

**T.C.
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LİSANSÜSTÜ EĞİTİM ENSTİTÜSÜ
SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLERANABİLİM DALI
İNGİLİZCE TEZLİ YÜKSEK LİSANS PROGRAMI**

**MULTIPLE MIGRATIONS FLOWS OF SYRIANS
THE CASE OF SYRIANS CHANGING DESTINATIONS FROM TURKEY TO THE
UNITED KINGDOM**

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**HAZIRLAYAN
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TEZ ETİK VE BİLDİRİM SAYFASI

Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak sunduđum “**MULTIPLE MIGRATIONS FLOWS OF SYRIANS: THE CASE OF SYRIANS CHANGING DESTINATIONS FROM TURKEY TO THE UNITED KINGDOM**” başlıklı çalışmanın tarafımca, bilimsel ahlak ve geleneklere aykırı düşecek bir yardıma başvurmaksızın yazıldığını ve yararlandığım eserlerin kaynakçada gösterilenlerden oluştuđunu ve bunlara atıf yapılarak yararlanmış olduğumu belirtir ve onurumla doğrularım 08/07/2021.

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My wife and My daughter; There are no words to express my gratitude and thank you for standing by my side.

Thank you all,
Bilal Hazzouri

ABSTRACT

This research studies the multiple migrations flow of Syrian through the qualitative study on Syrian migrants who lived in Turkey as long-term immigrants then decided to migrate to a new destination, mainly the United Kingdom. This research demonstrates the causes and drivers behind those multiple migrations through a mixed theoretical framework depend on the human capital theory and the Aspirations-Capabilities model. Moreover, this research debates the multiple migrations as human investment inspired by various factors in Macro, Meso and Micro levels to improve the current situation, increase the wellbeing or seek better opportunities. Also, those investments depend on the capacity and capability of potential migrants to cover each movement's tangible and intangible costs.

The study theorizes Multiple Migrations and illustrates the motivation and drives behind them. Then it gives an overview of the migration flow of Syrian refugees and their situation in neighbours countries and diaspora. After that, the study presents the finding of the qualitative study that was conducted through semi-structured and in-depth interviews with 25 Syrian migrants.

The study presents the Multiple Migrations routes of Syrian from Turkey to the United Kingdom and the priorities, needs, ambitions, aspirations behind each movement. Also, the study argues at the Micro-level the impact of the individual characters on multiple migrations, including age, gender, marital status, religion, ethnicity, and Education. Moreover, this study at the Meso level illustrates the impact of the cost of movement, the legal framework on the migrant's decision. Furthermore, it explores how the various elements of context around the migrants could motivate them to settle or move again to new destinations at the Macro level.

Keywords: Multiple, Migration, Aspirations, Capabilities, Migrants, Turkey, Syria, The UK

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ONS	: The Office for National Statistics
UNHCR	: The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
DESA	: The Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat
MENA	: The Middle East and North Africa
IOM	: The International Organization for Migration
UNRWA	: The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
PLO	: Palestine Liberation Organization
FSA	: Free Syrian Army
SNC	: Syrian National Coalition
ISIS	: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
SDF	: Syrian Democratic Forces
SAF	: The Syrian Arab Armed Forces
SDF	: Syrian Democratic Forces
E.U	: The European Union
LFIP	: Law on the foreigner and international protection
DGMM	: Directorate General of Migration Management
T.P.	: Temporary Protection
AKP	: Justice and Development Party /Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
ILO	: International Labour Organization
KRI	Kurdistan Region of Iraq

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The number of immigrants worldwide has been growing to reach 281 million people who live outside their country of origin in 2020. This figure rose by almost 48 million new immigrants during the period between 2000 to 2010. In contrast, the increase was over 60 million between 2010 and 2020. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), most of this rapid increase in the percentage of international migration worldwide is a direct result of labour and family migration. At the same time, fewer numbers could immigrate due to humanitarian crises and ongoing conflicts. Studies on the origin of international migration still show that middle-income countries are the primary source of international migration by almost 63% of the total international migration globally. However, regarding preferable destinations, with more than 87 million in 2020, Europe remains the foremost destination for those migrants, followed by Northern America, where nearly 56 million of migration are located. The graphs below illustrate the number of international migrations compared by the country of origin and destination country in the last ten years (DESA, 2020).

Furthermore, the world is witnessing an unprecedented displacement crisis where almost 80 million are forcibly displaced globally. Moreover, in 2020, 67% of those migrants come from just five countries, led by Syria with nearly 6.7 million refugees (Migration, 2020).

Table 1. Countries of refugee origin

Country	Refugees
Syrian Arab Republic	6.7 million
Venezuela	3.7 million
Afghanistan	2.7 million
South Sudan	2.3 million
Myanmar	1.0 million

Source: World migration report, 2020

Until 2020, 39% of the refugees are hosted in five countries, led by Turkey, the most significant number of refugees with 3.6 million (Migration, 2020).

Table 2. Countries hosting refugees

Country	Refugees
Turkey	3.6 million
Colombia	1.8 million
Pakistan	1.4 million
Uganda	1.4 million
Germany	1.1 million

Source: World migration report, 2020

Syria’s crisis has been ongoing since March 2011 until now as part of the Arab uprisings’ movements called the “Arab Spring.” This endless and complex conflict is producing the most significant flows of displaced people globally as more than half of the country’s population needs protection and humanitarian aid. According to The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 13.4 million Syrian have been forced to leave their houses since 2011 (UNHCR UK, 2021). 6.7 million were internally displaced in other provinces and villages inside Syria, mainly to Northwest Syria, and 6.6 million Syrians crossed the borders seeking safety and security in the neighbouring countries, mainly Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, or overseas. In terms of the proportion of the national population, the total population of Syria was almost 23 million before the war. This means more than half of the Syrian people have been forcibly displaced. Also, a third of the total population are refugees outside their country because of the war (Migration, 2020).

1.2 Research Questions

This research will argue the concept of multiple migrations in migration study, mainly the flows of Syrian, to uncover the inspirations, causes and drivers of those flows and understanding the factors that affect the capability of those migrants. This research will be by studying Syrian migrants and refugees who lived in Turkey as long-term migrants then decide to migrate again to

the United Kingdom whether those migrations to the U.K. were regular or irregular. This research tries to answer the following question:

What are the causes and drivers behind the Multiple Migration Flows of Syrians? The Case of Syrians Changing Destinations from Turkey to the United Kingdom.

1.3 Research Objectives

Many studies on Syrian migration probe into the movement of the Syrian people from their country of origin to a new destination. However, this article will focus on the migrants who often change their destinations many times "multiple migrations" due to diverse and contextual reasons.

Furthermore, understanding the causes and drivers that drive Syrian refugees to migrate from one destination to another will help both the respondents and policymakers in the countries where Syrians are located, migrating to maintain and develop their policies and responses. In addition, it will reduce the suffering of the migrants and refugees by improving their understanding of the situations. Furthermore, this study will contribute to the Multiple Migration theories framework.

The main objectives of the study are to:

- Explore the drivers and reasons that inspire Syrian migrants to migrate from one destination to another. (2011 to 2020).
- Demonstrate why Syrian refugees migrating are from Turkey, after settling for a few years there, to other countries as second migration, mainly to the United Kingdom.

1.4 Scope of the research

The ongoing conflict in Syria has caused millions of Syrians to migrate from their country of origin to Syria to other destinations. Turkey is one of the significant targeted countries for these refugees and migrants. According to UNHCR, more than 3.6 million Syrian people live in Turkey under temporary protection status. However, during the last five years, many Syrians, even those living in Turkey for a long time, are trying to move from Turkey to other countries, mainly western countries, for many reasons. The scope of this study will focus on the case of Syrians changing destinations from Turkey to the U.K.

1.5 Research Limitations

There is limited access to official data about refugees/ migrants in Turkey, the U.K. and many other countries. However, this limitation can be overcome by depending on the data of the UN agencies, mainly UNHCR. Also, the study will conduct semi-structured interviews with Syrian refugees living in Turkey then moving to the U.K. Furthermore, studying multiple migrations has many difficulties, including the following:

- The studies need to secure a long observation of the same migrants and collect longitudinal data (Agunias 2006) to understand the multiple migrations drivers, motivations, and migration trajectories. However, this type of data is highly costly and challenging to track.
- The countries of origin do not track migrants after leaving their homeland. Also, most destination countries do not track the migrants and refugees when they leave their territories.
- The vast expansion of illegal migration. Irregular migrants do not register themselves in the road countries they cross during their journey, even when they stay in those countries for a long time.
- Multiple migrations are not one-way migration. In many cases, the migrants leave and come back to the same countries to settle for long or short term or part of their journey to seek the last destination.
- There is a common difficulty facing migration studies which is the lack of a centralised database of migration.

1.6 Research Methodology:

To build an in-depth understanding of the causes and drivers of multiple migrations flows of Syrians, exploring the factors that affected their aspirations and capabilities. This research adopted a mixed method, including in-depth desk research and semi-structured interviews.

1. The Desk Research/Review included an extensive literature review, comprehensive online desk research, and analysing the governmental and officially published data. This desk review builds a reliable scientific base about the migration theory and multiple migrations studies. Moreover, the Desk Research provides a comprehensive knowledge of the Syrian crisis and the conflict's

routs and how that impacts the movement flows of people inside the country and outside the country to the neighbouring countries and worldwide. Furthermore, it provided a broad picture of the situation of Syrian migrants in the origin and destinations countries during their multiple migrations journeys. Besides, the desk research explores the migration policies in those countries and their impact on migrants.

2. Semi-Structured Interviews includes conducting 25 Semi-structured interviews with Syrian migrants who lived in Turkey as long-term immigrants then moved from Turkey to live in the United Kingdom after multiple migrations journey. These semi-structured interviews were conducted through a designed stratified sample to explore multiple migrations journeys and the reasons behind each stage. Also, it investigated the Multiple Migrations Drivers and causes. Moreover, semi-structured interviews examined in Micro-level the impact of the individual characteristics on migration decisions. Those characteristics include age, gender, education level, religion, marital status, ethnicity, and language. Besides, the interview at Meso-level distinguished the tangible and intangible costs of the multiple migrations, including gains and losses. Also, the legal framework roles and effects. In addition, at the macro-level, the interview concentrated on Political, Economic, Demographic, Environment, Social contexts. Furthermore, it explored the further steps of the migrants.

1.7 The Sample of the Research

To have an accurate picture and to avoid the heavy burden, a stratified sample was used. This sample considered the targeted population groups based on gender, age group, race and ethnic group, nationality, and education level. This research tried to work closely with the Syrian migrants/refugee who moved from Turkey to the U.K. So, the primary sample was from Syrian refugees and migrants who lived in Turkey as long-term migrants, as refugees, or under temporary protection, and then they decided to migrate to the U.K. to settle there for the long or short term.

This stratified sample includes the following groups:

- Interview methods: Online, Face to Face.
- Gender: Male, Female, prefer not to say.
- Marital status: Single, Married.

- Age group: The sample should cover a broad age group, but all interviewees should be adults. Moreover, this research sample will not include any minors.
- Registration Status in Turkey: Under temporary protection status, short-term residence permit, and work permit, with a possibility to include Syrians who hold Turkish nationality after 2011 and Syrians unregistered in Turkey in the sample.
- Registration Status in Turkey: Application registration card (ARC), Five years' leave to remain in the U.K. (LTR), Biometric residence permit (BRP), with a possibility to include unregistered Syrian in the U.K in the sample.
- Race and Ethnic group: Arab _ Turks _ Kurds _ other
- Education level: Illiterate_ primary school _ High school _ College_ University_ Master's degree_ PhD.
- Work/ profession: The sample should include people from a wide range of occupations.

All interviews, even face-to-face, are recorded after obtaining the owners' consent to avoid human error.

1.8 Analysing methods:

This research will use a mixed Analysis method, including (IPA) Interpretative phenomenological analysis and thematic analysis methods.

The IPA contribute to understanding migrants personal and unique experiences with multiple migrations. In contrast, Thematic Analysis identifies the themes and common patterns among the qualitative data generated through the interviews. Those themes will illustrate the opinions of migrants regarding multiple migrations and the key factors that inspired migrants to begin their multiple migrations, including the determinants that increase and decrease their capability to achieve their destinations countries.

The main steps of the applied analysis methodology could interpret as follows:

- Listen to all the migrants' interviews carefully.
- Interpret the interviews.
- Read all the interviews' transcriptions many times with taking notes.
- Identify the main patterns among the interviews.

- Generate the first set of codes. Those codes help line-by-line analysis and organise the interviewees' ideas, experiences, concerns, thoughts, and opinions.
- Produce the lists and categories of codes to gather the codes that have common patterns. Moreover, identify the hierarchy links and relations among those categories.
- Develop the common themes based on the interviews' transcription and the literature review made during the desk research. Underline the listed and categorised codes under the developed themes.
- Develop the result based on this in-depth analysis to answer the research question and reach the study's objective.

In this research, both online and face to face methods were used, and all interviews were recorded after obtaining the respondents' consent. To avoid human error, this research used the MAXQDA program while interpreting the recorded interviews. Also, the MAXQDA software and Microsoft Excel were utilised during the analysing process and generating and identifying the code and themes. Furthermore, both Microsoft Power BI and Adobe Photoshop software were used to visualise the data and produce the maps and charters.

Important note: All face-to-face interviews applied the COVID-19 related rules and restrictions determined by the United Kingdom government for the interviews that occurred in the U.K. Furthermore, all software programs and applications used in this research are licensed.

1.9 The code list, categories, and themes:

The table below illustrates the uses codes, their frequency, and the definitions of those codes.

