 249). In addition to governmental media organs, the leftwing structures including the labor unions, however, celebrated Anwar Al-Sadat in this endeavor. On the regional level, the conference held in Baghdad decided to freeze the membership of Egypt to Arab League and impose sanctions on Egypt in case the Camp David accords are to be signed. This decision was harshly criticized by Anwar Al-Sadat, underlining the importance of Egypt for the League. Internationally, a number of countries applauded the initiation while the challenging superpower of the USSR was objecting to the decision. Begin and Anwar Al-Sadat received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978, one year prior to the signing of the Egypt - Israel Peace Treaty.

English politician Sir Henry Wotton of the House of Commons of England describes a legate as “*an honest gentleman sent to lie abroad for the good of his country*” (Walton, 2015). Although prioritizing ambassadors and military rankers, Wotton implies high ranking state officials in general, addressing to initial Neorealist motives which, according to him, is an essential and non-negligible feature of governance.

Anwar Al-Sadat’s *realpolitik* and relatively Machiavellist approach, as remarked by certain scholars, could be characterized as opportunist, referring to his utilization of current disagreements and divisions among Arab nations on his country’s behalf, and unprincipled, underlining the everlasting and unresolved deadlock of Gaza and West Bank. However, further deepening during his presidential term, Anwar Al-Sadat’s main initiation was to establish closer relations with the West while distancing the country from the USSR influence, which was intended to serve his belief that emphasized a sustainable and mid/long term benefit for Egypt. This was, without a doubt, in line with Anwar Al-Sadat’s philosophy. Despite coming from a background that was greatly influenced by Arab nationalism, Anwar Al-Sadat differs himself from his former companion and predecessor, Nasser; as Anwar Al-Sadat’s main motive was ‘Egypt first’ when he assumed the role of presidency, in comparison to Nasser who assumed the leadership of all Arabs. This is the reason Anwar Al-Sadat, concordant to abandoning the utilization of the name ‘United Arab Republic’, which has previously practically ceased to exist in 1961 - followingly changing the name of his country to Arab Republic of Egypt from the United Arab Republic through abandoning the unity with Syria -, throughout the course of normalization with Israel State, disregarded the opinions of his former regional allies, deceived them and thus, comprehended, acknowledged and accepted the probable chesting of a possible traitorship labeling by the said allies which caused his country’s suspension of membership from a collectivity co-founded by Egypt until 1989. Regardless, he has accomplished to terminate a long-lasting hostility despite the internal and regional objections, which was, perhaps, the root of his assassination during the commemorative victory parade organized for the Egypt’s crossing of the Suez Canal in 1973 by a military officer with jihadist motivations.

Anwar Al-Sadat deceased as a true legate and a Neorealist leader with an immense statist incentive in 1982, not because he was embracing the Zionist motive of bringing the European values to the region, nor was he affiliated with the perspective, but because he believed that the normalization was the necessary evil for the greater good of his country. His legacy proceeds to influence Egypt’s international relations even in today’s world.

3.3. Period of Consolidation

3.3.1. Barcelona Process

In the course of the aforementioned stabilization between two of the major actors in the region, which would pave the way in the future for other regional actors to take action towards peace building, social Constructivist motives were still not to be neglected. Primarily, the Bandung conference and the Non-Aligned Movement was a prominent declaration coming from the former colonized nations that they will not take side of any superpowers solely due to pragmatic reasons, as they firmly did not affiliate themselves with former colonialists or invaders. In the same decade, Nasser, perhaps the very first Arab identity advocate, disposed the Pan-Islamist Muslim Brotherhood organization as the very first initiation of his presidency. Within a quarter of a century, a number of terrorist organizations with Constructivist motives were founded, including the internationally notorious Hezbollah. This has caused an emergence of numerous threats for Europe including irregular migration, human and drug trafficking and general safety and security. However, especially during the Cold War, semi-peripheral and peripheral nations were indirectly dictated to pursue a cooperative and collaborative policy as the trending globalism required interaction. There was no other alternative if mentioned nations were aggregately self-sufficient, a utopian phenomenon that was not observed in the period. This was in line with Western nations' approach as well, as, after the second half of 20th century, in order to overcome the mentioned threats and consolidate the financial circulation, Europe adopted a rather commercial policy with the semi-peripheral and peripheral countries of the East, specifically with Middle East including Mashriq, Canaan crescent, and the Maghrebs which defines a geography from Iran to Morocco and Mali.

Institutionalizing the said intention, in 1972, the Global Mediterranean Policy was founded in order to establish a Mediterranean free trade zone, in addition to strengthening the inter-regional collaboration. The initiation was arguably successful in many aspects; however, it was terminated after the significant geopolitical changes in the European region after 1989. Concordant to a relative normalization and stabilization in the region, the very first landmark of Barcelona Process or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euromed) was established in order to further fortify the economic and commercial relations between the European Union and the Mediterranean with the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference in 1995. The partnership became the platform that would free the European countries from the limiting perspective of previous Mediterranean policies through liaising with regional countries on political, economic

and cultural bases, in line with the three main sub-partnerships of the program; Political dialogue and security, economic and financial, and social and cultural partnerships (Derisbourg, 1997: 10-11).

The initiation was yet another success. New aspects of economic, financial, social and cultural interactions were adopted in the program. The regional collaboration was encouraged and accordingly, frequent workshops were organized in order to support the collaborative approach. In five years, half of the Mediterranean Partner Countries' trades were realized with the European Union (Bhutto, 2013). Additionally, the partnership became another binding factor for Arab nations, specifically Egypt and Israel along with the United Nations. The theme of the partnership also carried a vital significance. United Nations was a relatively political supra organization whereas Barcelona Process or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euromed) was intended to facilitate and accelerate the commercial as well as cultural interactions.

Despite a number of critiques directed to the platform and a substantial number of disagreements, especially between Arab nations and Israel including the Israel - Jordan conflict in 1996, and the fact that this platform could not fulfill all the projected intentions, Barcelona Process is regarded as a crucial milestone that, along with other initiations, helped pave the way for the regional stabilization and peace.

3.3.2. The Arab Spring and Consequences

Camp David Accords were crucially significant as, following the initiation, a number of gradual improvements did take place for either parties. Primarily, the newly adopted maritime regulations in regard to the Suez Canal, straits of Tiran and Aqaba gulf facilitated the commercial transactions of both nations. In addition to receiving an aid of substantial amounts from the USA, Israel State had no obligation to undertake the fairly expensive military costs. Both of the countries enjoyed geostrategic and political stabilization. This, however, was a reflection of exhaustion experienced from the long-lasting conflict and dispute atmosphere perceived by the administration. The experienced contentedness, however, was not fully welcomed by people of both nations due to fundamental and identity-wise motives and it was reflected on numerous occasions on various scales.

The most recent recollection to this stream dates back to 2011 during the massive uprising that has spread from Maghrebs to Mashriques and Canaan known as the Yasemen Revolution or the Arabian Spring. Although it would be difficult to associate the occurrence

with the Arab - Israeli tension, in less than a year due to the commencement of insurgence, civil strikes were fiercely experienced in Cairo and certain protestors targeted the Israeli embassy.

“Images of the attack revealed mobs brandishing metal pipes and sledgehammers, burning the Israeli flag, tearing down the cement wall that separated the embassy from the street, and infiltrating the embassy itself.” (Jacoby, 2015: 33).

The Egypt chapter of the uprising was relatively delicate as perceived from the subsequent stiffing conduct of enforcements. At the outset however, state forces attempted to focus on de-escalation and neutralization. Concordant to comprehension that suggested the expediency of a rather firm intervention due to the insufficient capacity of the police units, with the help of USA, Egyptian commandos intervened, infiltrated the embassy and rescued the diplomatic mission. This further escalated the current situation and rioters targeted the police, which responded with the declaration of state of emergency. The unfortunate incident elevated the safety and security concerns of Israel which was rekindled recently with the local militias recruited by terrorist organizations of Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah and even nations of Iran and Syria (Jacoby, 2015: 33) in addition to local support provided to Palestinian warriors through arms smuggling. The aggregate of these regional derogations directed Israel State to consider the construction of a border fence, which was projected to be located on the geo-strategical location of Sinai (Gold, 2013: 15-32).

The Arab uprisings that commenced in 2011 are still relatively ongoing in certain regions of the geography and have done little to help the peace building between Arab nations and Israel State, if it didn't sabotage the process entirely. This, however, was not perceived as a reason to re-initiate the finalized yet strongly rooted quarrel by the administrations of Israel and Egypt. Both parties have approached the regional and global crisis with precision and diligence (Abadi, 2019: 24). The motivation for such an approach can be based upon the vast challenges faced in the course of peacebuilding. Egypt and Israel State have strived for regional stabilization for a substantial amount of time. The awakening of this age's long hostility can obstruct these efforts, if not devastate the endeavors and launch larger-scale conflicts, which would not benefit either parties. The Neorealist perspective dictates mandatory collaborations of such which are based on the foundations of self-help and security motives.

3.3.3. Rapprochement in 2013

Sisi's Oath of Allegiance to 1979 Accords:

The 1979 accords, despite receiving harsh criticism from mainly regional actors to the extent of revocation of the treaty or expulsion from the regional organization that was co-founded by Egypt, was a significant milestone in the peacebuilding processes in the region and has formidably contributed to improving the relations between Egypt and Israel State. In spite of numerous occurrences throughout the course of recent history until 2011, no harm was intended towards the mentioned accords from neither of the parties. Stroking the nation vastly, the 2011 uprisings has lastly be-throned President Hosni El Sayed Mubarak. Led by the deceased Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded to power in Egypt in 2012. Perceived as a strong structure with relatively fundamental tendencies in comparison to its competitors, the Muslim Brotherhood had reservations towards Israel State. In line with the motivation, the administrative cadre of the organization suggested a referendum for the 1979 accords in order to ensure the presence of the people on the subject, however, the mentioned cadre also reported to US diplomats their reluctance towards revocation of those accords (Khoury, 2012).

The following year, concordant to the successful coup d'état, General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi was instated into the Presidency of Egypt. President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi made a statement for the Arabian news agency Al Hayat and assured his pledge to accords and peace with Israel State (Kais, 2012). Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi's pledge to peace has further strengthened the collaboration between Egypt and Israel State. The long lasting yet slowly and firmly fading safety and security concerns between the two nations, especially after 1979 accords, were replaced with military cooperation. A campaign against ISIS militias were co-organized and in line with this decision, Israel accepted the increasing Egyptian military power in the Sinai (Gold, 2013: 15-32). Concordantly, in 2015, Egypt, for the first time in history, voted for Israel State in regard to engagement in the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. Ongoingly, Egypt regularly collaborates with Israel State in destroying tunnels used for the transfer of alimentation, medication and ammunition smuggling into Gaza (Saleh, 2014).

The fierce *coup d'état* in Egypt was not fully justified by the people as it caused numerous civilian casualties and the overthrown leader, Morsi, had a substantial amount of support. This has brought Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi's legitimacy into question and the potential of abolishment could not be tolerated. In order to compensate for the mentioned potential, Abdel

Fattah Al-Sisi focused on gathering international recognition and support. With a long-lasting and Western leaned foreign relations tradition established during the Nasser's period - despite the perceived reluctance - and consolidated during Anwar Al-Sadat's period, Abdel Fattah Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi initiated the rapprochement with Israel and indirectly, with the USA. This was also reasonable as one of the shortcomings of main opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood, was basing the structures existence on fundamentalist motivations. Through this Neorealist conduct, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi was figuratively crowned as the champion of peacebuilding (Karsh, 2017: 3) and initiated a number of significant collaborations with Israel State, in addition to currently holding the governing power.

Egyptian - Israeli Collaboration Against Terrorism in Sinai:

In 2018, a sensational article on New York Times revealed that Egypt and Israel State agreed on a secret accord which paved the way for the Israel State to realize a minimum of 100 airstrikes through unidentified drones, armed helicopters and fighter aircrafts with the approval of Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, killing dozens of Egyptian police and military officers and bringing down a Russian passenger jet; ensuring the stability of Egypt and border security of Israel State (Krikpatrick, 2018). In comparison to their Israeli counterparts, the Egyptian officials consistently consolidated their power since the Camp David Accords through regional co-operations, especially with the Israel State. Accordingly, Israel State benefited the collaboration of Egyptian officers, especially on the smuggling of goods to Gaza Strip, located on the Palestinian territory and controlled by the unreliable power of Hamas militias.

Both of these parties had concerns in regard to the potential election of the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite the organization's relatively open declaration to stand by the Camp David Accords, the Muslim Brotherhood did pose a major problem for Israel State solely due to the organization's ideological affinity to Hamas and the continual hostility towards Jewish people. Similar mentality wise concerns were perceived by the Egyptian high-ranking officers, a well-skilled small group that is overly competent to fight and rule, traditionally bound to the principles of Free Officers Movement, Nasser's regional and relatively global nationalism and Anwar Al-Sadat's *realpolitik*; contradicting the fundamental motives and foundations of the Muslim Brotherhood. From the Neorealist perspective, the successful *coup d'état* was inevitable and most importantly, essential and obligatory for both of the parties after the certain election of Mohamed Morsi. The Israel State's silent contentment concordant to the successful *coup d'état* stands as a solid proof to mentioned motives (Yegin, 2016: 414).

Egypt - Israel Industry-Specific Partnership:

In addition to the historic peace deal of three decades signed between Egypt and Israel, a set of specific agreements constituted the first step within the field of a strategic partnership which took place concordant to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat's death and the occurring of new dynamics in the Canaan region including the mutual exchange of prisoners and Egypt's statement apropos the potential appointment of an ambassador to Israel State (Gold, 2013: 15-32). Primarily, with the free trade agreement signed between Israel and Egypt, under the leadership of the US (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2019), it was anticipated that trade volume between the two nations would increase from \$44 million to more than \$70 million (Sütalan, 2015: 138). Within the framework of that agreement, goods exported from the three regions of Alexandria, Cairo and Port Said in Egypt would be exempted from taxation (Ministry of Economy and Industry of Egypt, International Affairs). Accordingly, Israeli export rates specific to Egypt are expected to have a drastic increase (Ministry of Economy and Industry of Israel). Stating that the agreement was a crucial step in the development of economic relations between the two states, Egyptian Minister of Industry and Foreign Trade Mohammad Rashid emphasized that it would also contribute greatly to the welfare of the region and the shaping of a comprehensive and fair peace environment in the Canaan.

Attended by the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, the signing ceremony became the platform for the US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick's statements regarding the significance of the agreement between Egypt and Israel State since the 1979 accords. Previously, an Egypt - Israel industry and trade agreement was brought to the agenda in 1995, but the USA supported proposal was declined by Egypt. However, currently, Egypt was obligated to sign the agreement in order to avoid the projected conditions due to the new textile import regulations that would come into force in the USA on the very first day of January, which are, according to Minister of Finance Youssef Boutros Ghali, could cost more than \$470 million damage to Egyptian exports and 200,000 jobs to employment market (Sapa-AFP, 2004). Attended by the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, the signing ceremony became the platform for the US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick's statements regarding the significance of the agreement between Egypt and Israel State since the 1979 accords. Previously, an Egypt - Israel industry and trade agreement were brought to agenda in 1995, but the USA supported proposal was declined by Egypt. However, currently, Egypt was obligated to sign the agreement in order to avoid the projected conditions due to the new textile import regulations that would come into force in the USA in the very first day of January, which are,

according to Minister of Finance Youssef Boutros Ghali, could cost more than \$470 million damage to Egyptian exports and 200,000 jobs to employment market. As the textile becomes a more and more trending sector in the Egyptian economy, the mentioned agreement is projected to revive foreign investment which was on the decline down to \$400 million in 2003 (Hassanein, 2018: 3-4).

Additionally, Israel began exporting natural gas to Egypt. It is considered to be one of the most crucial agreements in the region in recent history. In line with the natural gas importation, Dolphinus Holdings of Egypt is projected to purchase 85 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas within a timeline of 15 years from Israel's Leviathan and Tamar offshore fields (Gal & Rock, 2018: 8). The amount from that export is estimated to cumulate more than \$19 billion for Israel's economy.

Greenlighting a stronger sustainability in economic relations and circulation between two nations, Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz pointed out the already established or projected to be established agreements are "just the start" (Masri, 2019) of collaboration with Egypt and emphasized that in case of insufficiency of the already sufficient subsea pipeline connecting Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, the construction probability of a second pipeline stays intact (Lewis & Rabinovitch, 2020). Accordingly, Yossi Abu, the partner of Leviathan and Tamar and the CEO of Israel's Delek Drilling, referred to the agreement as a "marking of a new era in the Middle East energy sector" (Reuters, 2020).

Concordant to the ancient hostility including numerous major disputes and armed conflicts especially skyrocketing between 1948 and 1973, Egypt, despite facing many oppositions from former regional allies, recognized Israel. Following the Camp David Accords, both nations experienced a set of challenges, occasionally originating from the other party; however, similar to the historical peace agreement, the industry-based deal marks yet another milestone to the collaboration while addressing directly to the firm and sustainable corporation and signals further consolidation of the bilateral special partnership.

To conclude; the establishment of a Jewish home was long dreamed by Hebrews. Acquiring the support of the United Kingdom towards the establishment of the mentioned 'home', which triggered a domino effect for other countries' declarations of endorsement was celebrated by Hebrew communities spread around the world. This, however, was vastly and aggregately protested by Arab locals and nations which kindled a series of multilateral conflicts, even towards British Mandate Government from the Jewish troops as the UK was primarily the

bold pioneer and concordantly, a failing mediator. With the support of external powers, Israel prevailed and neighboring states conceded to the existence. Certainly, coming to terms with a highly objected event such as the establishment of Israel State did take a series of events, discordances and even wars; including the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Six Days War and Yom Kippur War. However, the outcome was the bilateral tendency towards collaboration, which was initiated by Anwar al-Sadat and consolidated with the Barcelona Process. Despite experiencing a temporary setback during the regional insurgencies called the Arabian Spring, the relations were quickly regulated in, perhaps, a better manner through, primarily, the declarations of mentioned states apropos the collective strive towards better collaboration, which was concretized with the industry-specific partnership as well as the conjoint fight against terrorism.



CHAPTER IV

OIL AND NATURAL GAS CAPACITY OF THE REGION AND POLICIES OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL STATE APROPOS RESPECTIVE ENERGIES

A glance at the geography can clarify that Egypt, Israel, and conjointly Palestine, Lebanon, Southern Cyprus and Syria, the regional actors of the Eastern Mediterranean Basin, stand as the stakeholders of potential energy resources of the basin. Addedly, recent events have indicated that Turkey and Greece, despite stern controversies, could be referred as the eligible claimants as well. These controversies currently taking place among regional and continental actors have increased the international tension to the extent that transcontinental actors including France and Russia got involved with a relatively fierce approach.

Taking the prosperity of the estimated energy and natural resource capacity into account, the mentioned multilateral tension is well justified and perceptible, even by the International Relations' benchmark theories such as Realism, specific to the national interest, and Liberalism, specific to Utilitarianism, despite standing as conflicting norms. This, however, is treated as the unspoken truth; whereas the stated reasons are grounded upon the technical justifications of geographic structure of the basin, implemented and cosigned international agreements and covenants and thus, the correlated claims of rights of said actors. Almost-a-century old international challenge of energy sharing in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin appears to maintain its problematic characteristic for yet another consecutive hundred years. Accordingly, the basin's technicalities along with the energy and natural resource capacities of nations of subject carry vital importance and require comprehensive elaboration further to conspectus expressed in the Normative Framework in order to procure a wider aspect and extensive perspicacity.

4.1. Eastern Mediterranean Basin

Referred as an alternative to the highly controversial geographical depiction of 'Middle East', the post-Cold War era focused on the Eastern Mediterranean's linking feature of bridging Europe and the said depiction (Diez, 2002). Throughout history, the Eastern Mediterranean Basin stood as a non-negligible geostrategic, commercial and geopolitical power, not only for the regional actors but also for the international powers due to two vital reasons.

Primarily, it is the main route for the economic mobility between Europe and Asia as it is hosting the bridge to the Red Sea, the Suez Canal. The relatively recent expansion of the Suez Canal enabled the secured and fast transportation of commercial goods between continents, contributing to the economic growth of numerous countries. In comparison to the aggregate traffic in the Mediterranean Sea, this region held 35% (Yetkili et al., 2015: 13) and currently holds slightly over 50% of container traffic (Grifoll, Karlis and Ortego, 2018: 4-12). Secondly, international malefactions that are considered as threat risks to neighboring nations and implicitly, to residents of continents including human and narcotics trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime piracy appraise the value of the basin; platforming a gateway for preventive methods including implementing various signaling instruments, avoiding complications with immediate responses from negotiations to military measures, and thus, minimizing the probable safety and security emergencies and enforcement costs. In order to effectively respond to the mentioned commercial and safety & security wise concerns, a set of bilateral and/or multilateral agreements, acknowledgment and acceptance of declarations of EEZ's and relevant nautical terms and regulations are required (İşeri & Bartan, 2019: 117).