Table 3. Codes and themes list

Codes Category_ 1 st level	Codes Category_ 2 nd level	Frequency	The definition
Migration journey		207	
Concerns		17	Concerns during the multiple migration processes
Uncertainty		7	The associated uncertainty during and after the multiple migration processes.
Investment		25	Investment
Why TR		8	Why the migrants move to go to Turkey
Exp TR		10	Migrants' expectations from Turkey
From Turkey		9	Why the migrants move to go to the United Kingdom
Why the U.K.		13	Why the migrants move to go to the United Kingdom
Exp the U.K.		6	Migrants' expectations from the United Kingdom
1st migration Re		29	The primary reason for the first migration
2nd migration Re		43	The primary reason for the Second migration
3rd migration Re		5	The primary reason for the third migration

Mig Exper		14	The experiences that the migrants gained because of multiple migrations
Inspirations		11	Factors that helped inspire migrants
Capability		10	Factors that affected migrants' capability
Micro-level:		136	The effects of personal characteristics on migrants' decision
Language		21	The effects of the Language on migrants' decision
Ethnicity		9	The effects of Ethnicity on migrants' decision
Marital & Family		31	The effects of the Marital status and Family on migrants' decision
	Reunite	5	The desire to reunite with family members
Religion		22	The effects of Religion on migrants' decision
Education level		9	The effects of the Education level on migrants' decision
Gender		14	The effects of gender on migrants' decision
Age		25	The effects of the Age on migrants' decision
Meso-level		231	
Cost MM		25	The cost of moving in multiple migrations
Financial cost		14	The impact of the financial cost of moving on impact multiple migrations

Non-financial cost		15	The impact of the non-financial cost of moving on impact multiple migrations
Losses		34	Losses due to multiple migrations
Gains		25	Gains due to multiple migrations
Info		10	Information sources and their impact on the multiple migrations
	Info Sources	19	Information Sources
Legal		29	The impact of the legal framework on the ability to make a migration decision
Edu		6	The impact of the education factor
Stability T.R.		26	The feeling of stability in Turkey
Stability U.K.		21	The feeling of stability in The United Kingdom
COVID-19		7	The impact of COVID-19
Marco-level		0	
Political Con		184	The impact of the Political Context on multiple migrations
Political TR		31	The political Context in Turkey
Political UK		21	The political Context in the United Kingdom
Political UK >		5	The political context reason to remain in the U.K.
Political UK <		0	The political context reason to migrate from the U.K.
Mig policies T.R.		34	The impact of the government migration policies in Turkey

Mig policies the U.K.		16	The impact of the government migration policies in the U.K.
Safe & Sec		6	The effect of migration on a feeling of safety and security
	Expressing	6	The effect of multiple migrations on fear of expressing an opinion
	Deportation	12	Fear of deportation
	House	3	The ability to own a house
Political T.R.>		7	The political context reason to stay in Turkey
Political TR <		26	The political context reason to migrate from Turkey
Brexit		17	The impact of Brexit on Syrian migrants and refugees in the U.K.
Eco Con		152	The impact of the Economic Context on multiple migrations:
Eco TR		30	The economic situation in Turkey
Infl & TL ex rate		10	Inflation and the exchange rate
NGOs in Turkey		13	The effect of Syrian and international NGOs in Turkey
Eco UK		24	The economic situation in the UK
Jobs		22	The possibility of finding a suitable job
Per Eco		16	Personal economic situation
Eco TR <		18	Turkey's economic situation as a reason to leave
Eco TR >		5	Turkey's economic situation as a reason to stay
Eco UK >		14	Economic situation as a reason to remain in the U.K.

Eco UK <		0	Economic situation as a reason to migrate from the U.K.
Demo Con		48	The impact of the Demographic Context on multiple migrations
Syrian T.R.		18	The impact of the Syrian population in Turkey
Dem TR < OR >		12	Turkey's demographic situation as a reason to stay or leave
Dem UK < OR >		18	The demographic situation as a reason to remain or migrate from the U.K.
Env Con		39	The impact of the Environment (CLIMATE) Context on multiple migrations
Env TR < OR >		20	The Environment in Turkey as a reason to stay or leave
Env UK < OR >		19	The Environment as a reason to migrate to or from the U.K.
Social con		87	The impact of the social Context on multiple migrations
Soc T.R.		31	The social situation in Turkey
Soc U.K.		19	The social situation in the U.K.
Soc T.R.>		23	Social Context in Turkey as a reason to stay
Soc T.R. <		3	Social Context in Turkey as a reason to leave
Soc U.K.>		7	Social Context is a reason to migrate to the U.K.
Soc UK <		4	Social Context is a reason to migrate from the U.K.

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1.10 Research Stages:

1. Literature review
 - a. Multiple migration theories and cases.
 - b. Syrian flows reasons and roads.
 - c. Syrian refugees/ migrants in the United Kingdom
 - d. Syrian refugees/ migrants in Turkey.
2. Desk Research/Review: It includes Online Desk Research and Government and U.N. published data.
3. Conduct initial data analysis to formulate initial findings and identify the gaps in the data
4. Develop semi-structured interview key questions.
5. Conduct interviews with the selected sample.
6. Analyse the data.
7. Finalise research findings based on additional details acquired from the interviews.
8. Compile the findings and draft the conclusion and recommendations.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Migrations terminology:

2.1.1. International migrant:

To do an in-depth study of the multiple migrations, it is essential to understand the definition of international migrants. There is no official definition under international law to describe migrants or immigrants (Anderson & Blinder, 2017, p. 3). Moreover, In the recommendation on international migration statistics, the U.N. identifies international migrants as “any person who changes his or her country of usual residence” (Nations, 1998, p. 10). Furthermore, the international migrants must cross the border of their current country to another country. Also, they should have a new usual residence in the destination country, then the time frame of staying will determine if they will be long-term or short-term migrants (Nowok, Kupiszewska, & Poulain, 2006).

2.1.2. Country of usual residence:

The United Nations illustrates it in its recommendation on international migration statistics as the country where the people live. However, in this country, individuals have a place to live and spend their regular daily rest periods. Also, the U.N. mentions that the temporary movement of the people outside their country for any reason, such as economic activities, short or long holidays, religious events or medical treatment, will not change their country of usual residence (Nations, 1998).

2.1.3. Long-term migrants:

When persons leave their country of usual residence to another country for at least 12 months (Nations, 1998), this movement will change their country of usual residence to the new country where they are located. As a result, the person who moved will become a long-term emigrant in the view of his origin country. Nevertheless, the same person will be long-term immigrants for the target country.

2.1.4. Short-term migrants:

When persons leave their country of usual residence to another country for at least three months and less than 12 months, this movement should not be for economic activities, short or long holidays, religious events, or medical treatment. As a result, the person who moved will become a short-term emigrant in the view of his origin country. Nevertheless, the same person will be short-term immigrants for the target country. Furthermore, the seasonal workers could be categorised as short-term migrants (Batsaikhan, Darvas, & Gonçalves Raposo, 2018).




Figure 1. Migrants and visitors

The duration of the resident is a primary determinant to identify the migrates. Figure 1 illustrates the differences between migrants and visitors regarding the time frame. Nevertheless, other factors should be considered in some instances, such as diplomats working in the embassy and consulates in another country. In this case, their usual residence will remain the country of citizenship even they are spending most of their time in the county of the duty station. The same rule should apply to persons of the army who serve outside their citizenship country. Furthermore, some groups of people do not have the concept of fixed habitation or permanent residences, such as the Nomad and Roma community. Therefore, their crossing to the stats' borders will not consider changing their usual residence (United Nations, 2020).

2.1.5. Immigrants or Emigrants:

Using the term of immigrants or Emigrants depends on the location of the country. Furthermore, the country of origin or where migrants are moving from uses the term Emigrants to describe those people. In contrast, the country of destination or where migrants are moving uses immigrants to tell some people (Nations, 1998). Figure 2 presents the commonly used name for migrants based on the country of origin and destination.




Figure 2. Immigrants or Emigrants

2.1.6. Irregular migrations:

The international organisation of migration (IOM) adopted its definition of irregular migration from the international Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Irregular migration refers to people who crossed international boundaries but do not have the right to enter or stay in this country (IOM, 2019). However, when migrants do not use the regular channel of migrations, that does not reduce the obligation of the destination states from protecting their rights. Furthermore, irregular migration includes many categories of migrants who are forced to use the irregular channel, such as refugees and victims of trafficking (IOM, 2019).

2.1.7. Asylum seeker and refugee:

When every refugee is originally an asylum seeker, but not every asylum seeker is certified as a refugee, there is always confusion between the two terms of asylum seeker and refugee (UNHCR, 2006). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees recognises the people escaping from persecution and looking for international protection, but their claim does not

reach the final decision yet as an asylum seeker. On the other hand, people who are qualified for protecting the U.N.¹ provided by the UNHCR are called refugees (IOM, 2019). This mentioned protection is under UNHCR's mandate or national legislation regardless of whether this country is part of the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol (UNHCR, 2006).

2.1.8. The Resettlement:

This term refers to when the refugees transfer from the state where they asked for protection to another state that accepted them as refugees (IOM, 2019). In this case, the refugee usually will have the right to long-term or permanent residence. Moreover, they will have a high chance of becoming naturalised citizens (UNHCR, 2006).

Furthermore, The United Kingdom, in coordination with the UNHCR and the IOM, launched in January 2014 the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (VPRS). This program is designed to identify some cases from the most affected and vulnerable Syrian refugees and settle in the U.K. (Home Office, 2017). Furthermore, resettlement could be the only safe and regular migration channel for the most vulnerable Syrian registered refugee in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to move to the United Kingdom (Home Office, 2017).

2.2 Theories of Migration

In 1779, Adam Smith was the first economist who talked about migration. When he saw the migration from an economic point of view due to the instability in the labour market and the difference in returns, including profits and wages (Bodvarsson, Simpson, & Sparber, 2015, p. 5). Later, many economists reinforced this side of studying migrations. For instance, in 1932, through the theory of wages, Richard Hicks augmented the relations between labour market, income and migration (John Hicks, 1963). However, while Adam Smith demonstrated that many obstacles and restrictions still reverse the migration process, he did not elaborate enough on these restrictions (Bodvarsson et al., 2015, p. 5).

¹ The UN has another refugee office, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), responsible for Palestinian refugees.

Furthermore, the precise foundations for migration studies were remarkably developed based on the laws of migration proposed by English-German geographer Ernst Georg Ravenstein due to work on the national British census data. Moreover, Michael J Greenwood compiled those laws through his studies the internal migration in the developed countries (Bodvarsson et al., 2015, p. 6). As the following list:

1. in most migrations flows, the distance will be short and from a rural area to big cities.
2. Cities are multiplying, and more migrations from rural areas are settling there.
3. There is an inverse proportion between internal migration and external migration.
4. The multiple migration flows will produce compensating flows.
5. Migration who are migrating to long-distance prefers to settle in big cities.
6. Migration is more likely to occur among people who live in rural than those who live in cities.
7. Migration is more likely to happen to women more than men.

The increase in migration flows inspire more scholars to study and develop theories to understand this phenomenon. In 1946, the famous migration theory, the gravity model, was produced by George Kingsley Zipf. He came with a new perspective to study migration, including travel distance and the size of origin and destination cities also the costs related to this journey (Bodvarsson et al., 2015).

Sjaastad took the noticeable movement in migration studies in his model of human migration's cost and returns, where he debates the migration from human capital (Sjaastad, 1962). This model had been developed by many scholars later, including Gary Becker and others. The main point of the human capital theory is that those migrants seek to improve their wellbeing and maximise their returns. Therefore, they are migrating from one destination to another. However, those benefits from migration are not related to just economic factors, such as refugees.

Nevertheless, all of those returns and benefits will serve the human capital of the migrants. Furthermore, those movements include many related costs and migrants waiting for uncertain benefits from their movement. Therefore, many scholars recognised migration as an investment (Sjaastad, 1962).

Recently, Ximena Clark and others based on human capital theory develop a more comprehensive model, including the role of immigration policy in the migrants' decisions. Also, Clark highlighted the impact of distance and languages of the destination country in the migration when he studied U.S immigration (Clark, Hatton, & Williamson, 2007).

2.3 Multiple and repeated migrations

Multiple migrations are not a new term in the literature of the study of human migrations. It was always an important character in most of the cases of migration movements, but it has become imperative to study these cases in-depth due to their widespread prevalence in the last decade. There are many examples of multiple migrations, such as the multiple migrations of the Afghans to Iran after the U.S. invasion and then from Iran to Europe, due to Iranian economic deterioration. Also, the multiple migrations of Palestinians due to the Arab Israeli conflict.

Palestinians' Multiple migrations: One out of three refugees globally are Palestinian, where more than half of Palestinian people have been displaced out of Palestine since 1948 (Terry M Rempel, 2006). Many Palestinian refugees moved to neighbouring countries, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, then preferred or were forced to migrate to Europe and the Americas. The Palestinian refugee crisis had started in 1948 within the creation of the state of Israel. Then the ongoing conflict between Arab and Israel mainly wars between 1948 and 1967 where Israeli occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Louise W. Holborn, 1968). According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), more than 700,000 Palestinian refugees were forced to leave their houses in 1948.

In contrast, the number of registered Palestinian refugees in the Middle East reached 5.6 million in 2020 (unrwa, 2021); throughout the harsh years of displacement, the Palestinian refugee was affected by several military disputes and wars in the Middle East. Including the Lebanese civil war, the two-year battle between Lebanese armed groups and Palestinian

armed groups, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the Black September war in 1970 between Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Jordanian Army. As a result of the wars and the harsh living conditions, many Palestinians decided to continue their migration again and move from Palestine's neighbourhood to Europe and America in search of stability (Nour Samaha, 2015).

Migration is a learning journey many migrants are discovering new experiences during their migration journeys -learning by doing-. Also, migration has a theme of trial and error (Ciobanu, 2015) when migrants prefer to try the possible opportunities in their endeavour to enhance the chances of success of their migration. Furthermore, the immediate changes and the raising of new opportunities expand the possibilities for migrants to leave their current location to a new destination through multiple migrations.

Multiple migrations are a description of a human condition linked to several factors and contexts. According to several scholars and the literature on migration, there are many definitions where each study defines it based on the context and the case. This research defines multiple migrations as **Multiple movements of migrants (individuals, groups, or communities) to settle in a new destination for long or short-term; these movements could be across status borders or internally, across continents or within regions. Furthermore, these movement destinations could be to a new place or even the origin country in case of the return.**

2.4 Theorising Multiple Migrations

Most of the theories and studies of migration argue why do people move or try to escape from catastrophic situations in the origin country. Therefore, the migration study requires examining the root causes and drivers that motivate or bush them to move from their origin country or current destination to other destination countries. Also, it is essential to consider the ability of the migrants to cover the costs of the journey. This cost includes material and immaterial costs and the flexibility to deal with the changes and risks during their journey.

This study will depend on A mixed theoretical framework. This framework will illustrate the root causes and drivers that inspire Syrian refugees and migrants to continue moving from one destination to another. Also, it will help in clarifying why are Syrian refugees migrating from Turkey, after settling for a few years there, to other countries as a new destination, mainly to the United Kingdom.

Starting from the human capital theory, which is a well-established basis for most migration theories. This theory argues the migration is an investment where people move to improve their wellbeing. This proposed investment is based mainly on calculating the returns from the migration process. Is this return more than the cost that the migrant will require to complete this process. That cost includes the tangible and intangible cost price, including the social network, stress, relationships, and other factors. As a result, in the ideal case, according to Human capital theory, if the benefits of migration could be more significant than the cost of the journey, migrants will consider remigrating. Furthermore, the human capital theory always emphasises the perspective that migration is not an isolated process. Nevertheless, it could consider the investment in the human facto more important than the migration itself (Sjaastad, 1962, p. 93).