4.2. Egypt's Natural Gas and Oil Capacities

As indicated in the Normative Framework, Egypt has four offshore fields. The Zohr field's capacity is proven to have 850 Bcm (Elbassoussy, 2018: 75) of natural gas whereas the West Nile Delta (WND) project, including a set of different fields, has a capacity of 141 Bcm. While the Atoll field's capacity is estimated to have a gas reserve of 42 Bcm (Boustros, 2018: 10-11), the last field of Nooros, which was discovered in 2015, is believed to have 42,47 Bcm of natural gas reserve (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018). The aggregate offshore natural gas capacity of Egypt is totaled to be 1075 Bcm whereas the country's annual consumption is 57,71 Bcm which indicates that, in case the estimated figures on certain reserves are to be proven and the aforementioned fields are fully functioning, offshore natural gas capacities of Egypt would suffice to meet the domestic needs for a minimum of 17 years (CIA Library World Factbook, 2017).

Although the estimations as well as proven data demonstrates that natural gas is still the dominant natural resource, Egypt's oil reserves maintain significance in regard to national energy resources. However, most of these reserves are situated within the mainland of Egypt. Additionally, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, there is a calculated amount of 1,8

billion barrels of offshore recoverable oil located in the Nile Delta Basin (Balkaş, 2011: 28). The oil consumption of Egypt was estimated to be 802 thousand barrel per day in 2017 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018), however, recent studies indicate a 9 - 16% increase which is predicted to be more than 850 thousand barrels per day (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018). The aforementioned amount would suffice for the domestic needs for five years, if the consumption remains stable.

4.3. Israel State's Natural Gas and Oil Capacities

Israel's offshore natural gas reserve in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin is divided in nine fields; Noa (1,13 Bcm), Mari - B (42,47 Bcm), Dalit (14,16 Bcm), Tamar (283,17 Bcm), Leviathan (509,70 Bcm), Dolphin (2,26 Bcm), Shimshon (8,49 Bcm), Tanin (33,98 Bcm) and Karis (50,97 Bcm) in addition to Gaza Marines (28,31 Bcm), which is considered to be within Palestinian territory. These fields have an estimated cumulative reserve that is more than 974 Bcm (Kahveci, 2017: 31-56). In comparison to the world's aggregate reserve of natural gas, this amount might seem to be relatively small as it reflects to 0,88% of global capacity. However, in comparison to Israel's annual consumption, which is estimated to be 8,41 Bcm, this reserve is more than sufficient to provide for the national needs for the upcoming 25 years, if not more; as some scholars argue that the aforementioned amount would well meet the domestic consumption for 200 years considering the low probability that is the ultimate Resource Nationalism (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2016).

Oil, however, has been a problematic natural resource for Israel. According to the statements of The Government Services and Information Website of Israel (Israel Ministry of Energy, 2018), there have been many initiatives for exploring oil in the basin however the findings were fairly insufficient, even for meeting the domestic needs. Currently, there are no fields with proven reserves in the aforementioned region for Israel. The consumption, however, indicates a rough estimation of 90 million barrels per year (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018).

4.4. Maritime Regulations

Despite the fact that aforementioned data are concurred by a spectrum of platforms within the branches of the academy, government and private sector, the uncertainty in respects to the amount of reserves maintain its importance and vitalism as the nonexistence of multilateral

agreements among regional as well as international actors apropos norms of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone waters obstruct the explorations of energy and natural resources within the Eastern Mediterranean region. Furthermore, a potential attempt of exploring energy and natural resource capacities in non-consensual waters do pose a threat of paving the way for an atmosphere of conflict with other regions, much like Turkey's response to Israel's agreements with Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) and tertiary parties (Natali, 2012: 4).

As most of the offshore natural resource and energy-based conflicts among nations occur due to disaccord of geographical limitations, it is essential to apperceive the relevant definitions in respects to sea and maritime regulations as well. The first norm that appears in respects to offshore borders is the Territorial Sea. The UN defines the norm as the states' sovereign waters. The term consists not only of the waters but also the seabed and subsoil with a maximum limit of 12 nautical miles measured from the baseline (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Part II, 1994). The Territorial Sea is open to innocent passages of other nations' maritime vehicles that pose no threat (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Part II, 1994).

Concordant to the upper limit of 12 nautical miles, this area is known as the Exclusive Economic Zone; a crucial zone with a maximum limit of 200 nautical miles from the baseline that entitles the relevant state the right to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living and non-living natural resources as the norm of Continental Shelf is located within the same limitations and this specific norm is referred as natural prolongation of relevant state's land territory up to 200 nautical miles as well (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Part V - VI, 1994).

It is important to emphasize that, despite having a vast majority of nations' concurrences, the Convention of Law of the Sea of United Nations cannot be referred as a supra-authority over international entities, solely due to aforementioned anarchical nature of the international environment which gives nations the choice to conform/nonconform to the convention of the subject. As an instance, in 1983 Egypt formally joined the signatory countries of the Convention of Law of the Sea of United Nations, whereas the neighboring country, Israel is still not a party to the aforementioned convention, despite conforming to some of its definitions (Territorial Waters Law 5717/1956, 1990).

Regardless, today, this aspect of interactivity does occur on a daily basis and is vitally important as it is believed that energy-based initiations can alter the international relations; conflicts and civil upsurges, as well as collaboration-based rapprochements, do take place due to energy and natural resources-based motivations (Antresyan, 2014). In fact, certain scholars remark the indoctrination capacity of energy; in comparison to hard powers such as military, energy can pave the way for sustainable and long-termed impositions and/or collaborations which may form what is comprehended to be a hierarchized international platform (Şöhret, 2015: 8-11), despite the existence of pre-acknowledged anarchy. This is due to the uneven grounds in terms of energy and natural gas possessions. As an example, developments occurred in the recent past indicate that Cyprus and Israel have a surplus of natural gas capacity in their regions which can provide for domestic consumptions for several years in addition to standing as a potential contribution factor to their economies and relations with other nations through projected international trades, whereas Europe, on the other hand, requires other actors' collaborations in order to meet the natural gas needs.

Thus, from the perspective of the discipline, it is clear that energy and natural resources are critical assets required for survival as well as the designation of statuses of nations in many aspects.

4.5. Egypt's Energy Policies

4.5.1. Period of Gamal Abdel Nasser

As mentioned earlier, Nasser came to power with a projection of an integrative idea that was fueled by primarily national and concordantly international, relatively confederative motive which emphasized the importance of advancing towards an Arab collectivity that relies on each other au lieu the external actors when the lack of unity was heavily perceived in the Arab world; placing his claim for the leadership, not only for Egypt but Arabs in general. Eventually, when three of his six main principles - which would later on referred to as Nasserism - focus on the abolishment of imperialism, feudalism and political influence of monopolies and the capital (Binder, 1964), it is clear that these principles, vastly appreciated by the Arab youth not only in Egypt but in the Arab world in general, indicated a nationalistic approach that relied heavily on the communal and anti-imperialist motives. The international bombshell that is, perhaps addressed as Nasser's masterpiece, the nationalization of the Suez Canal is a solid practice embodying the aforementioned principles.

Another practical example of Nasser's conducts that were implemented in order to detangle Egypt's economic and political shackles is his fierce opposition to the Baghdad Pact. Supporting the members of Arab League for stronger and further consolidated collaboration before the implementation of the Pact, an agreement that was perceived by Nasser as an obstacle to Arab unity and safety as it would further reinforce the Western influence, Nasser categorically rejected the oath to the Pact, in addition to endorsing the Arab leaders to not get involved with it and condemning Iraq apropos the declaration of Iraqi allegiance to the Pact; despite the isolation threats coming from the Western actors.

Despite the first impression that underlines his policies as isolationist, distant to foreign interactions, anti-western and even hostile, Nasser attempted to maintain warm relations with the USA and the west in general during his initial years as the leader; the motive was preserved however the actors changed after the Suez crisis, building bilateral trust and collaboration with USSR which would eventuate in cooperation for the construction of the Aswan Dam. Nasser was known for his narrative rampages targeting the "distrustful west" while centering the Arabian pride and revolting against "the colonialist"; to add more, he even pursued this approach through his well-established program called 'Voice of Arabs', a media tool which became extremely popular in the region through harsh criticism of the western influence in the region. (Jankowski, 2002) However, setting the blurry intentions and agendas apropos the uncertainty in regards to the sincerity of the intention or the probable strategic maneuver to appeal to masses aside, two solid outcomes could be analyzed; Nasser did appeal to masses and did adopt a relatively neutralist policy towards international powers.

The probable resolution of disambiguation traced in these conflicting narratives, approaches and practices underlies in Nasser's vision for Egypt which are concurred on both international and domestic policies implemented in his term. Nasser enacted a series of foreign policies including Agrarian Reform Law of 1952 which would restrict individual freehold of the land, improvements in public services including healthcare - which had a drastic increase in figures of medical staff as well as facilities - and education and reformation of employee's personal rights. These numerous initiations were intended to relatively militate in favor of the citizens and liberate Egypt from what were relatively apprehended as international economic tyrannies; both address to communal interest, referring to his socialist tendencies (Choueiri, 2011: 598-633). On the international scale, he strived in order to maintain a balance between preserving his leadership prestige for especially the Arab youth and retaining the already established relations, improving, even, if the opportunities occurred and avoid aggression if

possible. Within the scope of energy, recognizing the significance of national resources and working towards using them for the benefit of Arabs - in line with his philosophy of Pan-Arabism with socialist paradigms -, Nasser was never reluctant to take sweeping measures if dialogues were insufficient, as seen from his radical initiations that caused the Suez crisis, the construction of Aswan Dam and closing the ports of Tiran.

4.5.2. Period of Anwar Al-Sadat

Anwar Al-Sadat had a relatively rational nature which rendered the National Good a priority, in comparison to his predecessor's Greater Good, an aspect of primary priority for him; making him the hero of the people whereas Anwar Al-Sadat was known to be a true diplomat and statesman, as appraised by his counterpart, Henry Kissinger of USA. In accordance with his aspect, Anwar Al-Sadat mobilized and realized his actions on the international platform towards a very certain and essential goal; whether it's in favor of the state or not. He never halted to advance to this ultimate cause howsoever. With an opportunistic approach, the end did justify the means, making the aggression and warfare a viable methodology to impose alternatives that were beneficial for his country. An instance for the pragmatic approach of Anwar Al-Sadat is the 1973 Oil Crisis that took place during the Yom Kippur war. The USA's financial support to Israel State in the course of Anwar Al-Sadat's strategically placed aggression, which was in fact a diplomatic leverage as he primarily attempted to resolve the tension through diplomacy however realized that the effort was in vain, that is the Yom Kippur war - as explained in the Chapter I - was not appreciated by Anwar Al-Sadat. In response, owing to Anwar Al-Sadat's persuasive competence and other reasons, the oil ministers of OPEC laid an oil embargo on the USA, skyrocketing the crude oil prices not only in the USA but in the west in general. The crisis as well as the war was resolved with the intervention of UN agencies and Egypt was the ultimate beneficiary of this strategic operation.

Standing as the successor of a relatively radical and bold leader of a country thirsty for a state clumping towards becoming a regional power with full liberation and sovereignty motivations, Anwar Al-Sadat was often mistaken to be a leader that could be manipulated and passive. However, his naivety as well as his peaceful characteristic were intentional; it was to disguise his 'Macchiavelist' tendencies in order to gain the support of the nation, as well as the international platform, which, otherwise, would pose threat and obstruct the pursuance of operations that was implemented, or projected to be implemented, to advance to the aforementioned target if the perseverance of the status quo which enabled him to implement proper policies was in risk.

In accordance with this spirit that heavily contradicts with the idealism of his comrade, he did not hesitate to assume the leading role to break the ice with long lasting opponent, the Israel State, and commence the normalization process, visited Israel State and made a very collaborative statement which paved the way for his new title of “Hero of the Crossing”. The reason behind this historically shocking *mise en scene* of a recognition was to liberate the Sinai Peninsula from the Israeli influence, as the region had long known significance in terms of safety and security from the geostrategic perspective. However, within the scope of energy and natural resources, specific to North-Western Desert and the Suez Gulf, the peninsula was hosting a number of oil fields with non-negligible oil capacity of agreeable quality (Dhanarsu, 2012: 177-181).

Another example of Anwar Al-Sadat's pragmatic measures are the signing of the protocol with Iran in regard to covering the energy crisis of Egypt. In addition to the supply of 650 thousand tons of oil, in the same year, both countries cosigned 850 million dollars' worth of projects that would benefit Egypt through tangible financial flows (Yanner, 1975).

From the Constructivist point of view, Anwar Al-Sadat's initiatives to collaborate with Iran as well as Israel State are contradictual. Liberal perspective could be offered as an explanatory paradigm however the Yom Kippur war question's viability remains unresolved. On the other hand, it cannot be referred to as a Realist motive as the recognition of Israel State harmed Anwar Al-Sadat's reputation concordant to the declarations of Arab league. Anwar Al-Sadat can only be explained as a Neorealist statesman who was well aware of the significance of the energy and natural resources and has undertaken a series of international implementations in order to provide better alternatives for his country.

4.5.3. Period of Hosni El Sayed Mubarak

In line with Egypt's tradition, Hosni El Sayed Mubarak was coming from a military background. He had a tranquil nature, much like his predecessor; however, the motivations of both leaders differed from each other vastly. As indicated, Anwar Al-Sadat's quiet approach was a reflection of his statesmanship. Whereas Hosni El Sayed Mubarak had a tendency of keeping his head down and he thusly avoided familiarization, which would ensure him with certain appointments in the military as well as the state (Bulloch and McKittrick, 2020) His attribute would, later on, reflect to his leadership on national as well as international level.

Concordant to his presidency, Hosni El Sayed Mubarak followed the foreign policy path of his predecessor and focused on consolidating the relations with USA and Israel (Telci, 2018: 25). In fact, his dedication to this consolidation was strictly conclusive that he preferred to look beyond the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (Ottaway, 2020). This was, among numerous other things, a shocking phenomenon that was criticized harshly on national and international scale; considering Egypt's role in the region of the period, it was scandalous.

This firm attitude was reflected as a role of mediation, however, the reality signaled the deep corruption. Hosni El Sayed Mubarak did follow his predecessors apropos the '*intifāh*', the openness policy enacted by Anwar Al-Sadat in order to liberalize the country's economy as well as liberate the country from the Soviet influence, which was, of course, Gamal Abdel Nasser's implementation. Hosni El Sayed Mubarak did realize the placement of '*intifāh*' on the economic scale. In fact, despite the preference of the majority of countries in the world due to resource nationalism, Hosni El Sayed Mubarak preferred to take a step further and embrace the very liberal approach which allowed the international capital to mobilize operations on the Egyptian oil (Yesevi, 2013).

However, as the strict leader failed to implement the mentioned openness policy within the field of politics as well as the public, it was later speculated that the mentioned openness policy within the field of economics was implemented in order to take serious bribes on international scale in order to enrich the Mubarak family and their entourage especially on the matter of natural resources, causing an non-institutionalized yet state backed economic segregation, or a distorted open economy (Uysal, 2020). Israel State is believed to benefit from this distortion through purchasing relatively cheap oil from Egypt.

In regard to the natural resources, what has ended, or at least stood as one of the facilitating elements for ending the term of the longest ruling leader of Egypt was lack of prediction and planning. Egypt was an energy-wise self-sufficient country. However, the third era of the Industrial Revolution, which prompted industrialization on the global scale, increased the domestic natural resource demand. The 2008 was a turning point as Egypt, a country formerly exporting natural resources, started to import natural resources for the very first time. In addition to loading extra weight on the already existing burden that is the economic crisis, the energy terrorism, which targeted the pipelines, causing a brief increase in tensions between Egypt and Israel, became an unresolved issue.

Hosni El Sayed Mubarak attempted to implement protective policies, but it was too late (Yesevi, 2013). After 30 years of reign, or, perhaps a relative tyranny, Hosni El Sayed Mubarak's throne was tottered as a consequence of his own incompetence. Energy plays a major role in politicians' positions. Hosni El Sayed Mubarak was aware of the significance of energy, as well as the caliber of the upcoming and steadily growing challenge - much like the water polluting dam in Ethiopia which harmed the waters of the Nile - yet, took no precautions and proceeded to implement wrong policies (Ottaway, 2020). Concordant to the regional protests known as *the Yasemen Revolution* which caused large demonstrations in Egypt, the overconfident leader was suspended from his position and was jailed in 2012.

4.5.4. Period of Mohamed Morsi

Coming from the deep-rooted opposition of Muslim Brotherhood background, Morsi was fairly different from the other presidents of Egypt. He was an accomplished academician with no military background and took active roles in politics in the *Ikhwan* (Muslim Brotherhood), a political group that was perceived as the main rival of governments led by former military officers. His hard-fought rise in power was celebrated by the majority of opposition groups however the public support declined swiftly concordant to assertion of 2012 constitutional declaration as it was perceived to be a segregate and strict execution (Özhan, 2013: 17). This was the tip of the iceberg as the magnitude of the energy crisis grew more than ever, which stood as one of the major reasons for the public dissatisfaction, if not the first. Within a very short period of time of one year, the electrical power deficit grew 25%, causing frequent power outages, which was attributed to the shortage in the fossil fuel by the Ministry of Electricity (Al-Arabiya, 2013). The peak of frustration took place when the Mohamed Morsi led government failed to place tangible resolutions to the energy outages during the tourism season, which repainted the government's prestige with incompetency. Furthermore, the military was discontent to lose governmental power to the rival organization and did not refrain to openly demonstrate the sentiment. In addition to attempting to cripple the functionality of the government through relative disobedience from the law enforcement side as well as the public entities responsible for the supply of energy (Trager, 2015), the shocking speculations suggest that the army collaborated with the youth rebel group Tamarod in order to fuel the energy crisis in order to set the stage to legitimately banish Mohamed Morsi (Marsden, 2013).

The domestic opposition's hostility undoubtedly played a major role. However, the situation was too troublesome to place blame on sole actor as, in addition to long queues for gasoline in stations, Egyptians were facing difficulties accessing basic nutrition due to long and

periodical energy outages, which has interrupted the productions (Hubbard, 2013). Compelled to come to terms with the energy insufficiency of a country which, for decades, was self-sufficient, Egyptians cheered for Mohammed Morsi after his endeavors bloomed and won the general elections; believing that the leader who did not rise from the ranks of the military, would address the problems of the people. However, struggling to rule while the very institutionalized and organized opposition attempted to halt every implementation possible, Mohammed Morsi neglected his ought-to-be priority and instead, due to his own, as well as his organization's inexperience in governing, enacted and implemented strict measures and failed to resolve the tangible problem that is the energy and natural resources. After only one very disappointing year of ruling, Mohammed Morsi was dethroned through *coup d'état* due to numerous reasons, one of them being in close relations with Turkey, jailed and lost his life during one of the hearings of his sentence.

4.5.5. Period of Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi

Concordant to the successfully executed *coup d'état* which toppled and jailed the previous leader Mohammed Morsi and the transition government, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi claimed the presidency. Although coming from a military background, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi's priority was, unlike the expected, the energy, as he was well aware of his country's challenges apropos the subject. He has demonstrated that through numerous examples, primarily with the 20 km of bicycle marathon that he had attended with governmental officials, students and activists right after his oath to the cabinet. This was done in order to promote reducing the utilization of national energy resources, in addition to addressing the environmental and health motivations.

Coming from a military background, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi's approach had oppressive tendencies. However, considering his emphasis on energy and natural resources, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi enforced relatively totalitarian initiatives for the sake of long-term economic recovery and energy implementations, which were consistently exhausted during his colleague Hosni El Sayed Mubarak's term. Within this scope, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi tried to familiarize the international companies to his administration and reconsolidate the trust through investing up to 5 billion USD until 2016. His initiations, supported by regional actors of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and UAE, produced good outcomes; resulting in a number of protocols signed with various international companies and receiving the declaration of internationally known British Petroleum in regards to finalization of the decision process which consists of a gradual investment of 12 billion USD in Egypt (El-Sheikh, 2015). Furthermore, one of the contractors of the energy sector in Egypt, the Italian energy and drilling company, ENI, announced the

good news in 2015. Following the drilling attempts in the South Eastern Mediterranean Basin, the company declared a natural resource bed within the Zohr field which potentially consists of a natural resource capacity of 850 Bcm. The mentioned amount is perceived to cover the domestic needs for a good amount of 17 years, which was cheerfully welcomed by the nation struggling to meet the domestic needs for a substantial amount of time.

Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi has demonstrated that, despite his background, he has paid a great attention to energy, which was unexpected as the Egyptian leaders rising from the ranks did have a collective tendency to fortify the army and focus on security. However, as Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi was well aware that one of the crucial elements of sovereignty was through implementing a firm self-help model specific to the elements of the nation. In line with this, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi placed energy and natural resources prior to foreign relations. As an example, through signing energy protocols with Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) and Israel State, he has clearly shown that he did not hesitate to further deteriorate the predicament relations with Turkey; as it was apropos the question of energy and natural resources (Durul, 2020). In addition, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi highlighted his will to transform Egypt into a nuclear hub for energy, despite international concerns from regional and transcontinental actors in regards to nuclear arms security (Burkhard, 2017: 22-27) - despite the fact that Egypt stands as a signatory party for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1968 - and reactions from national and international organizations and INGO's working in the field of environment (Shay, 2018: 3).