The human capital theory is an excellent asset to argue and study the multiple migrations, but we should extend it to be more inclusive. Also, we should consider that better migration investment requires accurate information, which is not priceless and sometimes migrants have difficulties obtaining the required information from an accurate source. Therefore, wrong information or even missing information could raise the possibility of remigration and repeated migration. In addition to human capital theory and understanding the multiple migration processes, this study will discuss the multiple migrations of Syrian flows through the aspirations–capabilities model presented by Jørgen Carling and then used by Hein de Haas and many scholars to study and understand migration and human mobility. This model constitutes an improved and more comprehensive expression of migration theory. Moreover, it argues the migration is based on the following principles:

1. The first principle is the presence of the ambition and desire of the migrants to move from their current place in which they initially settled to a new destination (Carling & Collins, 2018).
2. The second principle is the availability of sufficient capacity and capability for the migration to cover the expenses, the tangible and intangible costs that we mentioned before in the human capital theory, of moving to the new destination (Carling & Collins, 2018).

Also, based on the Jørgen Carling, those costs of movement determine migrants' decisions. For instance, this may lead to an involuntary immobility situation when migrants have strong motivations to inspire them to migrate (Carling, 2014, pp. 2–3). Nevertheless, the available capabilities do not allow them to cover the expense of the journey. Therefore, they may force to stay in their current situation.

Furthermore, Carling claimed that aspiration factors appear widely within the macro-level. At the same time, the various elements of the Meso and Micro-level determine the capability of potential migrants to take the action of moving to a new destination or staying in their current locations (Carling & Collins, 2018, p. 946). These arguments of Carling are broadly consistent with the framework proposed by Richard Black during his study of the relationship between human migration and environmental change.

Based on previous theories, we can describe multiple migrations **as human investments inspired by various factors to improve the current situation or seek better opportunities. This investment is governed by the capacity and capability of the people to implement it, considering the contextual restrictions.**

2.5 Multiple Migration motivations and drivers

Multiple migrations are a complex process where many factors are intervening at a different level. Also, the migrations could be motivated by many factors to remigrate again from their location to another destination. This study will argue the inspiration factors of multiple migrations based on

a couple of elements pointed by the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2004). Where UNHCR argued the irregular migration motivation from these following points:

- A. **Fear of persecution, physical integrity, or restricted freedom:** Migration will be more motivated to leave their current location if they were subjected or expect an exposure of any form of limitation of freedom or psychological or physical danger (UNHCR, 2004).
- B. **The desire to reunite with family members:** Migrants often seek to migrate individually, without their families, to alleviate migration restrictions and reduces risks. As a result, migration became one of the main factors in separating members of the same family. Therefore, migrants will often seek to relocate to destinations with tremendous potential for reunification with family members and re-establish stable families(UNHCR, 2004).
- C. **The absence of a certain legal situation:** Pursuing long-term legal stability through obtaining legal registration, long-term residence or citizenship in new countries is a significant purpose of migrants. Therefore, in the absence of clear conditions for a safe, legal status, migrants are often pushed to migrate to places that meet these conditions (UNHCR, 2004).
- D. **Lack of educational opportunity:** Access to appropriate, high-quality education and training opportunities is a significant driver of migration investment. In the absence of these opportunities, migrants will seek to move to new destinations to fulfil their aspirations for education and training (UNHCR, 2004).
- E. **Lack of employment opportunity:** The absence of adequate job opportunities and job stability enhances migrants' aspirations to invest in their multiple migrations, including the aspiration to rely on stable business far away on low financial aid provided by some governmental or non-governmental institutions (UNHCR, 2004).
- F. **Lack of durable and long-term solutions:** One of the aspirations of migrants, especially long-term migrants, is the search for stability within durable and long-term solutions.

However, this object could be affected by many factors, including the inability to make long-term plans and the failure to return to origin countries due to conflicts, poverty, or injustice. Moreover, the stability solution could be influenced by the weak or the failure of migration policies or the procedures that would help migrants integrate and settle. All of the previous enhances the aspirations of migrants to continue moving towards a permanent and stable destination (UNHCR, 2004).

G. **Lack of legal migration opportunities:** In addition to the above, another factor grows the multiple migrations, mainly the illegal ones. Migrants cannot secure legal migration because of visa restrictions or the lack of legal opportunities for resettlement (UNHCR, 2004).

Furthermore, Migrants' decision to move is a complete process affected by many levels of factors. On the one hand, the factors related to their current location where they have a good experience and knowledge about it and the determinants related to the destination location seek enough information. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the personal factors and many outside restrictions may they face (Lee, 2012).

Furthermore, to understand how the migrants evaluate the cost of the migration and decide to move to another destination or not, this study will rely on the framework was propose by Black (Black et al., 2011). Where Black proposed in his framework three levels of drivers (Castelli, 2018)

- Macro-level drivers are related to context and independent from the migrants themselves.
- Meso-level drivers are related to migrants but not under their complete control.
- Micro-level drivers are related directly to the personal characteristics of the migrations

To conclude, the study will depend on the human capital theory and the aspirations–capabilities model to explain the multiple migrations of Syrian. Also, to measure these aspirations and how the migrants evaluate their decisions, the study will use the points UNHCR illustrated, and the framework proposed by Richard Black and others. Figure 1 below illustrates the theoretical framework of this research.




Figure 3. The theoretical framework

CHAPTER III

MULTIPLE MIGRATIONS FLOWS OF SYRIANS

3.1 The beginning of the conflict and the most important events that led to the internal and external Syrian migrations flows:

In 2011, the anti-regime protests in Syria started in the south of Syria, exactly in Daraa city. After arresting a group of adolescents from the Syrian police because of political graffiti against the Syrian president. Moreover, the security forces cracked down on peaceful demonstrations and killed many civilian people throughout the country. Moreover, as a reaction, many peaceful protests spread across Syria, and their focus shifted to overthrow the regime. Besides, the Syrian security forces conducted raids in Homs, Damascus, Daraa, and several other cities to squelch protests. In that time, the internal displacements had started from these targeted cities to more safe places (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

On the other hand, there was an insufficient response from the government to the protesters' demands. In April 2011, and as a part of this response, the Syrian government released a few political prisoners and lifted a 48-year-old state of emergency (Oweis, 2011). However, the frequency of anti-regime demonstrations was not reduced. Therefore, the government chose to transfer more military weapons to the out-control areas such as Daraa, Banyas, Homs, and the rural of Damascus to end the anti-regime movement. At the same time, at the end of 2011, the international community and the United States of America launched a new package of sanctions in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the Syrian government from using force against peaceful demonstrators.

As the conflict was increasing, more armed groups and individuals entered the ongoing conflict when in January 2012, a member of al-Qaida announced the formation of the Nusra Front in Syria (Cameron Glenn, 2016). Besides, Lebanon's Hezbollah militias and Shiite militias from Iraq and Iran had joined the conflict. Furthermore, in January 2013, Israel started air attacks on many targets in Syrian areas.

In the middle of 2011, the spiral of violence escalated, and many civilians were killed. These significant events pushed some military officers to defect and establish the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in July 2011(NPR, 2012). While the armed conflict began to rise, peaceful protests started declining. Moreover, the opposition actors find themselves in a position where they should build their organisations. Therefore, some opposition actors formed the Syrian National Council in Istanbul in August 2011 when It claimed to be the first official representative of the Syrian opposition. And then, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, commonly named the Syrian National Coalition, was formed in November 2012 during opposition meetings in Doha, Qatar. Furthermore, the U.S., the UK, France, Turkey, and Gulf states formally recognised the opposition National Coalition as "legitimate representatives" of the Syrian people (Mec, 2013).

Syrian government forces began an attack on Homs city, the country's third-largest city and the revolution's capital, as the revolutionaries called it. Moreover, Pro-government troops killed more than 100 people, including more than 40 children and 30 women, in the village of Houla in Homs(BBC, 2012). It was one of the first massacres by the “Shabiha militiamen” loyal to Assad. Moreover, the fighting was so bloody in Homs city, and it continued sporadically until December 2015, when the last rebels evacuated the city as part of a deal with the regime mediated by the U.N. At the same time as fighting in Homs, the Syrian government forces assaulted Hama, which evoked memories of the 1982 Hama massacre. As a result, of this massive conflict in Homs and Hama, thousands of displaced people and refugees fled this area to neighbouring countries, mainly Turkey, as many of those areas in rural Homs and Hama were Turkmen. Also, to Lebanon near the western countryside of Homs.

Meanwhile, the increase in the power of the opposition enabled them to capture large areas of the country from Daraa to Homs, and the countryside of Damascus and later the eastern half of Aleppo and Raqqa. Later as a response to this control, the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF), using heavy weapons and the Barrel bomb, attacked the opposition-controlled areas intensively. As a result, more than one million civilians fled Aleppo city internally to rural areas or crossed Turkey's borders.

In parallel with the conflict between the government forces and the opposition, in June 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) declare a "caliphate" in the territory from Aleppo to the eastern Iraqi province of Diyala. Moreover, it seized the border between Syria and Iraq after thoroughly controlling the Raqqa province (BBC, 2014). Furthermore, ISIS controlled Kobani, a strategic town, because of its proximity to the Turkish border. In 2015, the U.S began the airstrikes against ISIS in Syria, dramatically expanding its campaign against extremist groups. Also, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) controlled Manbij after ISIS (wilson center, 2019).

Furthermore, with the help of U.S. and coalition airstrikes, the Kurdish fighters ruled Kobani after a four-month battle (wilson center, 2019). In October 2017, ISIS was driven from Raqqa by U.S. and coalition airstrikes, SDF, and allies. Besides, Syrian government forces declared victory over ISIS in Deir Ezzor. As a result of ISIS's control of a vast area in Syria and Iraq and the operations started by the U.S. and its allies, hundreds of thousands of residents were forced to flee to the nearby borders with Turkey and Iraq, which added to the growing refugee crisis in camps along the borders.

The south region of Syria was not better than the north side, where FSA declared that the Chemical governmental weapons attacked rural Damascus on Wednesday, 21 August 2013. Those chemical weapons attacks killed hundreds of innocent civilians in the Ghouta area in rural Damascus, which the FSA controlled. Based on that, the U.N. weapons inspectors concluded that chemical weapons were used to attack the Ghouta area of rural Damascus in August 2013, killing about 300 civilians (Siddique, 2013). Later, the government of the Syria Arab republic handed over chemical weapons to the United Nations in order to destroy them, and the process was completed by June 2014 (Kimball, 2021). Besides, Syrian government forces and Hezbollah militias forces recaptured Yabroud, the last rebel stronghold near the Lebanese border (Conroy, 2014).

Furthermore, in April 2015, Syrian FSA and fighters from the Nusra Front captured the Nassib border crossing with Jordan and three nearby military posts (AP, 2015). Therefore, The Syrian Arab Armed Forces (SAF) launched intense bombing raids in southern borders. As a result of escalating levels of violence, daily bombardment, and destruction in the southern region of Syria, thousands of families were forced to cross the border to Jordan, Lebanon and in small numbers to occupied Palestine and Israel.

As a pivotal event in the west north Syria, in March 2015, The Nusra Front, SFA and other Islamist groups captured the city of Idlib, the second provincial capital lost by the government after Raqqa in March 2013. Also, The Nusra Front and the SFA increased the frequency of attacks on areas controlled by the central government in the cities of the Syrian coast, especially the Latakia governorate (Euronews, 2015). In September 2015, the conflict in Syrian entered a new significant phase when the Syrian opposition and the Islamic groups controlled a massive area from the country. At the same time, the Syrian Arab Armed Forces and its allies were suffering from a problematic situation in controlling the capital and the surrounding areas. Nevertheless, all that situation changed significantly after excessive Russian intervention in Syria to support the Syrian government. When in September 2012, at the request of the government of the Syrian Arab Republic, Russia officially began its military intervention in the Syrian war, supporting the Syrian government against the opposition. As a result of the Russian intervention, the Syrian Arab Armed Forces return to control Homs, Syria's third-largest city, after four years from the opposition control. The Free Syrian Army groups leave the last opposition-held district of Homs as part of an evacuation deal with the government, and they were forced to be displaced to Idlib and rural Aleppo (Andrew Osborn, 2015).

In 2016, to reduce the massive flows of migrants to Turkey and Europe, the government of Turkey announced that Ankara would revise the visa-free entry of Syrian citizens to Turkey. As a result, since January 2016, Syrian citizens have required a visa to enter Turkey if they are coming from a third country by sea or air (Deutsche Welle, 2018). Based on the Turkish government, the Syrian citizen entering Turkey from the land border will not be affected by these requirements, and Turkey will not change the open-border policy. Later in March 2016, the Turkish government and The European Union (E.U.) signed the migration deal, which decreased the number of irregular migrations effectively through the land and sea from Turkey (Hurriyetaidailynews, 2016).

In December 2016, Syrian government forces retook Aleppo, backed by Russian air power and full support by the Iranian-sponsored militias, the country's largest city. This shift in events and the escalation of violence deprived the opposition of their last major urban stronghold. After that, Syrian government forces and its allies attached heavily to both Idlib and the northern rural of

Hama. Moreover, in April 2017, more than 80 civilians were killed in a sarin gas strike on Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib, the opposition-controlled province. This bloody attack provoked the United States to launch a missile attack on the military airbase where the Syrian government aircraft used it to attack Khan Sheikhoun. As a result, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), through its states parties conference in June 2018, established the investigation and Identification Team (IIT) to identify the perpetrators of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. In April 2021, the IIT team released the second report that accuses the Syrian regime of being responsible for the chemical attacks (OPCW, n.d.). Later, in July 2017, the Lebanese militia Hezbollah and Syrian government forces launch a military operation against the jihadist groups from the Aarsal area near the Lebanese Syrian border, which was accompanied by the forced deportation of fighters and their families internally to northern Syria.

In February 2018, The Russian forces supported Syrian government forces to escalate their offensive on Eastern Ghouta, the last rebel stronghold near Damascus. Hundreds of civilians were killed in these military operations. By 8th April 2018, anti-regime rebels agreed to evacuate Idlib. Moreover, later, FSA in a northern rural of Homs city agreed to a Russia-brokered deal to evacuate. Moreover, as part of a Russian-brokered cease-fire in southern Syria, rebels, including the FSA and other factions, agreed to surrender their heavy weapon to allow the government to resume control of Daraa province.

Moreover, Syrian government forces recaptured almost all the country's south, up to the borders with Jordan and the Golan occupied by Israel (Boms & Zielińska, 2019). In August 2016, the Turkish government intervened militarily in the Syrian crisis. Turkish Armed Forces crossed the borders into Syria to push back, with the help of Syrian opposition groups, so-called the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Kurdish-led groups from a borders area of the two countries' border starting from Jarablus city (cbsnews, 2016). In 2018, to establish a safe area, the Turkish Armed Forces launched another military operation in Afrin in western north Syria. Furthermore, in October 2019, Turkey launched the third military operation, "Peace Spring", in northern Syria (Reuters Staff, 2018). Later in March 2020, many direct military confrontations occurred between the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian Arab Armed Forces in northern Syria before Turkey and Russia announced a ceasefire.