On the contrary of what was expected, the coup d'état leader is much appreciated for his endeavors to ameliorate conditions and respond the national diuturnal problems for Egypt as well as Egyptians. Recent polls demonstrate that current president's re-election is a highly probable option, and this is due to Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi's focus on national issues rather than following a certain agenda dedicated to certain ideologies, passivism or corruption.

4.6. Israel State's Energy Policies

4.6.1. Pre-Gulf Crisis of 2003

Established after the Second World War with the support of trans-continental actors and struggling to realize self-legitimization on the international platform through recognition, which, after 30 years of endeavors, was accomplished with Anwar Al-Sadat, Israel was known to be an energy poor country. Accordingly, following the ancient models in regard to the energy

through oil and coal and maintaining the distance towards natural gas utilization as, despite standing as a cheaper and relatively more environmental-friendly option, from the perspective of the energy security, it did pose various risks as it requires long-term infrastructure investments as well as global agreements.

Unfortunately, despite the change of opinion towards natural gas, Israel State's attempts to invite international companies working in the field of energy, while embracing rather liberal policies including the concession-based approach (OECD, 2020), were unfortunately responded with insufficient interests. Representatives of companies were well aware of Israel State's relations with regional Arab countries that were considered to be rich in natural resources. They were concerned to be left out of the market through corporation sanctions from mentioned nations which would have harmed their financial interests, if not resulted in a permanent elimination and blacklisting from the field. Very few companies demonstrated interest however the explorations resulted in unsatisfactory outcomes (Bahgat, 2005: 671-677) This has compelled Israel State to be energy dependent on other nations, overriding the significance of energy security's aspect of provision as well as the regional dialogue. Accordingly, the Israel State, a country with a long history of inability to meet domestic needs from domestic and national resources until late 2000's while constantly fighting against the energy terrorism, assesses the energy as part of the national security.

Primarily, it is the Ministry of National Infrastructures that enacts, implements and practices policies within the field of energy and natural resources. However, the National Economic Council, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Security Council and the Prime Minister's Office undertake determinant roles in the decision-making procedures apropos the energy. Additionally, the majority of energy documents and data, especially notes informing the reserves and amounts, are permanently classified and the resting amount can only be opened to the public knowledge after four years of delay. This was the main reason for controversy when Israel State joined OECD. The country proceeded with the full membership procedure longer than it usually takes, as one of the conditions of full membership required information and data sharing with the OECD linked International Energy Agency.

In line with this, Israel State's priorities in regards to natural resources and energy were to frequently engage and establish long-termed natural resource and energy-based agreements with regional actors that are energy wealthy and avoid, prevent and take cautious measures that

would obstruct and complicate the provision procedures. In the course of realization, Israel State did tackle a series of issues. The very first major issue in the field of energy and natural resources was experienced nine years after the establishment of Israel State.

As a consequence of international law - as declared by UN organs -, Eastern blocks support as well as USA's pressure, Israel State was obligated to withdraw military existence from Sinai; increasing the significance of the port of Eilat, as well as the straits of Tiran for the nation as it became the hub for transportation for the oil imported from Iran. However, the defeated and thusly discredited leader, the defender of Pan Arabism, Gamal Abdel Nasser was misinformed by Moscow, banned United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) from Sinai in order to mobilize military power in the Peninsula and closed the straits of Tiran. The complication was quickly resolved and the dispute was temporarily settled when Israel State conquered Sharm el-Sheikh and opened the blockade which was followed by the international community's pledge to never obstruct Israel State's innocent naval mobilization after the return of Sharm el-Sheikh to Egypt took place. Of course, the mentioned closure was only the kindle whereas, what could be adhered to as the blaze, known as the Six Days War, had an utmost impact, not only on the national and regional, but also on international level as well; as transcontinental actors did not only play the role of mediation this time but they were directly affected by the upcoming tension.

The Arab - Israel war of 1973 had numerous outcomes. As the war took place between Israel State and Arab nations considered to be wealthy in energy and natural resources, the expected did occur and one of these outcomes was the effect on international energy circulation and market. The war was ceased through the intervention of international organizations' organs and the diplomatic competency of Henry Kissinger. Without a doubt, Henry Kissinger's strive which successfully resulted in the settlement of the conflict through separation consensus was not only to mediate and defuse the ongoing tension in the region but also to protect his country's interests; as the USA's decision to support Israel State with financial and military aid in the course of the war was not approved by the oil-rich regional actors who were constituting the majority of decision makers of OECD which resulted in an oil embargo against the USA.

Known as the Oil Crisis of 1973, the crude oil prices first doubled, and concordantly quadrupled in the USA, affecting the transcontinental nation as well as certain western countries. Concordant to the massive blow of the international energy supply the nation has taken, the Nixon's administration has promptly commenced domestic explorations and

established contacts with other energy and natural resource rich countries in order to find alternative solutions to the relevant vulnerability of the USA. However, within the scope of energy, globalism is a non-negligible norm. This was the reason, concordant to the arrival of the UN Peace Corps, Henry Kissinger convinced Israel to retreat forces from Sinai and Golan Heights. Followingly, the oil embargo was lifted two weeks after and concordantly, the war was formally finalized after the United Nations Security Council Resolution 340, which was declared as a compensation in regard to the failure of Resolution 338 and Resolution 339, took place (United Nations Security Council Resolution 340, 1973). The military retreat from the Golan Heights and Sinai of Israel State, the resolution of the Arab - Israel war of 1973 and the lifting of the embargo which has ended the Oil Crisis of the same year carries yet another significance in regard to the natural resources of Israel State.

Certainly, considering the problematic relations with Syria throughout the history, Golan heights are crucial for Israel State in terms of safety and security. Primarily, it is only 60 kilometers away from Damascus, Syria. Furthermore, the altitude of the section of these heights under the Israeli influence is more than 2000 meters, whereas Damascus' average altitude is less than 700 meters which gives Israel the upper hand on spot elevation. However, the geostrategic significance is not solely due to secureness of the nation. The region has one of the main drinkable water sources, providing for the $\frac{1}{3}$ 'rd of domestic needs for Israel State (Arslan, 2019). The importance of the region was recently emphasized by the statements of Israel State's PM of the period, Benjamin Netanyahu, while putting a firm appearance on the international platform, remarking that Golan heights will forever be controlled by Israel (Canli, 2018).

Until the early 2000, as clearly seen, Israel State's general conduct and practice for the natural resources and energy was circling around the protection and preservation of the status quo while attempting to find alternatives in case of potential unexpected occurrences; only to be aggregately changed as the nation's explorations has shown hope that Israel State, after all, might provide for the domestic needs for a substantial amount of time through newly discovered domestic resources.

4.6.2. Post-Gulf Crisis of 2003

Following other alternatives in terms of energy, Israel State redirected the national policies towards natural gas in the 1990's in line with the increasing consumption of energy as the industrialization was consolidating its establishment on the global level. Considering the recent economic recession, a number of regional conflicts of various scales and the collective

comprehension of energy and natural resources' role in the international relations, it was reasonable for Israel State to focus on other options; the nation had to become rather conservative and required to attach an additional significance to the already crucial element as a specific dependency, especially on a single actor, was conflicting with the 'self-help' motivated policy. Accordingly, although it was never operationalized, a Memorandum of Understanding in regards to natural gas was signed with Qatar; signaling Israel State's strive of the period of consolidating relations in terms of energy and natural resources; not only with regional, but also with the transcontinental and the international actors. Although standing as a well-known provider of military equipment in the region, USSR was adhered as one of the energies and natural resource suppliers, which was projected to be streamed to Israel State through pipelines over Caucasia and Turkey. Another significant energy-based agreement the Israel State signed within the mentioned period of time was the historic 2005 agreement with Egypt which was planned to consist of a provision of more than 1,5 Bcm of natural gas within the period of 15 upcoming years, with a 5-year-extension possibility. The deal was operationalized for a respective seven years period however, due to regional insurgencies, it was unilaterally terminated from the Egyptian side (Levine, 2012).

The domestic explorations were commenced in the same period and after a decade, in 1999 and 2000, Israel State's efforts bloomed. The Noa - 1 and Mari - B fields in the offshore of Ashkelon were proven to consist of an energy reserve that is more than 30 Bcm. Despite depleting earlier than expected in the year of 2014 due to dethronement of Hosni El Sayed Mubarak, which has temporarily obstructed the stream from Israel State's long-going partner of Egypt and thusly causing the nation to compensate the energy shortfall of the period from domestic needs from the mentioned reserves, Israel State was not impuissant.

In fact, Israel State was quite the opposite; a country which was compelled to provide for domestic needs throughout the history and addedly, was obliged to reshape domestic and foreign policies, accordingly, was relieved to find great prosperity in the Levantine basin. In 2009, solely the field of Leviathan was assumed to have a grand capacity of 311 Bcm, titling the reserve to be the greatest deep-water discovery of all times. Along with other prosperous discoveries including the 238 Bcm capacity of Tamar (Henderson, 2012), Israel State's offshore capacities were estimated to meet the domestic needs for 200 years (Henderson, 2011); relieving the nation from the historic burden and reconstructing the status in the international platform through advancing from the rank of natural resource importer to a potential exporter,

which was officialized through signing the agreement of natural gas supply with the Palestine Power Generation Company (Golan, 2014).

Mentioned amounts, despite constituting a relatively small amount of global energy reserve, pose numerous potentials for actors of regions. Certainly, the natural resources and energy, being an element of significance in regard to shaping the international relations, cause collaborations as well as conflicts. Concordant to aforementioned discoveries, Lebanon promptly announced a declaration, claiming that the regional reserves belong to Lebanon as the substantial amount of 850 km² is, according to Lebanese officials, standing in the Lebanese territory. Israel State had certain initiations apropos the region of the subject with Lebanon yet after a decade, the issue preserves its complicated characteristics and the relations between two countries has since been cautious (Henderson, 2012).

In addition to questionable interactions with Lebanon, Israel State's relations with Turkey has deteriorated drastically since the discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin; despite having reliable relations throughout the history which caused preservative perceptions for GSASC in regard to Israel State's position. Coincidentally and concordantly, relations between Israel and GSASC were improved and for the very first time in the history, an Israeli PM, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the GSASC, paving the way for a new period of relations, not only between mentioned states but, taking into consideration of the Greek influence in the GSASC, among Greece as well (Ferziger & Orphanides, 2012).