3.2 The migration of Syrians to neighbouring countries

The ten years of conflict in Syria since 2011 left more than 13.4 Syrian out of their home; among them, 5,602,785 persons were registered as refugees in the neighbouring countries until May 2021. Moreover, almost 66% of those registered refugees were women and children. The table below presents the population of the registered Syrian refugees according to the UNHCR. (UNHCR, 2021).

Table 4. Syrian in neighboring countries

Location name	Source	Population
Turkey	Government of Turkey	3671761
Lebanon	UNHCR	855172
Jordan	UNHCR	665834
Iraq	UNHCR	245953
Egypt	UNHCR	132408
Other (North Africa)	UNHCR	31657

Source: UNHCR 31 Mar 2021 <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71>

Those Syrian refugees and migrants in the neighbouring counties were looking for protection and safety at the beginning. Nevertheless, after all these years, Syrian refugees and migrants seek real opportunities to achieve self-sufficiency and stability through active participation in new societies (Kumar et al., 2019). The safe escape routes and accessibility to the border strip were the foremost factors determining the initial destination of Syrians' migration from their provinces to the nearest neighbouring countries. Therefore, most of the Syrian refugees and migrations in Turkey were from the Northwest and Northeast Syrian provinces such as Aleppo, Idlib, Ar Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zur. In contrast, Syrians from the Homs and Rif-Dimashq Governorate fled to Lebanon. Also, the Syrians from Al-Hasakah Governorate moved to Iraq, particularly Kurdistan Region. Moreover, Syrians from Daraa crossed the border, escaping to Jordan.

3.2.1 Syrian in neighbouring countries: Lebanon

Lebanon did not sign the refugee convention 1951 or the protocol 1976, but that did not prevent it from hosting 1.5 million refugees from Syria, and other suffering countries, as the government of Lebanon mentioned (Lebanon, 2021). Also, with 21.8 % of the total residence population, Lebanon is the first country globally regarding the number of refugees as a proportion of the population. Furthermore, the UNHCR registered 855,172 Syrian until March 2021. The highest percentage of Syrians in Lebanon live in rural and urban areas but not in camps where the Lebanon government prohibited forming official camps in Lebanon land (VASyR, 2020). However, some unofficial camps and some tent gatherings where some Syrian families live, as is the case in Aarsal camps. The table below presents the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon by province (UNHCR, 2021).

Table 5. Syrian in Lebanon

Country	Refugees
Bekaa	334,668
North Lebanon	230,601
Beirut	197,410
South Lebanon	92,493

Source: UNHCR 31 Mar 2021 <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71>

Legal and civil registration remains one of the main problems that Syrian refugees and migrants face in Lebanon, where The UNHCR document does not recognize it as a residence or work permit. Moreover, in 2020 only 20% of Syrians in Lebanon have legal residency when this percentage was 27 in 2017 and 22 in 2019 (VASyR, 2020). This decrease in the rate of registered people because of the difficulty of registration, the great refusal of requests from the General Security, and the existence of the sponsor system imposed by the Lebanese government to obtain a legal residence permit. Also, that residency is for a short period of six months with the ability to be renewed under the exact high-cost requirements.

On the economic level, working and finding suitable opportunities in the labor market is another significant problem facing Syrian in Lebanon, where Syrian cannot work without obtaining a work permit from the authority. Moreover, the International Labor Organization considered that the income of the Syrian worker in Lebanon is 40% less than the minimum wage. Also, the

International Labor Organization report showed that the unemployment rate of Syrian refugees in Lebanon reached 30% also 92% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon do not hold work contracts (ILO, 2014).

Regarding the education sector, Syrian refugees in Lebanon have many problems related to school registration and the lack of capability of public education facilities. However, the enrollment rate of pre-primary school education was meagre to reach just 16% of the total number of children. On the contrary, the enrollment rate of primary school was 67% of children from 6 to 14 years old. Furthermore, the enrollment rate of youth 15 to 17 years old in the school is still under 30% (VASyR, 2020).

3.2.2 Syrian in neighbouring countries: Jordan

Jordan receives Syrians fleeing from the war through its official borders or the extended border with Syria since the Syrian conflict started in 2011. Like Lebanon, Jordan did not sign the refugee convention 1951 or the protocol 1976. However, it still hosting 666,692 registered Syrian refugees, among them 128,579 live in camps and 538,113 persons out of camps, according to UNHCR in May 2021 (UNHCR, 2021). Those Syrian refugees are registered by The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and obtain a UNHCR document. Nevertheless, this refugee document is not considered an official residence in the country. Besides, It does not give its holder the right to work or travel but guarantees the right of protection for refugees (Couldrey Marion, 2014). The table below presents the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan by province (UNHCR, 2021).

On the other hand, Jordan often refuses to allow several groups to enter its territory through the official border with Syria, including Palestinian and Iraqi refugees residing in Syria and unmarried men of fighting age and individuals who do not have identification papers. These restrictions forced many of those groups to infiltrate through smuggling networks. Therefore, they were more vulnerable to Risks of Exploitation and Abuse (Couldrey Marion, 2014).

Table 6. Syrian in Jordan

Country	Refugees
Amman Governorate	196,509
Mafraq Governorate	165,949
Irbid Governorate	136,563
Zarqa Governorate	97,427
Balqa Governorate	18,352
Madaba Governorate	13,109
Jarash Governorate	9,335
Karak Governorate	8,548
Maan Governorate	8,311
Ajlun Governorate	6,499
Aqaba Governorate	3,733
Tafilah Governorate	1,689

Source: UNHCR 31 May 2021 <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36>

Jordan's official position was clear from the beginning of the crisis in Syria that it rejects a military solution and calls for peaceful solutions to avoid foreign interference. Moreover, Jordan's entire effort focuses on dealing with the refugee crisis on its borders. Furthermore, Jordan did not request the departure of the Syrian ambassador from Amman as the surrounding Arab governments did.

On the economic level, working and finding suitable opportunities in the labour market, Syrian refugees do not have the right to work in Jordan without obtaining a work permit from the authority. Therefore, some Syrian refugees work in the private sector with low wages and illegally (Couldrey Marion, 2014). ILO's report mentioned increasing unemployment and competition for current jobs in Jordan due to the presence of Syrian refugees. Also, the ILO indicates that the unemployment rate in Jordan increased from 14.5% to 22.1% during the extended period from 2011 to 2014. Moreover, there was a noticeable increase in the percentage of Syrians working in the local market. Furthermore, the ILO stated that many Jordanians believe that Syrian refugees compete with them for their jobs, especially in construction and low-skilled jobs (Isiksal, Zhakanova Isiksal, & Apeji, 2020).

On the Education level, With the support of UNICEF and other UN agencies, the Ministry of Education in Jordan responds effectively to the Syrian refugee crisis also facilitates the opening of new schools in camps and cities. Also, many schools started to work two shifts to increase their capacities to include Syrian children. Furthermore, The ministry of education said that the percentage of school Syrian children of the 6-11 age group is 19.7%, but it has reached 43.2% in children from 12 to 15 years old (MoE and UNICEF, 2020).

3.2.3 Syrian in neighbouring countries: Iraq

Despite the unstable political reality in Iraq and the economic pressures due to successive crises, Iraq still hosting 247,305 Syrian refugees. More than 60% of them live in 9 camps. Moreover, 97% of Syrian refugees in Iraq are in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The local authorities in KRI welcome the refugees and provide them with the available services (Regional refugee and resilience plan, 2022). The table below presents the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan by province (UNHCR, 2021).

Table 7. Syrian in Iraq

Country	Refugees
Erbil	125577
Dahuk	84983
Sulaymaniyah	32264
Other	1663
Anbar	1412
Kirkuk	761
Ninewa	645

Source: UNHCR 31 May 2021 <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/5>

Many camps are clear evidence of the state of poverty experienced by many Syrian refugees in Iraq. At the same time, many of them do not have a stable source of income or a job to meet their basic needs. On the other hand, economic indicators point to an evident growth of the economy of the Kurdistan region in recent years and the significant contributions of Syrian refugees and displaced Iraqis to this growth. Furthermore, Iraq did not sign the refugee convention 1951 or the

protocol 1976. Nevertheless, the Syrians who have the right to reside in the KRI region can legally work. (Couldrey Marion, 2014).

According to the UNHCR, Syrian refugees in the Kurdistan region of Iraq have access to basic services, including education, health, and documentation procedures. Moreover, The UNHCR and the regional government of KRI register refugees, which contributes to protecting them from forcible return and secures their access to available services.

3.3 Syrian in Turkey:

UNHCR Turkey:

Provincial Breakdown Syrian Refugees in Turkey

as of 10 June 2021




Figure 4. Provincial Breakdown Syrian Refugees in Turkey - June 2021, UNHCR, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/87150>

Turkey is hosting the high number of Syrian refugees in the world, with 3,675,485 registered refugees in June 2021, according to the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) and UNHCR. There are 3619513 who live out of camps, and 55972 live in 7 camps (DGMM, 2021b). Table 7 below presents the number of Syrian refugees in each camp in Turkey.

Furthermore, the number of refugees camps in Turkey decline from 22 camps in 2018 to just 8 in 2021. This decrease aligns with the plan of the Turkey government to reduce the number of Temporary Accommodation Centres and camps in its land (UNHCR Turkey, 2021a).

Table 8. Camps of Syrian refugees in Turkey

Province	Camp name	Population	Total
Hatay	Altınözü container camp	2,559	8,934
	Yayladağı container camp	3,469	
	Apaydın container camp	2,906	
Kilis	Elbeyli Besiriye container camp	8,431	8,431
Kahramanmaraş	Merkez container camp	10,271	10,271
Osmaniye	Cevdetiye tent camp	9,073	9,073
Adana	Sarıçam tent camp	19,263	19,263

Source: DGMM 02 June 2021, <https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27>

UNHCR Turkey:

Syrian Refugee Camps and Provincial Breakdown of Syrian Refugees Registered in South East Turkey

as of 10 June 2021




Figure 5. Syrian Refugee Camps and Provincial Breakdown of Syrian Refugees Registered in Southeast Turkey - June 2021, UNHCR, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/87151>

Based on the regulations and laws in Turkey, Syrians are not considered refugees. Turkey signed the refugee convention in 1951 but has reservations on the geographical framework, where it does not consider those coming from outside the European Union as refugees. Therefore, Syrians in Turkey cover under Temporary Protection in Law on Foreigners and International Protection, which observe them as asylum seekers or guests. Also, there are many Syrian living in Turkey as residents based on short-term residence or student residence. According to the updated DGMM data, on 20 June 2021, the Syrian with residence permit reached 94803. There are 81170 have a short term residence permit, and 5087 have a student residence permit (DGMM, 2021a). Furthermore, according to DGMM, more than 11000 Syrian have this exceptional Turkish citizen until 2020 (ERDOĞAN, 2020).

Based on article 12 of the naturalisation law, the Turkish government began granting some Syrians extraordinary Turkish citizenship. Article 12 mentioned that the interior ministry could afford the exceptional Turkish citizen to specific people after security check and with the cabinet's approval. Under article 12, three main categories identify the particular people who could have this exceptional Turkish citizen as following:

" a) Those persons who bring into Turkey industrial facilities or have rendered or believed to render outstanding service in the social or economic arena or in the fields of science, technology, sports, culture or arts and regarding whom the relevant ministries make a reasoned offer. b) Those whose being received into citizenship is deemed to be necessary. c) Those persons who are recognized as migrants." (T. Government, 2009, p. 3).

3.3.1.1 Temporary Protection in Law on Foreigners and International Protection

The ministry of interior developed the law draft on the foreigner and international protection (LFIP). On 11.04.2013, with the approval of the Parliament and the president, Turkey announced the LFIP, which include three pillars: Directorate General of Migration Management foreigners and international protection (Turkey, n.d.)

Article 91 of LFIP Law number 6458 indicated that temporary protection could provide for people who crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx. Those people looking for urgent security, safety, and protection cannot come back to their origin country after they were forced to leave it. In the case of Syrians in Turkey, this temporary protection could provide to all Syrian and

stateless people and refugees in Syria who reach the Turkey land from Syria after 28 April 2011. According to these temporary protection regulations, people seeking protection regulations will not be charged or punished for irregular border crossing if the Turkish authorities registered them while entering or approach Turkish authorities (General Directorate of Migration Management, 2014).

The central official governmental entity responsible for managing the temporary protection system in Turkey is the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) that established under the Ministry of Interior according to the same LFIP Law No. 6458 (UNHCR Turkey, 2021b).

Syrian under temporary protection have the legal right to stay in Turkey. Also, they are protected by law from any forcible return to their origin country if there is no durable solution in Syria. Moreover, temporary protection status ensures a set of rights and services, including health, education, social assistance and security (UNHCR Turkey, 2021b).

- Rights to work: The temporary protection status provides the Syrian with the possibility to obtain the right to work. Nevertheless, people under temporary protection still need to seek a work permit from the Ministry of Labour and Social.
- Health: the Syrians under temporary protection can access and benefit from the health system only in the province where they are registered.
- Education: All people under temporary protection status can access the Turkish education system. Also, they can apply for university and higher education using the temporary protection status.
- Long-term residence: According to the DGMM, the temporary protected status does not give the right to obtain a long-term residence permit.
- Mobility: people under temporary protection status should obtain travel permission from the provincial Directorate of Migration Management before moving inside the country. The TP status does not allow them to move outside the country. If moving to a third country, the TP status will be terminated (DGMM, 2020).

Figure 5 below illustrates the number of Syrian under temporary protection through the last ten years based on the data of DGMM.




Figure 6. the number of Syrian under temporary protection, DGMM

<https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27>

3.3.1.2 EU-Turkey migrant deal

In March 2016, the Turkish government, and The European Union (EU) signed the migration agreement after a lengthy discussion in November 2015. The EU and Turkey declared that this agreement to activate mechanisms would decline and stop the irregular migration to the EU from Turkey. (European Council, 2016)

The main agreed points through this migration agreement:

1. **Return the irregular migrants:** since 20 March 2016, the EU will send back to Turkey all irregular migration who reacted the EU territories through Greek islands from Turkey. Furthermore, this return operation will be entirely funded by the EU.
2. **Resettlement principle corresponding to returns (the one-for-one method):** The EU will resettle vulnerable Syrian from Turkey in the same number of Syria whom they will send back to Turkey from the Greek island. According to the agreement, in coordination with the UNHCR, this resettlement process will try to reach the most vulnerable Syrian in Turkey with priority to those who did not try to reach the EU illegally.
3. **No land or sea migration routes from Turkey to the territory of the European Union:**

based on the agreement, Turkey will block any potential sea or land routes that may be used by the irregular migration to reach the EU lands.