Another interesting relational alteration has taken place with Egypt. Commencing from the normalization period, Egypt and Israel State had relatively good relations, especially in terms of interactions regarding energy and natural resources. This, however, was disrupted when the reflection of upsurges in the region dethroned Mubarak and Egypt lost the former strong influence over Sinai due to domestic insurrections; the location hosting pipelines streaming natural gas to Israel State. This has reawakened the energy security concerns of Israel State, which was already in a state of conservation since the 1990's, and the expected did occur as the mentioned pipelines were subjected to 14 assaults by local residents as well as radical groups (Das, 2020: 218-219) in less than 18 months (Fisher, 2012). In the light of internal destabilization along with regional sabotages, the state owned Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS), known to operate the energy transfer has taken a rather unconventional decision and unilaterally terminated the stream (Rabinovitch, 2012) to Israel State which used to cover the nation's 40% of total energy consumption. It was declared to be a decision that was

not affected by international politics, as the head of the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company Mohamed Shoeib emphasized (Kirkpatrick, 2012). However, the statement was perceived to be doubting, considering that the state was influenced by the main opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood, during the period; a political group that was perceived to have alternative agendas as well as perception in regard to relations with Israel State (Das, 2020: 2018-219).

The following years were becoming more of a challenge for the concretized collaboration of 30 years as the public view towards Israel, that was siding with the current ruling party, main opposition of the period, in Egypt escalated its appearance; Israel the occupation power. Worsening the situation with gaining more power, the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi and his administration sentenced the former Minister of Energy Sameh Fahmi and Hussein Salem, a famous businessman, to jail due corruption apropos supplying Israel State with questionably modest priced energy and harming the national interests (Kirkpatrick, 2012). Although it was seen as a threat to bilateral relations, Israel State's Benjamin Netanyahu defused the rising tension through emphasizing his vision of perceiving it as a business rather than a political initiation while Avigdor Lieberman, the Foreign Minister of Israel State, remarked that interpreting the corresponding party's decision to a political dispute would be a mistake as the peace treaty of 1979 carries its vital cruciality for both sides.

The surprising decision from the Egyptian side is notably worthy as, what could be referred to as the Israeli strive towards energy independence, which was kindled after the late 1990's discoveries, had gained momentum; in line with the statements of PM Netanyahu underlining the national strive towards being an energy independent state (Winer, 2012). In addition to Leviathan, other energy and natural resource reserves were pursued to be explored and the results were encouraging. Addedly, despite the initial concern of Israel State in regard to disruption of the historic peace treaty as the Muslim Brotherhood gained power in 2012, the treaty was untouched, and the collaborative engagements were expected to be elaborated due to the energy shortage in Egypt. Two nations seemed to exchange the roles of supplier and the supplied, yet the cooperative approach was maintained and further broadened.

In 2013, Israeli companies' announcing dialogues with Egypt indicated the probable exportation of gas as Egypt was preferable in comparison to European nations. The consecutive year, operations were promised as the substantial amount of 7 Bcm could be streamed to Egypt from Leviathan field for 15 years, as the statement emphasized (Ashwarya, 2018: 77-99). Following the 2017's primary agreement that included Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi's legislation

consisting the permit that allows the private firms to operationalize energy and natural resources-based agreements with the state, Israeli Delek Drilling and Noble Oil signed a 10-year contract with Egyptian Dolphinus company consisting a large amount of 64 Bcm exportation (Pulsinelli, 2018).

As mentioned earlier, once a fragile country that required the implementation of conservative domestic regulations and surprisingly, yet not conflictingly, liberal foreign policies in accordance to meet the national self-help and security motives, Israel State transformed it's status to a nation with grand natural resource wealth within a relatively short period of time of 20 years while further establishing and consolidating energy based collaborations with numerous international actors, one of them being the historically hostile neighbor, Egypt.

To summarize; the aggregate offshore natural gas capacity of Egypt is 1075 Bcm and the oil capacity is 1,8 billion barrels oil whereas the domestic consumption is approximately 57,71 Bcm of natural gas and 30,5 million barrels of oil. The data suggests that the national natural gas reserves would suffice for 17 years. For the oil, however, it is only 5 years. Covering less than 1% of the global natural gas reserves, Israel State's aggregate offshore natural gas capacity is estimated to be 974 Bcm. There is no specific data given by the Israeli authorities in regard to offshore oil reserves. The annual domestic natural gas consumption of Israel State is estimated to be 8,41 Bcm which indicates that the reserve would suffice domestic consumption for more than two centuries.

Taking into consideration of the mentioned data, the globally trending industrialization as well as the current situation which emphasizes Egypt's multi utilizations of natural gas in order to meet other domestic needs, Egypt relies on natural gas importation; whereas Israel state - once considered to be an energy poor country and was obliged to regulate the national as well as foreign policies thusly - seems to prefer the exportation, as domestic reserves are vast in comparison to annual consumption.

Within the scope of national interests, despite the historical hostility, two nations have relatively maintained the peaceful approaches which traditionally paved the way for collaborative protocols, covenants and agreements towards each other for 40 years; and demonstrate a mutually concurred tendency to pursue bilateral cooperation as seen from the recent developments happening in the Eastern Mediterranean basin.

CHAPTER V

REVIEW AND CONCLUSION OF OIL & NATURAL GAS POLICIES OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL STATE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF SUSTAINABLE COOPERATION

5.1. Review of Oil & Natural Gas Policies of Egypt and Israel State Within the Scope of Sustainable Cooperation

5.1.1. Data and Facts Supporting the Sustainable Cooperation

In comparison to global reserves, the energy and natural resources - specific to oil and natural gas - within the geographical limitation of the Eastern Mediterranean basin, might seem relatively small in regard to solely forming and fortifying a substantial collaboration between Egypt and Israel State.

Table – 1: Egypt and Israel State’s Natural Gas and Oil Reserves and Consumptions

State	Natural Gas	Annual Consumption	Oil	Annual Consumption
Egypt	1075 Bcm	57,71 Bcm	1,8 billion barrels	320 million barrels
Israel State	974 Bcm	8,41 Bcm	-/-	90 million barrels

This table is compiled from the sources indicated in the subtitles of 2.4., 4.2. and 4.3 of this study.

As it can be seen from the *Table - 1: Egypt and Israel State’s Natural Gas and Oil Reserves and Consumptions*, both countries have substantial amount of natural gas and oil reserves in comparison to the annual consumption. However, it should be well noted that the perpetually conducted studies and explorations around the globe frequently update the currently existing figures of proven reserves and the mentioned region is, perhaps, one of the most prominent of all which comprises a basis for the potential increase for the national reserves of Egypt and Israel State’s offshore fields.

Taking into consideration of ruling bodies of two nations' traditional tendency apropos disregarding the historical feuds as well as benefiting from every opportunity to establish or further cementify the environment consisting of peaceful and collaborative approaches in every aspect of these states, the natural gas and oil, despite the limited reserves, are yet another of numerous alternatives that preserved and protected the cooperation and reconciliation to this day; which is a tangible element that the mentioned paradigm is expected to be retained in the future as well.

Furthermore, the limitation of reserves of aforementioned resources is partially due to the non-existence of international protocols which obstruct the transparent data acquisition as well as sharing. The basin is highly controversial as there are numerous regional as well as international actors involved in the subject. There are certain agreements signed between certain corresponding parties - which, unfortunately conflicts with each other, as seen from the non-conformity instance of EastMed and Memorandum of Understanding on the Limitation of Maritime Jurisdictions in the Mediterranean - however a holistic accord that includes and integrates all parties is certainly lacking. This issue limits and obstructs the access to reliable information.

Adedly, the probability of mentioned parties having reservations in regard to sharing the information obtained through irregular procedures in order to avoid probable deterioration of relations with regional actors due to international laws and regulations is still presumable. Thus, in order to pursue effective explorations, which would eventually benefit all corresponding parties in regard to achieving accurate results as well as liberating the actors with potential information obtained through non-conventional methods from experiencing a backslide of relations with countries, especially regional and followingly all actors involved in the subject are obliged to concur on collectively agreed accords as well as official adherences to said protocols. A probable accord with Turkey in the future, as an instance, in regard to the long disputed Exclusive Economic Zone partnered by both Egypt and Israel State, would facilitate the explorations especially on the northern part of the Eastern Mediterranean Basin, paving the way for consolidated relations not only with Turkey, but also between Egypt and Israel State as well.

While referring to the significance of regional and international collaboration, the transparency on reserves and probability of increase in amounts might pave the way for further consolidated relations between Egypt and Israel State. Additionally, the regional history

underlines certain characteristics of the relation between the administration and the people that differ vastly from the Western approach. Primarily, the governing systems tend to rely on the leader rather than the people as the highest rank is affiliated with utmost dominance. Attributed with, perhaps, a sort of a divine power, the leader is praised as well as feared. Accordingly, the leader prefers to maintain the distance with the people; despite the non-verbalized yet somehow well implied social construct that refers to the adhered medieval authority which justifies to remain 'above' the people, it majorly is due to the individual safety and security concerns of the leader, as seen from the recent outrage kindled due to Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi's addressing to military academy cadets behind bulletproof glass (Anadolu Agency, 2020).

In line with this relative isolation, the leader feels the urge to acquire the support of external powers instead of the citizens. The vivid instance to this phenomenon is Gamal Abdel Nasser's relations with the USA as well as the USSR in the course of nationalization of the Suez Canal which was corresponded with fierce protestation from France and was finalized with the declaration of war. In the course of facing a very strong opposition including the forces of France, UK and Israel, Gamal Abdel Nasser relied on the support of two world powers concurring on his cause. One of the very rare occurrences throughout the Cold War era, the USA and USSR's accordance is what finalized the war in countenance of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

In fact, possessing the mentioned utmost power in the aforementioned region is a crucial priority that surpasses numerous governing mechanisms, one of which is the mission, vision and strive of the state of subject. The long-established governing mechanisms tend to differ the state from the government in a functioning manner; the government implements the short-termed resolutions that facilitate the strive towards the long-termed projections established by the state. However, this is not the case for Egypt. The differing of the government and the state, as the history of the nation demonstrates on numerous occasions, is neglected - which is partially in accordance with the traditions of the regions - and the ideal of the state varies with each government, or precisely, the leader with relatively totalitarian tendencies; despite how much the currently established ideals conflict with the prior one.

An example of this phenomenon is the sensational practices of Anwar Al-Sadat. Rising from the ranks with his comrade, Anwar Al-Sadat was one of the most loyal officials during the government of Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, not only did he abandon numerous principles that were established by his fellow soldier, and later on his President, as well as his former allegiance the Free Officers Movement, Anwar Al-Sadat, ignored all fierce protestation

and opposition originating from Egypt as well as the international platform and shook hands with his Israeli counterpart.

This approach is appreciated by the corresponding party, the Israel State, as the collaborative approaches of counterparts with former military background tend to pave the way for cementified dialogues and cooperation, usually in favor of Israel State; thus, justifying the delicate approach of Israel State in regards to making sure that the preservation of the status quo is ensured maintains its vitality.

The bilaterally acknowledged and appreciated tendency towards regional cooperation between Egypt and Israel, despite the fierce history and the Constructivist differences, surpasses the other crucial elements. As an example, the Egyptian – Israeli collaboration against terrorism in Sinai clearly demonstrates that the highest authority of Egypt, despite coming from an enforcement background, would not hesitate to look beyond to the sacrificing of dozens of Egyptian police officers and the responsible airstrikes executed within the scope of a confidential agreement; only to maintain the consolidated relations. This incident is the perfectly fitting one of the many sample cases remarking the significance of regional and international collaboration.

In accordance with the scope of sui generis reality of the region, not only is it the state that requires regional and international circulation in order to survive; but also, it is the leader that requires external indorsement in order to maintain the status quo and hold the reins of power; even if it is in defiance of historically established national consuetudes, previously acknowledged ‘greater good’ or the safety and security of public servants and guards.

5.1.2. Barriers to Sustainability

The very first appearing potential risk that would harm the consolidation of the Egypt - Israel State collaboration is rather technical, which could cover the means of transportation and the political outcome of the preference. In order to transport the natural gas, a pipeline structure that would convey the Liquefied Natural Gas is required to be constructed. Israel State could avoid the investment in such construction via transporting the natural gas to the port of Elliatt and distributing the transported reserve through container tanks using the roadway however this would have been very costly and the very probable extortion within the scope of energy terrorism would require escorting of a security convoy which, financially, would be illogical; in addition to the burden of signing numerous protocols with numerous states of the roadway would be due however that would have been obstructed, or at least slowed down, as

international bureaucracy exists, especially towards Israel State. The second option is to transport the gas through a projected pipeline that would connect Israel State and Turkey. This intercontinental investment would be vast however, through using Turkey's already constructed continental pipelines, it would have been a gateway to international provision.

Although it would have been a more profitable option for Israel State, the International Relations plays a major part in disowning the project. Primarily for the last decade, relations between Israel State and Turkey are deteriorating. Furthermore, it would have harmed relations of Israel State with Egypt and Greece as both Egypt's and Greece's relations with Turkey, much like Israeli - Turkish relations, have been backsliding. Furthermore, both of these countries do claim a substantial amount in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin which would have paved the way for natural resource centered conflicts and protestations; slowing down the transportation procedure, if not terminate it aggregately.

The third option would have been an establishment of an accord with Egypt, most preferably through a pipeline. Although the investment would be null in comparison to other alternatives as the Arish - Ashkelon pipeline is already constructed, the return would be small as well. If this option was to be preferred, Israel State would have been dependent on Egypt in regard to transportation. Addedly, Egypt unilaterally dissolved the partnership within the last decade due to internal occurrences. Although it was an extraordinary situation, the potential risk of annihilation of projected contracts is still viable for Israel State.

The final option was to sign a trilateral protocol among Israel State, Egypt and Greece. Although it is an investment that requires a pipeline construction of 1,9 thousand kilometers through shallow and deep waters, it also eliminates the Egyptian and Greek objections while providing for the Western market. The commencement of the implementation of EastMed pipeline stream concordant to trilateral protocols among the aforementioned nations prove that this specific option was preferred, rendering dispute probabilities with Egypt and Greece obsolete while reaching to the European market through Crete, mainland Greece and Italy.

There are two main potential problems for this option. Primarily, EastMed excludes the potential economical accords with the Asian market, which would have fortified relations with the Asian nations. However, this vulnerability is not specific to this option solely and further accords could be linked to EastMed in order to sweep this potential loss of a grand market in the future. Second threat - which is proven to be an accurate concern as it has taken place - is Turkey's potential intervention and thusly further backsliding of relations with Turkey. With

the vastly deteriorated relations with all three countries, Turkey pursues to find international partners through establishing alternative accords with other regional actors as well as consulting the international organizations on the basis of maritime regulations.

5.1.3. Tentative Vulnerabilities to Consolidated Peace and Collaboration Environment

So far, the course of history and realized cooperation models have stood as tangible evidence for the prospective preservation of current relations. However, taking into account the pre-given indoctrinations of international platform, the sole certainty is uncertainty. Without a doubt, discussing the probable occurrences that might unexpectedly appear with no clarity nor predictability would not assist to the advancement towards the aim of this study. However, there are potential threats worthy of analysis as these might be an obstruction or, even more, a reason for deterioration of relations.

Primary potential threat to well consolidated relations - especially on the economic basis - between Egypt and Israel State would be Constructivist concerns. As implied earlier, Israel State embraces the Western approach apropos differing the government structure from the state structure. As an example, the rightwing party of Likud's success in the Israeli elections was an element of major concern for Anwar Al-Sadat as his intentions could be sabotaged due to fundamental motives from the corresponding party. However, despite the logically predicted concerns, the chairman of the party and the Prime Minister of the period Menachem Begin's collaborative signals through his cabinet members facilitated the sensational initiation of Anwar Al-Sadat, proving that a rightwing party, which is expected to crucialize Constructivist norms through marginalizing or befriending other nations, could also pave the way for implementation of state's missions and ideals.

The majority of Egypt's ruling parties were led by leaders who rose from the ranks and their approach towards Israel State could be analyzed within the framework of Neorealism, specific to national interest and pragmatism; disregarding, or at least dismissing the identity wise differences while solely focusing on the national gains. However, for a very short period of time, the rival group of Muslim Brotherhood was the ruling body. Taking into consideration of the fact that Egypt does not have a governing tradition that institutionally differs the government structure from the state structure, the Muslim Brotherhood, a political party with relative bounds to strict fundamental motives that rose to power while, for the first time in the history of Egypt, relying on the support of the people, could vastly alter state missions and

ideals and thusly harm the peace environment established by Anwar Al-Sadat with Israel State as the majority of the people were unhappy with the relations with Israel State due to mentioned fundamental motives as well as the retrograded natural resources centric exchanges.

Second major reason of concern that might render this long-lasting cooperation very vulnerable is, as implied earlier, the intervention of regional actors. It is clear that corresponding parties of Egypt and Israel State have experienced and greatly benefitted the bilateral collaboration established and despite minor setbacks, preserved for almost half of a century. This however might be obstructed when the other regional actors with justified rights to protect their national interest on the multilaterally and - to a certain extent - internationally shared waters due to very probable emergence of relative injustice perception. Although it might be the case for all actors included in the Eastern Mediterranean basin's energy and natural resources, considering the current occurrences, Libya and Turkey are to be emphasized as case studies.

Turkey's relations with Egypt and Israel State are already severely damaged. Libya, on the other hand, while agreeing with Turkey's stance against Israel State especially on the ages-long unresolved issue of Palestine and Palestinians, experiences chequered relations with Egypt. In any case, when Turkey's influence on the region is considered, Libya is expected to lean towards maintaining the already established collaborative relations with Turkey through supporting Turkey despite facing opposition from the neighboring country. The expected did occur and Libya did sign the Memorandum of Understanding with Turkey concordant to the signing of EastMed between Egypt, Cyprus and Israel State, complicating the boundaries as well as limitations of corresponding party's primary agreement through conflicting on a substantial number of articles and subjects.

Turkey claims a crucial section of the basin through the Memorandum of Understanding with TNRC and Libya, challenging the rival alliance of Egypt, Israel State and Cyprus Republic, which is internationally recognized administration of the island. Despite the controversiality of TNRC and the status that is yet to be established, the mentioned Memorandum of Understanding still poses a threat to relations between Egypt and Israel State on the basis of energy as the probable recognition from the international arena, regardless if it objectifies the less likely recognition of TNRC in the short term or specific objective towards Memorandum of Understanding, might obstruct the bilateral explorations for more capacitated potential collaborations. In such case, it might even deteriorate relations as Turkey's feature of

hosting a probable transportation route of gas to Europe might resurface in accordance with Israel State's national interests. Recent statements from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey in regard to the national will of fortifying better ties with Israel State clearly indicates a probably a small yet non-negligible step towards building a cooperative approach, considering the steadily deteriorating relations of Israel State and Turkey for the last decade while aggravating the relations with Egypt.

5.1.4. Analysis Within the Scope of Theoretical Framework

In order to determine a tangible resolution on the basis of theory, it is crucial to review prominent theories of International Relations that might counter argue with the absolute outcome of the study.

As mentioned in the Theoretical Framework, globalization, which was rooted to remarking milestones of Peace of Westphalia and the Industrial Revolution, had gained momentum especially after the Second World War and the end of the Cold War. It is argued that the momentum caused a relative acceleration of advancement of prior 250 years within a very short period of 50 years. In this accordance, one of the main theories of the discipline, Classic Realism has lost the validity as well as effectiveness, not only specific to the subject of this study, but for International Relations in general as the theory, on the international platform, revolves around zero-sum game motive; an improbable approach that not only focuses on the total acquisition but also on the total bereavement of the corresponding party or parties which is improbable to achieve in a world with Globalism within the scope of free-market capitalism, a phenomenon that is advancing in a grand phase which requires utmost collaborative and cooperative interactivity unless extraordinary conditions are involved.

Much like other theories that conflict with the Realist approach, Constructivism, at the first glance, seems appropriate to implement in this case study; as the theory focuses on constructing structures and acting in accordance with said structures, much like identity. However, specific to this study, the Constructivist approaches are not reliable as well; as a single construct regardless of the theme - identity, geography or a sort of commonality originated due to collective subconscious -, can only be achieved through partial internationalism given the condition that the structure does not internalize an isolationist framework of regionalism, strive towards a common Megali Idea - the Pan-Arabism - or a strict global perspective - Non-Aligned Movement -. Even under such conditions, assuming that a structure is somehow constructed in a global environment, the members of the construct would

eventuate in a vulnerable position, disregarding the high probability of non-corresponding actors' adoption of a particularly negative attitude towards the said structure's members, including economic sanctions, unilateral cancelation of deals and even embargos which would further amplify the projected vulnerability of those members. In accordance with the subject of the study, the Constructivist concerns appeared in Egypt, primarily during Gamal Abdel Nasser's period and secondly, during Mohamed Morsi's period. His former comrade, Anwar Al-Sadat wiped away Gamal Abdel Nasser's practices while Mohamed Morsi's cabinet ensured their sincerity to 1979 peace accords. Israel State, on the other hand never experienced such incentives due to fundamental motives, as it can be seen from the election of Likud party's approach to Egypt.

However, despite the incontestability of globalism and the outcomes, the incentives of states irrepressibly exist. An absolute peace environment is a rather unapproachable objective taking the anarchic structure of the international platform and within this scope, states are obliged to defend their national interests specific to safety and security, self-help and survival. Thusly, liberalist approaches are equally insufficient to provide an explanation as well.