4. **Activate the Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme:** The EU member states voluntarily will active the resettlement program from Turkey When Turkey can substantially end or reduce irregular migration.
5. **Eliminate the visa requirements for Turkish citizens to enter the European Union:** As a result of Turkey's commitment to the agreement and its fulfilment of all criteria, the Parliament and the European Council will assess the situation and work on reducing visa requirements for Turkish citizens no later than the end of June 2016.
6. **More Financial support for Turkey's refugee response:** The EU will fund Turkey by 3 billion euros to empower Turkish response to refugees and fund programs for people under temporary protection in health, education, infrastructure, and livelihood. Furthermore, the EU will contribute another 3 billion euro by the end of 2018.
7. **Strengthen the customs union between Turkey and the European Union:** The EU and Turkey will improve and upgrade the Customs Union.
8. **Revive Turkey's accession plan to the European Union:** The EU will re-energize the accession process of Turkey to the EU, mainly reviving the negotiations in chapter 17 and further steps regarding chapter 33.
9. **Joint action to support humanitarian efforts:** The European Union will work jointly with Turkey to develop the humanitarian conditions inside Syria, mainly supporting Turkish efforts to improve humanitarian conditions in areas close to Turkey's borders in Syria, to ensure a safer life for the population there and reducing the flows of new refugees

3.4 Syrian in the United Kingdom:

According to the Home office description of the immigration system in the United Kingdom, individuals could cross the UK border legally or illegally, and the home office will deal with both accordingly where legal methods should be through the legal borders with obtaining a visa or without a visa depending on the country of its origin in the list of non-visa country. Also, individuals, including refugees and asylum seekers, could cross the borders through the resettlement schemes. Besides, there is individual cross the border illegally where they will detain and return.

Furthermore, individuals can apply for asylum to settle permanently and extend their stay or for citizenship.

Based on the UNHCR, more than 130000 refugees and 61968 asylum seekers in the United Kingdom by the end of 2019(UNHCR, 2020). Moreover, according to the home office number of Syrian refugees in the UK is more than 20,000. The figure below illustrates the number of asylums in the UK in the last two years.




Figure 7. The number of asylums in the UK in last two years

Asylum seekers during their application process do not have the right to work if they did not have it before seeking asylum. Nevertheless, in some cases, the UK government could permit to work for asylum waiting for the decision if they have waited for more than 12 months.

Furthermore, the refugees have the full right to work and move after they grant the right of protection.

According to the UK government, the table below illustrates the most countries of Asylum application in the last ten years in the United Kingdom, where Syrian came at number 10 in this list.

Table 9. Asylum applications lodged in the UK, by nationality

Nationality	Date of application										Year Ending		Change (latest year)	
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	June 2019	June 2020	Number	%
	Iran	1866	2477	2659	2410	2000	3242	4184	2570	3320	4855	4201	4627	426
Albania	174	395	819	1325	1576	1519	1493	1430	2005	3488	2813	3134	321	11.41%
Iraq	378	277	275	310	588	2216	2672	2379	2700	2985	3188	2578	-610	-19.13%
Eritrea	711	797	728	1387	3233	3695	1230	1085	2151	1876	2229	1800	-429	-19.25%
Pakistan	1416	2418	3280	3359	2726	2470	2870	2495	2033	1937	1876	1626	-250	-13.33%
Afghanistan	1596	1271	1008	1038	1139	2261	2329	1326	1349	1573	1339	1465	126	9.41%
Vietnam	449	328	402	437	381	582	778	1070	1215	1561	1354	1372	18	1.33%
Sudan	573	688	636	743	1449	2912	1310	1685	1611	1524	1683	1317	-366	-21.75%
India	527	553	1087	974	703	1014	1498	1327	1321	1580	1417	1285	-132	-9.32%
Syria	127	355	988	1648	2025	2539	1376	604	711	1031	878	1168	290	33.03%

Source: UK Government

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/921403/asylum-summary-jun-2020-tables.xlsx

Based on the data of the home office, the highest application from Syrian was in 2015 when it reached 2539 Asylum applications. Furthermore, there is a 33% increase in the number of applications in 2020 to reach 1168 after 1031 in 2019. The figure below presents the distribution of Syrian asylum applications in the UK in the last ten years.




Figure 8. Syrian asylum application in the UK in the last ten years

CHAPTER IV

MULTIPLE MIGRATIONS FLOWS OF SYRIANS FROM TURKEY TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

The majority contribution of the data of the Desk Research illustrated in the literature review and theoretical framework in the second chapter. In contrast, this chapter will present the data and the findings extracted through the semi-structured interviews with the selected sample.

4.1 demographic information of the research sample

The semi-structured interviews included conducting 25 Semi-structured interviews with Syrian migrations who moved from Turkey to live in the United Kingdom after multiple migrations journey. These semi-structured interviews were conducted through a stratified sample to ensure that it represents all age groups and genders.

4.1.1 The Nationality and Ethnic group:




Figure 9. The Nationalities and Ethnic groups of the interviewed sample

The interviews sample included 84% Syrians and 12 % Syrians who have Turkish nationality. Also, one out of the 25 interviewees holds Swedish citizenship in addition to his Syrian nationality. Regarding the ethnic group, the sample included 88% Arab people and 12% Kurdish. Figure 6 above illustrate the nationalities and Ethnic groups of the interviewed sample.

4.1.2 The Age and Gender:




Figure 10. Age group and gender of the interviewed sample

Regarding gender, the interviews sample included 80% men and 20% women. Moreover, 44% of the sample was from the 30-34 age group. Also, 16% and 8% were from the 35-39 and 50-54 groups, respectively. While the percentage of both 25-29 and 40-44 was 12%. In contrast, the research interviewed 4% of 45-49 and 56-69 age group. Figure 7 above illustrate the age groups and gender of the interviewed sample.

4.1.3 The Marital status and number of dependents:




Figure 11. The Marital status and number of dependents of the interviewed sample

The sample included more than 75% of married interviewees and 24% of single persons. Moreover, most interviewed migrants were single and did not have any dependents or married, just dependent. In contrast, 20% of them have dependents, while 16% of the sample have four dependents. Furthermore, just one migrant mentioned that he has five dependents. Figure 7 above illustrate the marital status and number of dependents of the interviewed sample. Later this chapter will argue the impact of the marital status of the potential migrants on their ability to move or stay.

4.1.4 The education and the foreign language level:

Education level and learning the languages of the destinations country language is essential in studying multiple migrations. Therefore, the sample ensures a comprehensive range coverage of this determinant. Among the 25 interviewed migrants, 12 persons hold master's degrees, and nine migrants mentioned they have Bachelor's degrees. Moreover, the sample included two migrants who reached primary school. In contrast, just one interviewed migrant declared that he has a PhD degree.

Furthermore, besides the Arabic language that all the interviewed speak, three interviewees can speak Kurdish as second mother tongue. Regarding the foreign languages, according to the semi-structured interviews, 15 migrants mentioned that their English level is Fluent as opposed to only four who spoke fluent Turkish. In contrast, 13 migrants declared that their level of Turkish language is poor or they have the basic while just three interviewed have poor English. Figure 9 illustrates the education level and the foreign language level of the sample.




Figure 12. The education level and the foreign language level of the sample

4.1.5 The origin locations of the sample in Syria:




Figure 13. map of origin locations of the sample in Syria

The map above illustrates the origin locations of the interviewed migrants in Syria. Where the sample of this research came from 6 provinces. 12 out of 25 were from the economic capital of Aleppo and its rural. Also, three interviewed migrants lived in the capital Damascus in contrast to 1 from rural Damascus province. Moreover, 3 and 2 were from Homs and Hama, respectively. Furthermore, just one migrant from Daraa, in contrast to 3 migrants, lived in Idlib before starting their migration journey. The below figure 11 presents the timeframe of leaving the sample their areas of origin in Syria, while figure 10 presents the map of origin locations of the sample in Syria




Figure 14. the timeframe of leaving the sample their areas of origin in Syria

4.1.6 The locations of the sample in Turkey:



Figure 16. map of sample locations in Turkey

The map above illustrates the location of the sample in Turkey. The most considerable proportion of the same was living in the Southeast Anatolia Region, which hosts the most significant Syrians in Turkey. Moreover, the rest of the sample came from Istanbul, the biggest province of Turkey.

Furthermore, 12 out of 25 migrants were living in Gaziantep. Also, three interviewed migrants lived in Hatay province, where many Turkish residences already speak Arabic, and one from Adana. Moreover, the sample included two migrants who resided in Şanlıurfa, and the same number came from the coastal city of Mersin. In contrast, five migrants from the sample were living in Istanbul.




Figure 17. The period of residence of the sample in Turkey

Figure 14 shows the number of years the sample spent in Turkey, where it was one of the sample requirements to interview people who lived in Turkey at least for one year, which is the minimum period that the UN considers for long-term migrants.

4.1.7 The locations of the sample in the United Kingdom:




Figure 18. The map of sample locations in the UK

Regarding the location of the sample in the United Kingdom, they were located from many regions. 8 out of 25 migrants were living in Nottingham in the Midlands region. Also, 7 out of 25 were living in London, the capital of England. Moreover, 3 and 2 migrants were living in Manchester and Huddersfield, respectively. Figure 9 presents all the current locations of the sample in the United Kingdom. The map above illustrates the location of the sample in the UK.

Furthermore, Figure 17 below shows the year of the arrival of migrants to the United Kingdom and the method of migration used. 72% of the sample reached the UK in the last two years in comparison to 20% arrived before 2019, and 8% came this year 2021. More than 75% of the sample were regular migration regarding the migration methods. Also, another 8% went through

the UK resettlement program. In contrast to just four out of 25 migrants were irregular migrants, which shows the difficulty of illegal access to the UK.




Figure 19. The arrival years and the method of migration of the sample to the UK

4.2 The Multiple Migrations routes of the sample from Syria to the United Kingdom




Figure 20. The journey of migrants from Syria to the UK

The above map illustrates the migrants' journey from the country of origin, Syria, to the UK after their residence in Turkey for no less than a year. In addition to the financial ability to cover the cost of the chosen route, The migrants' decision is always limited by several factors at the Meso level, such as legal frame and visa requirements and restrictions. Furthermore, the characteristic of the Micro-level plays an influential role in choosing the road to be suitable for individuals and their partners and dependents. The interviewed sample showed that they used three main routes:

1. The direct route by plane from Turkey to the UK is available through visa, resettlement programs, or reunification programs for migrant families.
2. The second route is across the sea to Europe and from there to the UK.
3. Finally, the third route is by land from Turkey to Europe and then to the UK.

However, of course, there are many paths that regular and irregular migrants are using but not mentioned here.

Regarding the concerns during the multiple migration journey, migrants mentioned many risks and difficulties they faced from the origin country to the first destination and then to the other destinations, as in the movement from Turkey to the UK. For example, the migrants suffer from psychological pressures, constant anxiety, and uncertainty to make decisions. Also, there were many security risks on the road, especially within irregular migrants, where migrants deal with Human Trafficking gangs along the route. Furthermore, there is a high risk of arrest and involuntary return along the road.

4.2.1 The primary reasons for the first migration from Syria:




Figure 21. The word cloud of the primary reasons for the first migration from Syria.

“Seeking safety and stability in 2017, we moved to Turkey. We need a kindergarten for our kid, health, and education. Also, the basics of life in Turkey are available” (O.H, online interview, April 26, 2021)

“I had to travel because of the conscription and compulsory military service” (O.K, online interview, May 17, 2021)

“In Aleppo, as a result of the bombing of barrel bombs and missiles, we fled to Turkey” (M. Shaban, online interview, May 24, 2021)

The interviews with the migrants show that many reasons inspired the decision to leave the origin country, most of them related to the Macro level and the country's situation due to the continuation of the conflict and the dramatic events mentioned earlier.

Many migrants decided or were forced to leave to seek protection and improve their safety regarding the unstable security and political situation. Also, the fear of death, arrest, or refusal to

“In the last years in Turkey, the situation was not as easy and attractive as it was before. Also, it was not as welcoming as it was before as a work environment either” (Y.S, online interview, April 26, 2021)

“Losing hope of obtaining Turkish citizenship” (H.H, online interview, May 3, 2021)

“When I look back, I feel lost a lot. Nevertheless, when I look to the future, I think that the investment decision is still worth it...Migration is an investment, and the Syrians borrow money to send their son illegally through the sea, then this person will reunite the rest of the family. They invest in this person for a better future for all of them” (B.H, online interview, April 25, 2021).

The lack of hope of returning to the origin country and several other factors inspire Syrians residing in Turkey to migrate to another destination. Many migrants indicated that their inability to establish a stable future in Turkey was the main factor that pushed them to emigrate from Turkey. This instability feeling that migrants observe is linked to several circumstances, including legal instability. Turkey does not recognise Syrian migrants on its territory as refugees but rather as people under temporary protection or as guests. This categorisation deprives them of several rights, including complete protection from forced return and freedom of movement, since there is no travel document for Syrians in Turkey. They need permission to move internally between provinces. Also, there is a fear of deportation that accompanies Syrians in Turkey, which encourages instability and migration. Furthermore, the ability to establish a home is a significant factor that supports human stability. Still, Syrians in Turkey do not have the right to own real estate according to Turkish law.

Moreover, seeking to obtain official and identification papers, including a passport and citizenship, is a critical factor that pushes Syrians to migrate from Turkey to other destinations. Turkey government started naturalisation among Syrian in Turkey. Nevertheless, this process depends on article 12 of the naturalization law, which means extraordinary Turkish citizenship and no guarantee to obtain Turkish citizenship, even after a long period has elapsed in Turkey.

Also, there are many causes related to the Macro level. For instance, there are growing racism, inequality, and bullying in schools in the social context. Also, there is instability in the labor

“I will lose a lot, but I will gain stability and official papers. The legal motive is the most important”
(B.B, online interview, April 21, 2021)

“When I look back, I feel lost a lot. Nevertheless, when I look to the future, I think that the investment decision is still worth it...Migration is an investment, and the Syrians borrow money to send their son illegally through the sea, then this person will reunite the rest of the family. They invest in this person for a better future for all of them” (B.H, online interview, April 25, 2021).

Based on the human capital theory, migration is an investment to improve people's current situation and well-being. Also, in the ideal situations, migrants to decide to move forward should understand and calculate the differences between the costs they will pay during the migration process and their profits if they reach their destination country.

In unstable countries that suffer from conflicts and insecurity, individuals decide or force to leave to improve their security situation and obtain protection is an investment to develop the state of safety. A remarkable observation in these complex cases is that people do not have time to study their options if possible. Still, they will try to choose the best available option seeking protection and safety. later, they will try to assess their choices when they settle relatively to decide whether they will stay, move, or return.