Taking into consideration of differences of identity, in addition to a very turbulent history, the stimulated reservations of Egypt and Israel State towards each other was inevitable. In fact, in addition to ongoing hostilities in line with the said reservations, these two actors lobbied international structures against each other on numerous occasions. However, despite the well settled antagonism, Egypt stood as the first Arab nation to recognize Israel State while acknowledging the projected conduct of potential marginalization by international actors of the same structural identity; including the Arab League, the organization headquartered in Cairo and led by Egypt.

The peace and collaboration centered relations established 40 years ago with the remarkable initiation of Anwar Al-Sadat and Menahem Begin were well established, consolidated and still ongoing to this day; to the extent of allowing, and furthermore, bearing the speculations to take place including the involvement in a corruption allegation in order to provide energy and natural resources below the international market prices to the corresponding party and unresolved liability in regards to the lost lives of Police officers to Israeli air strikes.

Despite mentioned speculations' outputs which were strong domestic oppositions and investigations resulted in jailing, leaders demonstrated immense efforts to protect and preserve the peace environment did their best endeavor to avoid all potential risks that were a projected

harm to collaboration. Considering the compromises of leaders, the hard-earned establishment of collaboration and recent bilateral and multilateral protocols, the first glance suggests that the conducts of these countries towards each other are inspired from Liberalist tendencies.

However, the motivation, perhaps the most essential element facilitating the comprehension of international relations, dictates that Liberalism plays a small role in the transformation of relations in a relatively short period of time; as, if it was a fully embraced liberal approach that attaches a great credence to cooperation and collaboration, the conduct towards Turkey and Libya, two non-negligible actors of the region would have required to be altered as well.

The Neorealist theory suggests that, within the specificity of this study, the alignment of national interests ensure the safety and security, survival and self-help incentives of nations of the subject. Primarily, the argument in regard to cutting the funds of the military after the Arab-Israel war demonstrates that there was a financial vulnerability which required intervention. Not only the potential peace environment would ensure the certainty of national safety and security through rendering this internal discussion obsolete through eliminating a series of potential conflicts, but it will enhance the national welfare as well.

In addition, in order to ensure the survival of a state in globalism, international interaction is inevitable. As an instance, once standing as a provider, Egypt struggled with energy and natural resources in recent decades. Without international help, the issue would have maintained its problematic feature for a long time. However, the neighboring country of Israel State offered a helping hand to Egypt's in accordance with contributing to the peace environment. However, from the Neorealist perspective, both of these countries have benefitted from this collaboration in regard to canalizing the resting finances and labor to other vulnerabilities, redounding not only to bilateral survival but also, indirectly, to the self-help incentive of these countries.

The last 40 years of peace remarks that, despite the ancient hostility as well as the structuralist distance, Egypt and Israel State developed a collaborative and cooperative approach towards each other in line with sui generis national interests and it would only contribute to mutual benefit if this conduct was to be preserved and consolidated.

CONCLUSION

Originating from fierce fundamental and cultural divergences, the mutual hostility between communities did reflect to the very vivid and unfortunate practice of conflict and war waging on numerous occasions throughout the history and proceeds to cause concerning incidents even in today's times. Yet, specific to the subject of this study, in defiance of the frequently experienced distressing occurrences including the tragic assassination of a leader who was one of the architects of this ecstatic reconciliation along with relatively minor impediments, the peace between two countries was established and to this day, it still is steadily progressing.

Certainly, under the non-negligible obligations default to the anarchic structure of the international platform, this was due for both parties; not because of a sudden and irrational change of perception that conveys the actors of the subject towards a utopian incentive, but, yet again, because of the aforementioned non-negligible obligations; the vulnerabilities of nations specific to energy, finances and security.

Despite being a former supplier of energy and natural resources, in the last decade, Egypt's vulnerabilities in regard to the said material have increased and the country is struggling with severe economic challenges. Furthermore, safety and security concerns were crucially important as the country was struggling with certain regional actors. This has prompted Egypt to find collaborators, preferably on the regional level, in order to face the challenge in the most financially favorable manner possible. Accordingly, a set of deals were established with Israel State apropos the energy. The mentioned set of deals maintain the vitality for Egypt. Furthermore, these accords are as valuable for the economy as they are for the safety and security, not only for Egypt, but for Israel State as well; as the energy-based relations are observed to consolidate the peace between countries in addition to decreasing the need for the investment in military, as the security concerns thusly mitigate which contributes greatly to the enhancement of domestic welfare of mentioned actors.

This is certainly crucial for appealing to communities of both countries, as the significance of the 40 years old peace environment properly narrated by leaders - preferably in comparison to the historic hostility and it's mutual consequences undisputedly carved in the collective memory - will certainly convey the masses to provide integrated support to and

mobilize towards peacebuilding procedures between two countries; enabling leaders to take stern steps in order to reinforce the already established peace, especially within the scope of collaboration.

As a result, the energy has a conflicting feature on international level as it might play the major role of a conducive element in regard to regional and international hostility as well as multilateral association within the scope of cooperative approaches. In respects to this point of view and this specific relation, in a world where free-market capitalism centric Globalism already influences the approaches of international actors aboundingly and progresses to influence even further, especially on mutual dependency; archaic virulent are, primarily, compulsorily and in accordance with this obligation, swiftly replaced with peaceful environments based on mutual and relatively long-lasting interests.

It is vividly seen from the recently improving and increasing energy centric relations between Egypt and Israel State which has proven, on many occasions throughout history, to further solidify the permanently established peace. Thus, in accordance with the underlined realities along with obtained information and discovered findings, it is clear to predicate that the hypotheses of this study postulating energy as a contributive element towards building and improving the already existing permanent collaboration is validated while responding to the research question of this study; within the scope of Eastern Mediterranean energy policies specific to oil and natural gas, pragmatic measures can cause a positive orientation shift in the relations if the alignment of mutual interests do take place. Most vivid example was how, in a relatively short period of 17 years, Egypt progressed from the armed conflict of Yom Kippur War to supplying Israel State with natural gas. In case there happens to be a discordance in regard to mutual interests, or if the interest of first party conflicts with the interest of second party, increase in bilateral tension to the extent of armed conflict seems to be inevitable. The very first example to this was seen when British existence in the region was subjected to fierce attacks of Israeli forces; a country established with the major assistance of-

yet again, the British. Conveying to the last assertion of this study which tangibly proves, once more, that the energy and natural resources impact the international relations and did so in respects to the interaction between Egypt and Israel State through the establishment and improvement of the regional collaboration-based peace environment. However, as mentioned before, the enhancement of relations is not the sole outcome of energy-based interactions. In fact, the probability of conflict is rather presumptive in comparison to

collaboration. As seen from the Memorandum of Understanding on the Limitation of Maritime Jurisdictions in the Mediterranean cosigned by Turkey and Libya, the rapprochement on the basis of energy on multilaterally claimed geography among Egypt, Greece through GSASC and Israel State did produce a fierce opposition. Correspondingly, although the first glance dictating a projection of a pessimistic scenario that might include resorting into violence, this obstruction can, indeed, pave the way for further inclusive regional cooperation.

The said Memorandum of Understanding has, without a doubt, a legal basis and is thusly a non-ignorable element for corresponding parties in regard to the proceedings of explorations. However, in respects to the pragmatism of Neorealism, this crisis can be the commencement point of newer opportunities through a new and updated draft including all regional actors, their demands as well as their concerns and concordantly, their concurrences on agreed terms as well as their promises to acknowledge and practice the said concurrences.

Adedly, although it is not included within the scope of this study, another point of concern was the exclusion of the Asian market as indicated earlier. Correspondingly, a potential of a projected protocol integrating China in line with the Belt and Road Initiative, in which Turkey has a strong participation, would enable the country to effectively utilize the line of transportation located on the Red Sea section of the Suez Canal. This could stand as a potential resolution to overcome this concern, especially, taking into consideration of Turkey's probable assistance if the possible projections mentioned earlier would take place which would pave the way for not only regional collaboration but also, international cooperation.

The current trends acknowledged, apprehended and promoted by not only nations but also esteemed international organizations are referring to the significance of sustainable environments; a broadened norm that includes sufficiency on various sectors and different levels through numerous aspects. However, the perquisite for the implementation of wide angled sustainability is lacking, the *raison d'être*. Why would nations prefer to advance towards embracing collaborative approach and establishing multilateral cooperation if the predicted return is nonexistent? As if it was insufficient for nations to not mobilize their endeavors, in accordance with the zero-sum game, Realist incentives dictate the strive to obtain all that is possible while causing the corresponding party to lose what is already possessed. In consideration with this, why would nations act against the incentive which might pave the way for birthing of a new challenger or further consolidating the capacity and enforcement power of an already existing challenger?

The most tangible method to mobilize nations towards the mentioned goal is to underline the projected satisfaction of national interest specific to every actor of the specific occurrence; preferably referring to the safety & security or finances, as explained by Maslov's Hierarchy of Needs earlier in this study. As an example, to this, Israel State would not have mobilized to provide for the energy deficit of Egypt if the said mobilization did not hold a financial and security wise appealing for the country. Similarly, British existence would not have abandoned the quest of Sinai Peninsula and retreated if a probable fall of opinions with USA as well as USSR – and thusly the rise of concerns in regard to the least harmful projection of backsliding of relations - was not a possible upcoming.

The means to do so emphasizes the element of collaborative approach and specific to this study, it is directly linked with collaboration on various levels. Despite the existence of the projected counter argument that is the zero-sum game incentive, it is impossible to implement such a scenario of a total gain and loss under current conditions. Even if that specific occurrence might refer to an absolute gain while causing an absolute loss to corresponding party, it usually is temporary; referring to ultimate success of short and mid-term while future interactions might dictate a rather larger loss indirectly linked to the previous occurrence.

It is only when the said incentive is kindled through the said methodology that nations mobilize their efforts and strive for collaboration, which is, as proven on numerous cases, pave the way for basing a platform for the probable peaceful, secure and sustainable environment. However, complexity is due underlining as it enhances when it is comprehended that sustainability is not a chain or a line; it is an interlinked circle. From the Neorealist perspective, peace environment is achieved through international collaboration however the collaborative approach requires the previous peaceful approaches. Only the existence of all required elements of sustainability can generate a sustainable environment. The only way to facilitate the apprehension of mentioned complex chain is to assume that the national interest on the international level is the first step towards the quest of implementing all other factors.

Thus, under the circumstances of current international platform structured with free-market capitalism centric globalism, national interest fueled international interaction is an unquestioned requisite for progressing towards sustainable, peaceful, secure and collaborative environments. If these probable predictions do take place - and the history deems it very likely -, mentioned developments apropos the reduction of security expenses, increase in domestic welfares and improvement in multilateral relations are to be expected; only this time, on a

regional and international scale which proves once more that energy can be the main element in regards to finalizing the centuries old hostilities, building international bridges and establishing regional, or perhaps global, peace environment.



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