In the research case of Syrian immigrants who spent a period in Turkey, Turkey secured them the security and initial stability they were asking for after leaving Syria. Nevertheless, after years from their residences in Turkey, their priorities changed, especially after the lack of hope of returning to the country of origin. The change in the priorities includes seeking long-term stability, obtaining official and legal papers, advancing educational opportunities, and building a solid future. Therefore, some Syrians decide to invest in better-planned migration from Turkey to the third destination. Further in this chapter will illustrate more the related factors that could affect the decision of the migrants to choose the better migration investment based on their case and context.

“There are two factors if persons are under 18; the probability of their emigration is less, especially if they are in Turkish schools and has integrated into the Turkish education system. Their ability to remain and integrate in Turkey will be higher... However, if the age is more than 18, then the probability of emigration is greater. In contrast, if persons are over forty, the inspirations to migrate will decline because they no longer have ambitions to be in a new society” (B.M, personal interview, May 5, 2021)

Age is part of many personal factors, such as Marital status, the family, and the number of dependents, which all integrate to influence the decision to migrate in each movement. The capability of migrants to begin investing in building a new life is greatly affected by their age group. Every movement requires adapting, learning a new language, and constructing relationships with a new community. Regarding those and other migration requirements, the youth show more possibility than the older groups. In Turkey's Syrian migrants' case, people at the old age group do not prefer to spend the financial cost and non-financial cost of movement again in the new country. At the same time, they will reach their retirement before achieving that investment result. In contrast, the young generations see new movements as a magnificent chance to develop and build solid bases for the future.

On the other hand, some migrants find that their older age has contributed to the formation of experiences and knowledge that may help them understand life better. Furthermore, they may also seek to retire in a society that contributes to securing a better life for them in the retirement stage. In those cases, age inspires the multiple immigration processes if the appropriate conditions are not available in the first destinations where already they are in exile and are not in their original countries.

affected my migration from Syria, but the gender factor effect was not straightforward in my travel to the UK" (O.K, online interview, May 17, 2021).

"Gender has a lot to do with the decision to migrate. Because I, as a female, need a country that protects me and a government that protects my daughter is also a female, so sure, it affected my decision and pushed me to leave" (B.B, online interview, April 21, 2021).

The gender factor dramatically affects the ability of individuals to decide to migrate, while migrants seeking stability, protection, and safety is in a place where they will be exposed to risks based on their gender orientation. Furthermore, the gender factor could increase or reduce the ability and capability to migrate.

The gender factor directly affects the determination of the migration trip method according to the risks associated with those routes. Besides the high risk of life accompanying migrants on the irregular migration routes, whether by sea or by land, the irregular migration routes are often unsafe for women. During those journeys, women are exposed to many risks that may lead to sexual and physical harassment and assaults.

On the other hand, the gender factor directly affects emigrants from conflict areas, especially men from places of forced conscription, such as Syria, where men are forced to engage in armed actions. Likewise, in the northwestern regions of Syria that are controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces. they forcibly conscripting females and males alike.

“What accelerated the decision to migrate was the presence of children” (A.H, online interview, April 28, 2021).

“This decision [irregular migration from Turkey to the UK] took me five years. I am from 2016, and I was refusing to migrate. I do not want to get away from my kids. I want my family to live close to our country [Syria] in Turkey” (A.M, online interview, April 25, 2021).

“Civil status is as complicated as any marriage with the responsibility for movement and movement. It is also accompanied by support and ambition for a new beginning. Sometimes it was a support factor, and sometimes it made migration more difficult” (Z.N, personal interview, April 18, 2021).

Civil status and the presence of the family has several effects on multiple migrations. While the presence of children inspires parents to emigrate to seek a better life and future, the company of the family may also limit the family's ability to move where there is an increase in the cost of migration. It also increases the burden of decision-making for the caregivers regarding the routes of migration and its safety. Furthermore, Family reunification is also one of the main factors that inspire migrants to embark on the migration journey.

In addition, the presence of a partner during the migration journey contributes to alleviating the burdens of multiple movements and sharing the financial and psychological pressures. It could also be an essential inspiration for a long-term investment start in a stable future.

Multiple migrations and regular movements affect the formation of families among migrants. Some migrants may delay building a family or having children until they reach their last destination country, which may take several years. As a result, some migrants may lose their opportunity to form a stable family and have children.

“This [religion] encourages the decision to travel to a non-Muslim country. Because of my experience in 3 countries ... My problem with the societal culture in the religious society that was restricted my freedoms my Life was not for me” (H.H, online interview, May 3, 2021).

The religious factor could inspire or discourages immigrants' decision to migrate according to their personal religious position. Some migrants prefer to stay or search for societies like their origin country from a religious perspective. In contrast, some migrants could choose to go through a completely new experience and settle in a different society than they lived in their previous communities.

In addition, there are a group of determinants related to the religious factor, such as freedom of religious appearance, the practice of religious rites or the availability of foods that are compatible with the religious belief. Those determinants may contribute to determining the destination of migrants, whether in choosing the destination country or the specific region within that country.

4.3.5 The impact of Ethnicity on multiple migrations




Figure 28. Word cloud from the interviewees' response about ethnicity

“...from the national and ethnic point of view, the fact that my husband is a Kurds was in a bit of annoyance, but in the UK, where things are easier where no one asks, and the country is diverse” (S.H, online interview, April 30, 2021).

“The Arab background did not significantly affect me in Turkey...but the decision was based on thinking about the future, not because of an ethnic related issue...” (O.H, online interview, April 26, 2021).

“... even when I am not very attached to my ethnic group. Nevertheless, I was subjected to some pressures sometimes... I did not have a real problem, but I felt that I was on the verge of having trouble, or at least I would not be treated like anyone else. That is why I want to travel to a place where my ethnicity is not an issue. Here is much diversity...” (O.K, online interview, May 17, 2021)

The ethnic background factor may not be a direct inspiration to initiate a multiple immigrations process. Still, its interaction with several other circumstances may strengthen or restrict the migrants' decision to move to a new country, stay where they are or even return to their origin country. In addition, Ethnic background may have more influence on ethnic minorities. Migrants from ethnic backgrounds who consider a minority in one area may prefer to migrate to more diverse countries, where the ethnic and race do not distinguish them from other people, such as Syrian migrants from Kurdish backgrounds in Turkey.

“Language is an essential determinant for us. Because the language was facilitating us to migrate to the UK... If we failed in emigrating to Britain. We could have gone to the Netherlands because we could study in English and speak English. We did not have a country that requires a new language among our destination options” (S.H, online interview, April 30, 2021).

“My lack of learning the Turkish language is a factor that pushed me to leave. Perhaps if I learned Turkish and integrated into Turkish society, I might have tried to find other opportunities [not chose the migration from Turkey]” (O.K, online interview, May 17, 2021).

“Because I know the Turkish language and have a Turkish name, this helped me a lot. While if I did not learn the language, that could affect me and push me to move before longtime. The English language was an inspiration, and my options were open. My choice was Paris, but the university refused” (Z.N, personal interview, April 18, 2021).

The language factor is a significant driver in choosing the destination of migrants, especially in the case of the United Kingdom, where English is the official language. Many migrants prefer to speed up their migration process by avoiding years of learning a new language in countries where they do not speak their languages unless there are other incentives and advantages.

On the other hand, the migrants' failure to learn the host country's language may promote multiple migration options where the lack of learning the host country's language adversely affects the ability of migrants to integrate with residents.

As is the case with educational attainment, the language factor promotes broader migration options, especially if the migrants can speak one or more languages besides their mother tongue. The availability of This language gives them a broader scope to choose the destination countries and choose other migration routes such as student and cultural exchange, scholarships, and work.

For each migration process, there are costs associated with it. These costs could be classified into tangible or intangible based on the human capital theory mentioned in the literature review before. However, all migrants suffer from those costs at different levels based on their character, response, and context. Also, other factors could affect this cost of movements, including the expenses that migrants should pay in their origin country, the destination country, and the journey between them, which could include many phases. Furthermore, the tangible cost also could be affected by the migration routes and methods where each method has related expenses, such as crossing the border regularly or irregularly, preparation expenses, and the cost of the journey itself.

On the other hand, the intangible cost may include migration and adaptation periods' psychological and emotional challenges. Moreover, the vast differences between the cultures, societies traditions, system of rights and duties or even policies and laws all those circumstances could lead some migrants to severe cultural shock. In addition to the cost of new starts in each destination. These hard beginnings may include several aspects starting from time-consuming to create a safe space to live, loss of job stability, and the labor market's cumulative experience. Furthermore, because of the frequent changing of destinations and communities, migrants are more at risk of losing their Social Safety and breaking their social circles significantly. Besides, the inability to pay the high cost of movement could force migrants to leave their partner or families member behind them either in the origin country or other places during the journey.

Based on the Jørgen Carling and the aspirations–capabilities model illustrated through theorizing Multiple Migrations before, those costs of movement determine migrants' decisions. For instance, this may lead to an involuntary immobility situation when migrants have strong motivations to inspire them to migrate. Nevertheless, the available capabilities do not allow them to cover the whole expense of the journey. In this study, the involuntary immobility could describe the Syrian situation who want to migrate to the UK from Turkey. Still, they are not able to cover the complex cost of movement.

In some multiple migrations' cases, when additional factors support covering the cost of movement, as in the resettlement programs, sponsorships, and scholarships, this supports migrants to decide to move again to other destinations. Based on the aspirations–capabilities model, the cost will be a factor to increase aspirations and improving the capabilities of the migrants.

the residence [short-term residence] make you look forward to leaving. Because residence renewing is linked to the passport and the Syrian passport is linked to the Syrian regime, which cost you a large amount of money to renew. This series and the commitment to the Syrian official papers push you out” (B.M, personal interview, May 5, 2021).

“We sold everything we had for the visa, everything we have. We came to the UK with no penny with us” (H.H, online interview, May 3, 2021).

“Of course, I was almost stuck in Turkey with your Syrian passport, which did not help me reach any country. Even Turkey put many obstacles on you because if you leave the country, you cannot return if you do not have residency [due to visa requirements]” (F.Q, personal interview, April 21, 2021)

4.4.2.1 The legal status in Turkey:




Figure 33. legal status of the sample in Turkey

Syrians in Turkey have the right to obtain the Temporary Protection status, described in the previous chapter, also, the possibility of obtaining short-term tourist residency and, in some cases, obtaining humanitarian residency. Figure 30 presents the legal status of the sample in Turkey, where almost half of them had Temporary Protection status before holding residence permit, work permit

or even the Turkish nationality. Compared to 11 out of 25 Syrian who had residence permits, three combined this residence with a work permit. Furthermore, the sample included 3 Syrians who hold Turkish nationality after 2011.

4.4.2.2 The legal status in the UK:

The research sample included Syrians who are students, refugees, and asylum seekers in the UK. 44% of them have five years' leave to remain in the UK (LTR). On the contrary, 36% of interviewed migrants have Application registration cards (ARC), and just 20% have a Biometric residence permit (BRP). Figure 31 illustrates the legal status of the sample in the United Kingdom.




Figure 34. legal status of the sample in the UK

The legal factor is a significant determinant of migrants' decision to migrate or stay. Evolving the human capital of the persons through obtaining official papers and a strong passport is one factor that inspires and motivates people to leave their origin country and change their destinations through multiple migrations. Nevertheless, potential migrants' ability to provide the required official papers to complete the migration journey may limit their ability to move forward or push them to change the migration method or even suspend the immigration decision.

4.4.2.3 The impact of the legal frame on Migration routes:

The ability to choose suitable migration routes depends on the legal framework that potential migrants have. For example, in the research case of Syrian people living in Turkey and want to move to the UK, there are many categories: Syrians who have a Syrian passport or Syria who cannot obtain a passport. The first categories still have all the options of the regular migration routes even with high visa requirements. In comparison, the second categories have fewer options to migrate regularly outside resettlement program or family reunification programs if one of their members is already in the UK.

According to the Passport Index, the Syrian passport is one of the weakest passports globally, where it can give access to just 32 countries, just 4 of them visa-free (Index, n.d.). This very low ranking causes high requirements of any visa to enter any country worldwide. Therefore, the Syrian passport limits the capacity of Syrian in migrations. Besides, the weak ranking of Syrian passport is so costly to obtain. Also, many Syrian refugees and migrants in Turkey can request a passport or official paper due to the security issue with the Syrian regime. In addition, many Syrians are facing difficulties in registering their newborn in the Syrian Civil Registration System, which means those children will not have any official Syrian paper and will stay with temporary protection status.

4.4.2.4 The impact of the legal frame on Mobility:

Turkey does not provide Syrian refugees who registered under temporary protection status any travel document. That means they should stay inside the Turkish border to ensure this protection with limited access to Syria through the land borders with Turkey. Also, Syrian under temporary protection status cannot travel inside Turkey without permission from the Directorate of Migration Management (DGMM) DGMM in their province.

On the other hand, The UK provides Syrian refugees who obtain protection and settle in the UK a refugee travel document under the 1951 UN convention, which allows them to travel to many countries worldwide (the U. Government, n.d.).

4.5 Marco-level: The impact of Macro-level factors on multiple migrations

4.5.1 The impact of the Political Context on multiple migrations



Figure 35. Word cloud of the impact of political context

“What helped us is that Erdoğan [the Turkish president] supports us [Syrian refugee in Turkey]. You feel that there is no system, but it is a government policy, and it supports the Syrians” (A.L, online interview, April 30, 2021).

“The refugee situation in Turkey is much better than in neighboring countries. The Turkish state’s support for the revolution... In general, Turkish politics were positive and pushed many people to think of settle in Turkey” (M. KA, personal interview, April 18, 2021)

“In Turkey, the issue of freedom of expression depended on the subject” (M.M, online interview, May 24, 2021)

“There was relative freedom. It was my duty to return the favor to support the AK Party. But in general, it was not a comfortable place in terms of freedom of expression” (F.N, online interview, April 29, 2021)

“I did not feel the freedom of expression, and I was afraid to express my opinion about the presence of the Turkish army in Syria” (M. Sh, online interview, May 24, 2021).

Based on the UNHCR, the number of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK does not exceed 200 thousand at the end of 2019 compared to 3.6 million in Turkey at the same period (UNHCR UK, n.d.). That makes refugee and asylum topics part of the UK's political debate but not the focus. Also, Syrian refugees are not the center of the case as in Turkey.

80% of the interviewed migration indicated that the political context in Turkey inspire them to leave, compared to only 12% who stated that the political context is a factor supporting the Syrians to decide to stay in Turkey. Moreover, just 9% saw it as a secondary factor. On the contrary, 84% of the interviewed migration indicated that the political context in the United Kingdom inspire them to come and settle there, compared to only 16% who stated that the political context is a secondary factor for them in the United Kingdom.

These percentages come from the fact that many Syrians considered their presence in Turkey directly linked to the Justice and Development Party AKP's supported policies. Thus, many Syrians see, the policies and positions of the AK Party and the Turkish President are protecting Syrians in Turkey. Furthermore, the use of Syrian refugees in the political conflict between the Turkish parties is affected Syrian in Turkey, as many Syrians consider this use directly contributes to increasing the tension between the Turkish and the Syrians. Also, there is a great fear among Syrians from deportation if the opposition controls the political scene. Besides, there is a fear of the return of relations between the Syrian government and the Turkish government. This political context inspires the Syrians in turkey to migrate from Turkey to another destination to seek better political stability.

On the other hand, many Syrians see that the Turkish political context does not push Syrians to migrate because of the public political position of the Turkish government in support of the Syrian revolution. Also, Turkey is hosting the Syrian opposition and its institutions and providing continued support. Moreover, the Turkey government offers vast space for the Syrian opposition activity from Turkey.

“When I arrived in Britain, I felt that my ability to express myself had increased, but my desire to express myself decreased, and I no longer had the urge to express my opinion” (B.H, online interview, April 25, 2021).

Besides, many migrants stated that they did not prefer to speak about the political topic in Turkey. Moreover, they indicated that the ability to express depends on the subject and their position on the issue. Whether their opinions are consistent with the general policy of the Turkish government or not. For instance, they will not feel free to talk about intervening in Syrian or the refugees’ agreement with the EU.

The level of freedom of speech in the UK may be greater than in any other country. Still, the impact of multiple migrations is apparent on the migrants who feel that they can express their opinion, but there is fear within them that prevents them from speaking. Alternatively, sometimes, they lost the motivation to express their political thought due to their geographical distance from Syria. Also, in Turkey, the geographical spread and massive number of Syrians made political events related to Syria the focus of daily conversations.

“Brexit did not affect my decision to settle in Britain... But it affected me because my brother resides in France. This means that I must request a visa to visit him” (B.H, online interview, April 25, 2021).

Brexit, On 31 January 2020, the United Kingdom completed the withdrawal process from the European Union. Many migrants indicated that the UK's decision to leave the EU did not directly affect their decision to migrate to the UK and settle there. Nevertheless, there is a great fear among migrants of changing migration laws based on the agreement. In addition, the holders of the refugee travel document will have to request a visa before entering several European Union countries, which began to impose a visa on the holders of this document after Brexit. Mainly this visa will affect refugee families whose members reside in the UK and European countries.

decent life. If several people are working for one person, it is difficult to cover the costs” (S. AA, online interview, April 23, 2021).

Syrian refugees and residents in Turkey also struggle to obtain a work permit to work legally in Turkey. This is because the right of residence or temporary protection in Turkey is not accompanied by the right to work. Based on the ministry of labor and social security of the Republic of Turkey (ÇSGB, 2016);

- The employer should apply for work permits on behalf of the foreigner under temporary protection through the e-Government website.
- The foreigners should prove that they were under temporary protection for more than six months.
- Foreigners under temporary protection should apply for work just in the province where their temporary protection was registered.
- The number of employees under temporary protection should not be more than 10% of the employees who have Turkish citizens in the sample workplace.
- Foreigners’ temporary protection and proving that they were under PT for more than six months can participate in the Turkish Labor Institution's vocational training and workshops.

Despite the above points delivered by the ministry of labor and social security of the Republic of Turkey, which allow Syrian to work as a foreigner in Turkey, the employee at the labor market prefers Syrians who hold Turkish citizenship and speak Turkish. Due to the difficulty of obtaining a work permit for Syrians under temporary protection or residing on a short-term residence basis. Furthermore, many interviewed migrants mentioned that holding the Turkish Nationality became the primary requirement in any job offer regardless of the experiences or skills of the employee.

“It was never easy to find a work opportunity in Turkey. I have all the necessary experience, but I do not have Turkish citizenship or a work permit. It was the primary determinant because the employers preferred a Syrian with Turkish nationality, even if they had no experience” (M.M, online interview, May 24, 2021).

“Now [in the UK] the economic situation is excellent, and I have money from the governmental benefits in the bank... we can find a job. Also, the government qualify us to work, so I have a plan” (M. Sh, online interview, May 24, 2021).

"Life became difficult, but in the UK the currency is stable... The change is in small percentages. But in Turkey, prices of good have doubled several times" (M.K, online interview, May 9, 2021).

In addition, the exchange rate of the Turkish lira against foreign currencies and the inflation in the Turkish economy negatively affected the Syrian workers who receive their salary in Turkish lira. The figure below shows the exchange rate of the Turkish liar against the Pound sterling. At the same time, this factor was an attractive factor for Syrians who receive their salaries in foreign currencies. Those are working with international and local organizations as part of the humanitarian response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey and cross the border to Syria. Furthermore, many of them indicate that the average salaries of those jobs are very well. Still, it is unstable because the presence of these organizations is linked to the political context.



Figure 37. Exchange rate of TL to GBP based on <https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=TRY&to=GBP>

“Our economic class is basic, below the middle but is not bad. My relationship with sellers is superficial and routine. While in Turkey, it was deep and robust. Here, strong relations with sellers do not exist in addition to what I know of economic policies” (Z.N, personal interview, April 18, 2021).

“In the UK, which is different, I will start learning from scratch due to the difference in the labor market. Our financial situation is good and not very good as it was in Turkey” (B.B, online interview, April 21, 2021).

One of the primary difficulties migrants face in every migration journey is the changes in the labor market requirements. Therefore, they must start from scratch to build new experiences that fit the new market, and this is what happened with the Syrian migrants who lived in Turkey and moved to the UK. Also, the relationship between the agent and the customer differs from the Mediterranean countries and the UK. This type of relationship could be more profound and friendly in the MEAN region than in the UK, as many migrants mentioned.

However, the economic factor remains a significant factor in supporting or limiting the decision of migrants to move to a new country or stay in their current location. Both Turkey and the UK have strengths and weaknesses that differ from one migrant to another.

In the UK, the high cost of living and high taxation system may be unattractive for some migrants to come to settle there. On the contrary, many other factors could inspire migrants to choose the UK as a new destination, such as the strength of the currency, market stability and the availability of opportunities, especially after Brexit. In Turkey, the governmental encouragement in the economic context, opportunities for establishing private projects, and the emerging economy's strength may support migrants to stay in the country, especially those who receive their wages in hard currencies. Meanwhile, the Turkish lira exchange rate fluctuation and instability may push migrants to leave Turkey despite job opportunities.

“The demographic factor in the UK is very supportive of staying, the number of foreigners in London is more than the number of British people, it is a diverse city” (B.H, online interview, April 25, 2021).

Both Turkey and the United Kingdom are very diverse demographically. Turkey is hosting an enormous Arab community from Syrians and other Arab’s nationalities, supporting Syrian migrants to decide to stay in Turkey. On the contrary, migrants argue that the significant presence of Syrians in some Turkish cities such as Istanbul and the southeast of Turkey is increasing tension between the host community and refugees. Also, the large number of Syrians contributed significantly to the creation of isolated communities within the host communities. All of that may push some migrants to migrate to new destinations where they will not be a target. In the UK, the significant demographic diversity and the variety of migrants helps the Syrians to be part of this community and not dominate it as the case in Turkey.

From another perspective, many migrants indicate that the demographic factor is secondary, while the focus for migrants is on other factors, including improving the economic situation, long-term stability and obtaining official papers.

“It did not affect much. I need political and psychological stability much more than the weather factor” (O.K, online interview, May 17, 2021).

Weather, climate, and environmental factor are relevant factors for stability. Still, migrants from areas of armed conflict may not consider it among their priorities in the first stage in which they are still looking for the basics. The same case could apply to the Syrians who resided in Turkey for a while and then migrate to the United Kingdom. Some migrants may not find the weather as a factor that attracts them to move to the UK, but if they compared to other factors that affect the migrant’s decision, the weather might be considered a secondary factor. Furthermore, some migrants demonstrate that thinking about weather and climate is a luxury and not within the scope of thinking who fled wars.

The weather factor in Turkey is considered attractive to migrants due to Turkey’s climatic diversity and variety of seasons. At the same time, the weather is colder in the UK, with a noticeable absence of the sun on most days of the year. Furthermore, the climate and weather in Turkey are as close as it is to Syria. Therefore, many migrants consider it a supporting factor in their decision to remain in Turkey if other factors are available, including long-term stability. While some Syrians who came from the cold regions, such as the mountainous regions in rural Damascus or Homs, did not find it challenging to adapt to the cold weather in the UK.

From another perspective, some considered that the possibility of movement provided by the travel document that the UK provides to refugees in its territory might help alleviate this factor by travelling to warm countries on vacations. Moreover, some refugees also indicated the possibility of migrating again after getting British citizenship to warmer lands. Nevertheless, this migration is also not because of just the weather but a group of supporting factors, including improving the economic and social situation.

4.5.5 The impact of the social context on multiple migrations



Figure 40. Word cloud of the impact of the social context

“The culture was close, the language and the place. I do not need to build a new culture in Turkey. Instead, my Arab culture expanded to include Turkish and to become a part of it. I need to develop a new culture here [in the UK]” (Z.N, personal interview, April 18, 2021).

“What joins the Syrian society in Turkey is the political opinion and the political position, which led to mixing the social factor with the political” (O.K, online interview, May 17, 2021).

“My ability to integrate with the host community in the UK is more than in Turkey. It is easy to have a Spanish or Italian friend before Corona. My ability to be social in Turkey was more remarkable than in the UK, but my entire network was Syrians...I miss the social life in Turkey” (B.H, online interview, April 25, 2021).

“Relationships with the host community were in individual cases. Regarding the ability to find friends, it was easy due to the massive presence of the Syrians... Perhaps we did not communicate with the Turkish people because we have a small Syrian community and have our community” (Y.S, online interview, April 26, 2021).

There is a remarkable convergence between Arab and Turkish culture, traditions. Also, both communities have common religious and societal practices. Moreover, Turkey's details of daily life are very similar to Syria, making the migrants feel that they are not far from their social environment. All this made the social factor in Turkey a factor that inspires migrants to stay and limits their ability to decide to migrate to new destinations because of what they build from the social capital in Turkey.

“The presence of Syrians there [in Turkey] and a sizeable Syrian community helped us resist our desire to emigrate and push us to find alternative solutions” (H.H, online interview, May 3, 2021).

“The Turkish people are very similar to us, and this is more comfortable, but the problem is the language. But people who have learned Turkish can live comfortably with society” (A.L, online interview, April 30, 2021).

On the contrary, the large number of Syrians in Turkey made them a closed society. It reduced their need to integrate with the host society, mainly with exist of a different language. Moreover, the Syrians in Turkey may establish their community in their areas of presence. Furthermore, making new friends and building social relationships were very easy within this closed Syrian society and complicated with the host society. In addition, the Syrian society in Turkey was characterized by a dominant political tendency, which was the opposition. As a result, the political factor has a significant role in this society's formation, which may pressure some migrants who do not want to interfere with the political aspect.

“Here [the UK], you want to try to create this situation, and you are making an effort to create this social situation, yet it is still weak compared to Turkey” (A.M, online interview, April 25, 2021),

On the other hand, the social factor in the United Kingdom remains much weaker than in Turkey. Several factors affect this social aspect, including the difference in culture between Syria and the UK and the small number of Syrians compared to the large number in Turkey. Furthermore, the fact that the spread of COVID-19 had a significant impact on the social factor worldwide. Therefore, the social aspect will not be noticeable in the list of the inspiration of most migrants to the UK.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

5.1 Analytical Summary

Multiple migrations could label as a human contextual reaction to improve the current situation and increase the individual's well-being and their feeling of safety and security. Thus, some migrants could see the entire process as an investment in these regards, while others saw it as a mandatory action they were forced to do. Therefore, they do their best to reduce the cost of movement and enhance the return benefit.

Overall, Migrants suffer from a lack of clarity in making decisions before and during the migration journey and from anxiety and instability after reaching the destination country if they manage to make it there. For instance, irregular immigrants' plans could be changed based on risks and challenges on the road. Also, the reaction of authorities and the surrounding conditions at each station on migration roads could impact their plans. The spread of unofficial refugee camps along the road is evidence of these difficulties. Moreover, many migrants are forced to stay in those camps or changed their destination to other countries that were not among their previous options. Likewise, regular immigrants are always reluctant to decide according to the amount and accuracy of the information they can access or receive from their trusted and unreliable sources besides the effects of other factors on the macro, meso and micro levels.

Several factors at different levels influence the decision of migrants, where various elements of the macro-level either inspire Syrian refugees and migrants to stay in Turkey and integrate into the host community or think of migrating again to new destinations. Nevertheless, meso and micro-level elements play a crucial role in determining new destinations according to the migrant's awareness of their ability to cover the financial and non-financial migration costs demonstrated by the meso level. Migrants select the best path according to personal characteristics illustrated at the Micro level.

Changes in various priorities, needs, ambitions and aspirations of the same migrant in each migration step they undertake significantly affect their decisions to move and increase or decrease multiple migrations possibilities. In the case of Syrian who fled from the conflict areas in Syria to

Turkey, the top of priorities was seeking safety, protection, temporary stability, and primary livelihood conditions. With the hope of returning to Syria diminishing and managing to meet an essential part of these priorities, some migrants started to think about getting rid of the instability, building a stable life, and improve their life opportunities in long-term investment at the personal and family levels.

Likewise, regarding changing priorities in the selected sample, the data shows that migrants neglect the importance of some factors or consider them secondary in their first migration from Syria. These factors include environmental aspects, strong relationships, owning a home, citizenship, mobility, relationship with surrounding society, and other aspects, migrants neglect their importance or are considered secondary factors first migration from Syria. However, those factors return to be present in the list of top priorities in the second migration from Turkey to the United Kingdom or other destinations. Furthermore, they could consider the same factors as the main drivers for their further migrations from the United Kingdom. In addition, it should be noted that a change in these priorities is also directly related to an increase in the available options and an improvement in the preparation stage. Besides, considering the significant change in the resources available in each immigration due to new circumstances such as obtaining new travel documents, residence, or nationalities. Furthermore, the migration experience that the migrants acquire after each migration process allows them to manage their migration process more effectively and help them to choose between the available options with remarkable ability to anticipate risks and threats.

In the case of Syrians in Turkey, it was the first migration experience for many migrants, which made it the beginning of a unique experience and dealing with it without any previous experiences or expectations. As a result, their stay in Turkey was more difficult, even though it is cheaper than all of Europe. On the contrary, migrants whose second migration experience was Turkey could deal with the situation better, such as the Syrians who came from other neighboring countries or the Arab Gulf States to Turkey.

On the other hand, preparation for migration is an essential part that may outweigh the importance of the migration step itself. It is crucial to determine whether the migrants will succeed or not in their migration or other multiple migrations are needed. In the ideal situation, migrants take sufficient time to study, prepare and research all available options and choose the best one. Nevertheless, this preparation phase does not exist in the condition of refugees and migrants who

flee from areas of conflict and war, where they are often forced to migrate in circumstances that cannot be predicted or planned. Furthermore, as mentioned before, preparation should include the ability to access reliable and updated sources of information about the situation in the countries of destination and the route leading to those countries. Thus, that will reduce the possibilities of recurring migrations significantly, which happens in many cases due to blunder calculation of the tangible and intangible costs of the movement led by false information or even the arrival of migrants to a reality different from what they expected.

The impact of Micro-level and the individual characteristic on multiple migrations

Regarding the influence of individual characteristics on multiple migrations, they work perfectly together to affect migrants' decisions. For example, age group greatly influences migrants to integrate into new societies more than older ones. Therefore, we can see that young people can decide to stay or move. Still, the individual from an older age group would think a lot about the difficulty of beginning from scratch before taking any decision. Furthermore, gender and marital status have a massive impact in choosing the migration method for migrants. For example, irregular migrations are accompanied by high risks along the route, which threatens the migration of the most vulnerable groups through it. At the same time, regular immigration is associated with high financial costs and high legal requirements related to visas and residency in the host country. Furthermore, in the case of a family and many individuals, it will directly affect the mobility of migrants and their ability to decide, considering the high costs of movement and the safety of family members.

Religion and ethnicity also contribute significantly to determining the destinations that migrants may choose, and some may prefer to go to a specific destination that achieves religious and ethnic safety and comfort. Likewise, the religious and ethnic factors may encourage or limit migrants' decision to leave or stay based on the context surrounding them and its appropriateness to their religious and ethnic identity. In addition, the level of personal education and knowledge of foreign languages is a supportive factor for migrants even they decide to stay or migrate to new destinations. Also, it increases the available migration options through work, training, or study opportunities.

The impact of Meso level factors on multiple migrations

The ability of migrants to deal with meso level factors significantly contributes to the success of their migration or repeat it through multiple migrations to reach the desired goals. Firstly, potential migrants should be aware of the cost of movement they will pay due to their decisions. Also, they should be realistic regarding the benefits and returns they expect from their migration. As mentioned before, each movement in the multiple migrations has tangible and intangible costs. Moreover, the impact of those costs will be different from one individual to another based on their characteristics at the micro-level and surrounding context at the macro level. Another finding for the research is that migrants in multiple migrations prefer to reduce migration costs regarding integration and language learning, so they prefer to migrate to a country where they speak the language to gain as much time as possible.

In addition, the legal framework associated with migrants and migration policies is a critical factor that essentially controls the ability of migrants to make the appropriate decision. In some cases, it may be a reason for the migrants' inability to complete their journey, even if they have the ambition and motives for that migration. Nevertheless, it may be a supportive factor for them to open specific migration opportunities compatible with their legal framework, as in resettlement schemes for refugees and the most vulnerable groups.

The impact of Macro-level factors on multiple migrations

Regarding the political context, it is not just linked to a politic of the host country. However, the political framework of migrants may be a factor that supports or reduces the multiple migrations inspiration, as is the case in the severe political polarization of Syrians in Turkey, which contributes to pushing some migrants to leave to other less polarized destinations.

Also, Many Syrian migrants in Turkey see that Turkey's policy of supporting the Syrian opposition constitutes a supportive factor for them to stay in Turkey. Nevertheless, this makes the migrants' stability threatened by any change in Turkish internal politics in any future elections. Also, including refugee issues in internal political debates between political parties and government may increase the tension between refugees and the host community, negatively affecting the migrants' ability to settle and integrate into host societies. In this case, the political context will become a push factor for migrants inspiring them to move. In addition, many migrants mentioned that they are still afraid of deportation from Turkey to Syria, which is threatening their feeling of

stability and inspiring them to leave to another destination. Furthermore, Syrian immigrants in Britain feel less pressure from a political perspective, as Syrian migrants are not among the principal axes of internal political discussions. Nevertheless, many migrants consider that Brexit will negatively affect their movement and communication with their families in Europe.

Regarding the economic aspect, migrants always look for job stability, which is an inspiring factor for migrants moving between countries through multiple migrations. Nevertheless, with each move, migrants suffer from a change in the labour market and the needed experiences, which forces them to start from scratch in each movement. In addition, migrants' decision to leave or stay is also affected by the stability of the local economy and the economic policies, including investment Laws, the tax system, and the ability to work legally through official work permits and obtain health and social insurance. Wealthy migrants and investors recognise Turkey as a suitable place for stability and investment due to government facilities and support. In contrast, migrants with low wages suffer from daily work problems, which pushes them to migrate to a new destination.

Regarding the environmental context, some migrants may consider it a secondary factor to consider during the early stages of their multiple migrations. However, after the stability and improvement in their human capital, this factor appears to be an influential factor in determining the migration options as many migrants mentioned that they might move again to another country with better weather after ensuring other stability aspects.

The demographic and social context are key factors in determining the decisions of migrants where they are affected by their social surroundings in a way that influences their ability to integrate and interact with the host community or other migrants. For example, in Syrian migrants in Turkey, Syrians have become part of the Turkish demographic due to the large number and their distribution over the entire Turkish regions, which supports the migrants' decision to stay because of the ability to interact with the social surrounding. On the contrary, these large numbers of migrants may become a challenge due to closed societies or establishing societies where migrants are satisfied and limited by internal interaction with other same-origin migrants. This case threatens migrants' integration with the host community and prevents their long-term stability.

5.2 Future work and recommendations

Through working with the selected sample some on several topics and concluded results and the topics that should be focused on in future studies, include the following:

- The impact of multiple migrations on the migrants' identity and the variables associated with multiple movements and interaction with different societies on forming those identities.
- The impact of multiple immigration on the formation of migrant's families. To what extent do multiple migrations affect the size of immigrant families and their decisions to form stable families?
- The impact of multiple migrations on freedom of expression, the desire and ability of migrants to express their opinions freely.

All the topics mentioned above may contribute to an in-depth understanding of the drivers and impacts of multiple migrations.

In addition, the selected sample should include groups of potential migrants who desire to emigrate and have sufficient motives to move but do not have the ability to deal with the tangible and intangible costs of migration. Those may fall under the category of involuntary immobility. Finally, future research may work on the case studies of specific migrants over a long time to understand the events through the timeline of the multiple migrations.

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ANNEXES

Annex A: Semi-structured Interview Guideline

Interview Guideline:

Before starting the interview:

- Participation in this research is totally voluntary.
- Briefly introduce the topic of the research and the reason behind it.
- Inform the interviewee about the expected time of the interview. These interviews were designed and developed to be carried out in approximately 45 minutes.
- Collect the consent of the interviewee. Each interviewee's participation consent must be obtained and documented before commence requesting the answer to any of the interview questions. Also, consent to record the interview should be obtained and documented.
- The anonymity of the interviewee's identity is protected. Inform the interviewees that their identities and personal information will be protected. Also, any personal information will not be shared or published without their consent.
- All answers are welcomed where no right or wrong answer is. Nevertheless, the interview is seeking to explore the ideas, opinions, and experiences of each interviewee.
- Participation in this research is totally voluntary.

Annex B: the consent form

HASAN KALYONCU UNIVERSITY
Faculty of Economics, Administrative & Social Sciences
Political Science and International Relations Master's Program



Multiple Migration Flows of Syrians:

The Case of Syrians Changing Destinations from Turkey to the UK

Information sheet:

Dear interviewee, before your kind participation in the study through this semi-structured interview, it is essential to read this information carefully. If you agree with the following information, you can indicate your confirmation through the consent section below with your kind signature.

The goal of the study:

This study aims to provide a better understanding and explanations for the Multiple Migration Flows of Syrians. Moreover, why are Syrian refugee migrating from country to another?

Research Questions:

What are the causes and drivers behind the Multiple Migration Flows of Syrians? The Case of Syrians Changing Destinations from Turkey to the UK.

Research Objectives

- Discussion on the causes and drivers that push Syrian refugees to migrate from one destination to another. (2011 to 2020).
- Demonstrate why are Syrian refugees migrating from Turkey, after settling for a few years there, to other countries as second migration, mainly to the United Kingdom.

Your contribution:

You will participate in a semi-structured interview which will take approximately 45 minutes. All answers are welcomed, and there are no right or wrong answers. However, The interview seeks to explore the ideas, opinions, and experiences of each interviewee. Also, all interviews will be recorded and transcribed. You can request a copy of the interview transcript.

Purposes:

The interview will be used for a Master study in Political Science and International Relations. Also, It may contribute to publishing in academic journals, a dissertation and presented in public lectures.

Confidentiality:

The interview will be confidential. Moreover, the interviewee contributions will not be shared with any other individuals than the university team. The researcher is responsible for storing the data and keeping a separate record of your contact details to manage the data correctly and confidentially.

However, you will have the right to withdraw from the research by notifying the researcher (bilal.hazzouri@std.hku.edu.tr).



Consent form (tick as appropriate):

I voluntarily agree to participate and agree to the use of my responses for the purposes indicated above.

I do not wish to remain anonymous.

I am happy for my contributions to be used in academic/professional publications print/online (e.g., books, journal articles, conference papers).

I am happy for my contributions to be used in teaching (e.g., lectures, seminars, workshops).

I am happy for my contributions to be used in public lectures, presentations, talks and activities.

Date:		Date:	
Name of participant		Name of the researcher:	
Signature of participant:		Signature of researcher:	
Preferred contact - email or telephone:		Preferred contact - email or telephone:	bilal.hazzouri@std.hku.edu.tr +44 7310 684393 +90553 567 74 99

Annex C: Semi-structured interview Questions

Questionnaire to be conducted before the interview:

1. This short questionnaire will help collect the interview's primary data and provide the needed data for the descriptive analysis.
 - Name of the interviewee:
 - Age of the interviewee:
 - Gender:
 - Marital status:
 - The number of dependents:
 - Nationality:
 - Ethnic group:
 - Mother tongue:
 - Religion:
 - Education:
 - English Language level:
 - Work/ profession:
2. where did you live in Syria?
3. When did you leave Syria? To where?
4. How long did you stay in Turkey? And where?
5. What was your legal status in Turkey?
6. When did you arrive in the UK?
7. Where are you living in the UK?
8. What is your legal status in the UK?

Semi-structured interview Questions:

1. Could you tell us about your Migration journey, please?

Follow-up points:

- a. Why did you leave Syria?
- b. How many countries did you live in after leaving Syria?
- c. Why did you choose to migrate to Turkey? What expectations did you have?

- d. Why did you decide to migrate from Turkey? From where did the idea of migration from Turkey come?
- e. How did he get to the UK from Turkey? What is your journey path?
- f. Why did you choose the UK, not another country? What expectations did you have?

Multiple Migrations Drivers:

Micro-level: Individual characters:

In your opinion, what is the impact of personal characteristics on your decision? How did they increase or limit your ability to make a migration decision?

Follow-up points:

- Age:
- Gender:
- Education level:
- Religion:
- Marital status: & Family: The desire to reunite with family members
- Ethnicity:
- Language:

Meso-level

1. How do you describe the cost of moving? The tangible and intangible cost price, including the social network, stress, relationships, and other factors.?
2. How did the financial cost of moving to impact your decision? did it increase or limit your ability to make a migration decision?
3. How did the non-financial cost of moving, such as social networks, impact your decision? did it increase or limit your ability to make a migration decision?
4. What do you think you lost because of migrating from Turkey?
5. What do you think you gain because of migrating to The United Kingdom?
6. Did you have access to accurate information sources about the situation in the United Kingdom before moving there? What were these sources?
7. In your opinion, what is the impact of your legal framework, legal status in Turkey, your passport, visa requirements (if there are) on your decision? How did it increase or limit your ability to make a migration decision?

8. What is the impact of the education factor on your decision to migrate from Turkey?
Moreover, to migrate to or remain in the United Kingdom?
9. Did you feel settled OR NOT in Turkey? Why?
10. Do you feel settled OR NOT in the United Kingdom? Why?

Marco-level

The Political Context:

1. How do you describe the political context around you in Turkey? Considering political stability, freedom of speech, security, parties and politicians, fear of discrimination or persecution.

Follow-up questions:

- a. Were you subjected to or expect an exposure of any form of limitation of freedom or psychological or physical danger? Where?
 - b. What is the effect of your migration from Turkey to the United Kingdom on your feeling of safety and security?
2. How is your political situation in the United Kingdom? Considering political stability, freedom of speech, security, parties and politicians, fear of discrimination or persecution.
 3. How do you see the impact of the government migration policies in Turkey and the United Kingdom on your decision of migration?
 4. Do you consider Turkey's political situation as a reason to leave or stay in the country, and why?
 5. What is the political factor's impact (including Brexit) on your decision to migrate to or remain in the United Kingdom?

The Economic Context:

1. How was your economic situation in Turkey? Considering job opportunities, incomes, Consumer prices, the relation between producer-consumer, Government policy.

2. How is your economic situation in the United Kingdom? Considering job opportunities, incomes, Consumer prices, the relation between producer-consumer, Government policy.

Follow-up questions:

- a. What do you think about the possibility of finding suitable job opportunities in Turkey and the United Kingdom?
3. Where do you think your personal economic situation is better in Turkey or United Kingdom? And why?
4. Do you consider Turkey's economic situation as a reason to leave or stay in the country and why?
5. What is the impact of the economic factor on your decision to migrate to or remain in the United Kingdom?

The Demographic Context:

6. What was the impact of the size of Turkey's Syrian population on your life (social life, work, relations,)?
7. Do you consider Turkey's demographic situation as a reason to leave or stay in the country, and why?
8. What is the impact of the demographic factor on your decision to migrate to or remain in the United Kingdom?

The Environment (CLIMATE) Context:

1. Do you consider the Environment (CLIMATE)in Turkey as a reason to support the decision to settle or move from the country, and why?
2. What is the environmental (CLIMATE) factor's impact on your decision to migrate to or remain in the United Kingdom?

The social context:

1. How was your social situation in Turkey? Considering culture, traditions, cultural practices, social network, making friends, relation with the host community, Integration.

2. How is your social situation in the United Kingdom? Considering culture, traditions, cultural practices, social network, making friends, relation with the host community, Integration.
3. Do you consider the social Context in Turkey as a reason to leave or stay in the country and why?
4. What is the impact of the social factor on your decision to migrate to or remain in the United Kingdom?

Closing:

1. Do you think of leaving the United Kingdom to another country soon? Why?
2. Do you want to come back to Syria one day? Why, under which conditions?
3. Do you want to come back to Turkey one day? Why, under which conditions?
4. Would you like to add any notes or comments?

Thank you so much for your time. You will receive a copy of your answer.